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Abstract
This thesis consists of three main chapters, which address different but re-
lated research questions, using original data collected during extensive field work in
the Bangladeshi garment industry.
After the introduction, Chapter 2 addresses possible reasons for the low share of
women in supervisory positions in the Bangladeshi garment sector. Despite women
making up 80% of the workers in the sector, they hold less than 10% of supervisory
positions. Together with local partners, we designed a randomized intervention in
which we trained equal numbers of male and female workers for supervisory posi-
tions, and placed them as supervisors on randomly selected sewing lines in their
factories. Initially, lines with male trainees showed higher productivity, though this
difference vanished after two months. Surveys of workers in the factories show that
workers on all levels regard women as lacking the technical expertise to be good su-
pervisors, while their leadership and other soft skills are regarded more favourably.
However, extensive knowledge testing revealed that women have no less technical
expertise, while management exercises and especially self rated ability revealed that
women lack confidence and leadership skills compared to their male peers. This
points to a mismatch between perceived and actual weaknesses of women as super-
visors in that industry, which could prevent the management from taking effective
measures to bring more women into supervisor roles.
Chapter 3 studies the effect of knowledge exchange among line supervisors in these
factories on productivity. Specifically, it addresses the wide spread practice in eco-
nomics to measure learning among co-workers through productivity increases, which,
however, could also be caused by other peer effects, such as competition or imitation.
I show that similar productivity increases as commonly used as evidence for learn-
ing are prevalent in situations in which learning is unlikely. However, a randomized
communication intervention implemented by the respective factory management at
three factories shows that knowledge exchange on production processes among work-
ers indeed increases the efficiency of workers. There is furthermore some evidence
that this effect was stronger between socially connected workers.
This effect of social ties in the communication intervention was based on social
network data collected among supervisors in four garment factories. Chapter four
discusses this network data in more detail, thereby contributing to several ongoing
debates in network research.
ix
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Chapter 1
Introduction
There has been a recent surge in interest in development economics into studying
firms in low income countries, mainly spurred by research showing that these firms
exhibit widely differing productivity levels even within narrowly defined sectors,
which could also explain the overall lower productivity in these economies (Hsieh
and Klenow [2009]; Banerjee and Duflo [2005]). Furthermore, many large firms in
developing countries do not implement simple management techniques which could
greatly enhance their productivity (Bloom et al. [2013]). This could be due to low
competitive pressure, or too burdensome regulatory environments and low levels
of generalized trust which makes firms reluctant to involve managers from out-
side the founder family who could introduce better management techniques (Bloom
et al. [2013]; Bandiera et al. [2015]). Unfavourable pay-schemes, which disincen-
tivise workers to cooperate in the implementation of productivity increasing new
technologies remain in place due to a lack of managerial expertise in many of these
firms (Atkin et al. [2015]). Furthermore, ethnic and other kind of conflicts in many
low income countries directly play out in these firms and affect their productivity
(Hjort [2014]; Ksoll et al. [2010]; Kato and Shu [2011]).
This thesis contributes to the rapidly expanding body of research on large
firms in developing countries in the context of the Bangladeshi garment industry.
Bangladesh has over the last years emerged as the third largest garment exporter
in the world,1 and its vast garment sector, consisting of more than 5,000 large ex-
port oriented factories, provides a unique laboratory to study the opportunities and
challenges that large firms in developing countries face (IGC [2014]). Furthermore,
these factories, or at least the large share among them which is specialized in knit
1Source: WTO, International Trade Statistics 2014: www.wto.org/english/res e/statis e/its e.htm
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and woven garments, are remarkably homogeneous in their internal operations. All
factories consist of at least three production departments: cutting, sewing, and fin-
ishing. 50-80% of the workforce is employed in the sewing departments, which are
usually organized into parallel sewing lines, each designed so that the whole sewing
process of a garment can be completed on one line. The sewing lines can therefore
be considered as independent production units under the roof of one factory. Also,
the sewing workforce is remarkably homogeneous across the knit and woven facto-
ries, being around 80% female and between 18 to 30 years old. Unless promoted to
supervisory, mechanic, or quality control positions, which overwhelmingly happens
only to males, workers typically drop out of the sector in their 30s (Chapter 2 of
this thesis studies in detail the reasons for the extremely low promotion rates of fe-
male workers to higher positions in these factories). And even though factories vary
widely with respect to their age, professionalism of their management, and adher-
ence to regulations, this is not reflected in the pay of their ordinary workers, which
generally follows government set levels for workers ‘grades’, such as ‘helper’, ‘ma-
chine operator’, or ‘multi-task machine operator’.2 Anecdotal evidence also shows
that factories are not differentiated in which type of workers they hire, such as al-
ready experienced workers, or older or younger ones. Due to high worker turnover,
factories constantly need to hire new workers, and usually train the new hires them-
selves for the required tasks. These characteristics lead to a setting in which a
large number of factories with very similar organizational set-up and workforce, but
considerable variation in management techniques, exist in a geographically small
area. This presents a unique setting to study the interplay between management
and productivity in a development context.
This thesis consists of three chapters on different but related research ques-
tions, using original data collected in extensive field work at several dozen gar-
ment factories in Bangladesh. The first chapter, written jointly with Christopher
Woodruff, Rocco Macchiavello, and Atonu Rabbani, addresses the strong gender
imbalance when it comes to supervisory positions in the garment factories. While
80% of the sewing workforce in the factories on average is female, women make up
less than 10% on even the lowest supervisory positions. This question has poten-
tially wide reaching implications, since if female supervisors were actually better at
directing the overwhelmingly female workforce, the factories would forgo possible
productivity increases by sticking with male supervisor, in a sector which is subject
2This relates primarily to the nominal pay of workers, according to their contract. Factories
could still differ in the reliability with which they pay wages, or the arbitrariness with which they
deduct sums from the wages for various reasons.
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to strong price pressure and international competition. We gave to equal numbers
of male and female workers, who were selected by factories as possible candidates for
promotion to supervisory positions, a six week long intensive training program de-
signed by the German bilateral development agency (GIZ), and subsequently placed
them for a two months trial as assistant supervisors on randomly selected lines. Dur-
ing the trial phase, lines receiving a male trainee seemed to profit in terms of higher
productivity, while those receiving female trainees did not, with the difference being
statistically significant. However, this difference vanished in the subsequent months,
with the lines which received female trainees catching up in terms of productivity.
We accompanied the intervention with extensive surveys of workers on different
levels in the factories, which revealed a number of additional insights. Workers in
general rate men as more able supervisors. This gap was mainly driven by a per-
ceived advantage of male supervisors in technical knowledge about machines and
production processes, while women were rated little worse compared to men in lead-
ership and communication skills. However, in tests on technical knowledge about
garment production conducted at the beginning of the training session, no differ-
ence in technical expertise between female and male trainees could be found. On
the other hand, men have much more confidence in their ability as supervisors com-
pared to women, and women do somewhat worse at leadership exercises. However,
these differences disappeared in later survey rounds after the training and trial as
supervisor. We also found that the perceptions about female supervisors, especially
among male workers, do improve if the worker has actually worked under a female
supervisor. Taking these results together, we think they point towards a mismatch
in perceived and actual weaknesses of women as supervisors in the local garment
industry, shared by workers and managers. Women are perceived to lack technical
knowledge for the supervisor job, while in fact the evidence points towards a lack
in confidence and leadership skills, which however, seems to fade quickly with some
training and experience. However, wrong perceptions about the mismatch could
prevent the management to take effective action to increase the numbers of female
supervisors.
The second chapter addresses organizational learning in these factories, or
the question to which extend workers can profit from production knowledge gained
by their co-workers in the factory. Organizational learning has long been assumed
to be a key driver of productivity growth in firms (Arrow [1962]; Lucas [1993]).
However, the study of the effect of knowledge exchange on worker productivity is
difficult, as such knowledge exchange is usually difficult to observe. The literature
3
often measures learning by increases in productivity if others have already worked
on the same product. However, this risks confounding the effect of knowledge ex-
change with other peer effects, such as competition. I demonstrate this problem by
showing that in Bangladeshi garment factories, sewing lines are more productive in
the first days they produce a new garment, the more of the garment has already
been produced on other lines before. However, similar effects on productivity can
also be found among first lines that produce a garment which has not yet been pro-
duced on any other line before, if more than one line start producing the garment on
the same day. As no other lines have produced this garment before in these situa-
tions, learning effects are unlikely to drive these increases. To clarify to what extent
knowledge exchange between workers contributes to these productivity increases, a
communication intervention was implemented at three Bangladeshi garment facto-
ries. On randomly selected sewing floors, whenever a sewing line started to produce
a new garment which had already been produced on another line before, the line
chief from the line that already produced it was sent by the production manager
to brief the line chief who now also started producing the garment. I show that
these briefings increased productivity of the sewing lines on the first two days they
produced the new garment, before the line would reach its long run productivity
levels again. This provides novel experimental evidence that knowledge exchange
indeed drives productivity increase in firms. There is furthermore some evidence
that this effect was stronger when the line chief reported social ties to the line chief
who provided the briefing.
The result on the interaction of the randomized communication intervention
with social ties is based on survey data on social connections among line chiefs,
which I collected in four Bangladeshi garment factories. While Chapter 3 studies
one of the possible effects of these social ties, increasing knowledge exchange be-
tween socially connected worker, Chapter 4 discusses the characteristics of these
social networks in more detail and tests to what extent several network formation
models can explain these characteristics. The line chief networks exhibit low levels
of density and high levels of clustering, a common characteristics of empirical so-
cial networks, which many network formation models struggle to replicate. I show
that in the context of my data, a simple block random graph model, with blocks
defined on the level of the sewing floors in the factories, does capture both density
and clustering levels surprisingly well. The high levels of clustering in the network
data could be driven by line chiefs forming ties within small spatial units. This
suggests that the ubiquitous high levels of clustering observed in empirical social
4
networks could also more generally be caused by social ties being formed in very
localized interactions. In a further contribution, the chapter shows that lagged in-
degree of line chiefs predicts to what extend newly arriving line chiefs form social
ties with existing line chiefs. While this ‘rich-get-richer’ phenomenon is interesting
in its own right, this results also confirms a central underlying assumption of the
popular preferential attachment random graph model (Barabasi and Albert [1999];
Jackson [2008]).
To conclude, this thesis uses the unique setting of the Bangladeshi garment
sector, which consists of a large number of fairly homogeneous large firms in close
spatial proximity, to contribute to several research questions. It provides suggestive
evidence that wrong perceptions about the strengths and weaknesses of female super-
visors hold back women from advancing to roles with more responsibilities and pay.
It furthermore shows that communication of production knowledge among workers
on the same level in the factory hierarchy spurs productivity, and contributes to the
understanding of social network formation in the workplace. The following three
chapters will discuss this work in more detail.
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Chapter 2
Challenges of Change:
An Experiment Training
Women to Manage in the
Bangladeshi Garment Sector
Joint with Rocco Macchiavello1, Atonu Rabbani2, and
Christopher Woodruff3
2.1 Introduction
Management of large firms in low-income countries is highly variable and poor on
average (Bloom et al. [2012]). While the recent literature has focused on the broad
set of management practices pioneered by Bloom and Reenen [2007], effective man-
agement – including the adoption of such practices – rests on successfully managing
relationships and perceptions in the workplace (Gibbons and Henderson [2012]).
This observation shifts our attention from practices to managers. With shortages of
qualified managers perceived to be an important barrier to better management in
developing countries (McKinsey [2011]), we still know little about how companies
in low-income countries develop and select managerial talent.
1University of Warwick
2University of Dhaka
3University of Warwick
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Figure 2.1: Female Worker and Manager in the
Garment Industry, U.S. vs. Bangladesh
Note: Figure shows the historical evolution of the share of fe-
male workers and managers in the US garment industry, and
compares it against the current shares in the Bangladeshi indus-
try. US Data from Ruggles et al. [2010], Bangladeshi data own
calculations.
We study mid-level management in the ready-made garment industry in
Bangladesh, a sector with more than 4,000 factories, employing around 4 million
workers and accounting for an estimated 12 percent of Bangladesh’s GDP. Besides
its intrinsic relevance, the sector provides an ideal context to study mid-level man-
agers. The sewing section in a typical factory is organized along several production
lines employing between 20 and 80 workers (operators) managed by mid-level man-
agers (line supervisors). We focus on one distinctive feature of the industry: while
women account for about 75 to 80 percent of workers in the sewing operations,
men account for around 95 percent of supervisors and higher-level managers. The
situation is stark: Figure 2.1 contrasts employment patterns in Bangladesh with
the historical evolution in the United States and shows just how strong the gender
imbalance is in Bangladesh.
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Why are there so few female supervisors? Does this gender imbalance result
in a large misallocation of managerial talent in the sector? To address these ques-
tions, we start from a simple observation: in a static sense, managerial capital is
misallocated if the marginal female supervisor is more effective than the marginal
male supervisor.4 If this was the case, factories could improve efficiency by promot-
ing additional women and fewer men.5
Empirically, we face several challenges. First, given there are so few female
supervisors to begin with, it is difficult to identify the marginal female supervisor.
To overcome this problem, we implement a six-week operator-to-supervisor training
program in 24 factories.6 The program induces factories to try out (and possibly
promote) more female supervisors than they otherwise would. Second, we need to
observe the performance of both male and female line supervisors. We implement
an experimental design in which upon returning from training, trainees are tried
as assistant supervisors on randomly assigned production lines. This allows us to
identify the causal impact of having a female supervisor on performance. We then
compare the performance of females and males trained in the program, and the re-
sponse of operators working for them, using both very detailed production data and
in-factory surveys. Finally, we recognize that the initial lack of female supervisors
poses additional interpretative challenges to the test outlined above. We implement
uniquely detailed baseline surveys and diagnostics tools with workers and managers
at all levels in the factories to understand what supervisors are expected to do and
compare perceptions and reality of women’s relative abilities within the relevant
pool.
We show four sets of results. First, we ask what supervisors (are supposed
to) do, and what are the perceived weaknesses of females as supervisors. Across
4Note that the observation is correct for any distribution of potential supervisor’s effectiveness
across genders. In particular, it is possible that in the current industry equilibrium men self-select
and/or invest in additional skills with the expectation of becoming supervisors. This could result in
the pool of men available for promotion being on average better than the pool of available women
for promotion.
5Large inefficiencies would be at odds with the fact that all factories in our sample are large ex-
porters operating in highly competitive product markets. A large literature shows that competition
increases efficiency (Syverson; Foster et al. [2008]; Backus [2014]), improves management practices
(Bloom and Reenen [2007]; Bloom et al. [2012]) and that export status is associated with higher
productivity (Bernard et al. [2007]) and better management (Bloom et al. [2015]). On the other
hand the factories in our setting are typically owned by a small group of investors and might face
lower pressure on the financial market side.
6The training program was designed by the German bilateral aid agency, Deutsche Gesellschaft
fu¨r Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), together with local training companies.
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eight broadly defined sets of tasks, we find remarkable agreement across hierarchical
layers in the factories about what supervisors are supposed to be doing. There is also
remarkable agreement in the factory that women are weaker than men in essentially
all eight dimensions. In particular, women are perceived to be less competent than
man in understanding machines and operations – crucially, the most important task
for a supervisor from the point of view of operators. These negative perceptions
are less strong, but nevertheless present, among female operators and among those
operators with experience working under a female supervisor.
Second, we compare these perceptions to reality. Before the training began,
we conducted an extensive skills assessment with the trainees. Three results emerge.
First, there is no difference in technical knowledge of machines and operations be-
tween male and female trainees – despite the widely held opinion to the contrary.
Second, in simple leadership exercises women are less likely to be selected by their
team for a leadership position and women perform slightly worse in an exercise in
which they instruct other team members to perform a simple task. Third, in essen-
tially all eight broad tasks female rate themselves as being less good than existing
supervisors while male trainees do not.7
Third, we examine the performance of male and female trainees once they
return from the training. Two sets of results emerge. First, immediately upon re-
turning from training female trainees underperform relative to male trainees. This
initial gap in performance is measured both using surveys of operators supervised
by the trainees as well as detailed daily line-level production data. The gap in
performance, however, completely closes after few months working on the line as
supervisors. In simulated management exercises, female trainees outperform male
trainees on average but not when managing small teams that include a male oper-
ator.
Finally, we explore attitudes of male operators exposed to the program.
These are of particular importance given that the bulk of future line supervisors
is currently recruited from this pool. Two results stand out: first, male operators
exposed to female trainees improve their view of female as supervisors (but less than
female operators do). Second, male operators exposed to female trainees are more
pessimistic about their prospects of being later promoted to supervisor roles and
7Relative to male trainees, female trainees also have lower education levels, numeracy skills and
factory experience.
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expect to work for a shorter period of time in the factory. In short, the promotion
of female supervisor appears to demotivate male workers.
Taken all together, these results portray a nuanced but comprehensive pic-
ture of the causes and consequences of gender imbalance in the sector. The evidence
is consistent with an industry equilibrium in which factories haven’t experimented
with female supervisors due to misperceptions about their relative effectiveness. The
fact that misperceptions are widespread across the organization – including among
workers and potential female supervisors themselves – supports this equilibrium by
requiring simultaneous changes in beliefs. In a static sense, even a profit maximizing
manager with correct beliefs might not promote women if - in our case - he believes
other co-workers won’t respond adequately due to their beliefs. Dynamically, such
a manager might believe workers’ perceptions can be aligned to reality, but at the
cost of alienating and demotivating male operators – from which the bulk of man-
agerial talent is still likely to be supplied to the factory in the short-run. In the
conclusions, we distil some implications of this interpretation for our understanding
of organization’s failure to adopt adequate management practices, the sources and
consequences of gender imbalances in general, and the design of policies that could
ameliorate those.
This paper contributes to different strands of literature. It complements a
literature examining the causes and consequences of the (lack of) female leadership.
Although there are numerous contributions studying the gender gap in labour mar-
kets and in the private sector (see, e.g., Bertrand et al. [2014]; Matsa and Miller
[2013]; Bertrand and Hallock [2000]; Dezso¨ and Ross [2012]; Glover et al. [2015]),
our work is conceptually closer to studies of female politicians in India by Chat-
topadhyay and Duflo [2004] and Beaman et al. [2009].8
As Chattopadhyay and Duflo [2004] we focus on establishing the causal im-
pact of female leaderships on outcomes. As Beaman et al. [2009] we emphasize
the importance and evolution of perceptions of female leaderships. Our analysis,
however, needs to be adapted to reflect the operations and incentives of large firms
operating in a competitive export sector. First, the performance - not just the ap-
pointment - of female leaders is affected by beliefs and perceptions of co-workers.
Second, we investigate the costs associated with appointing female leaders.
8Some of our results are also related to a large experimental literature documenting gender differ-
ences in attitudes and preferences, see, e.g., Gneezy and Rustichini [2004]; Niederle and Vesterlund
[2007]; Niederle et al. [2013].
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In so doing, the paper also contributes to the literature on management and
productivity (see, e.g., Hsieh and Klenow [2009]; Bloom and Reenen [2007]; Bloom
et al. [2012, 2013]; Bruhn et al. [2012]; McKenzie and Woodruff [2015]).9 The work
by Bloom and various co-authors raises a puzzle: the management practices they
study are well-known and seemingly simple to implement. Why do firms fail to
implement them? Gibbons and Henderson [2012] argue that changing practices is
actually quite complex, both because individual practices are complementary to one
another (see also Ichniowski et al. [1997]) and because management involves both
formal rules and informal norms. Managers may know what is wrong, know how
to fix what is wrong, but yet be unable to implement the required changes because
they are unable to shift the equilibrium of the game between managers and workers
(or between managers at different levels of the hierarchy). Our research design and
emphasis on understanding misalignment of perceptions within the firm borrows
from this perspective. The difficulties of implementing change echo recent work by
Atkin et al. [2015] in the soccer ball industry in Pakistan. They document workers
resisting to a new technology. We highlight how resistance to change is embedded
into a set of norms and perceptions we set out to measure.
Finally, the paper contributes to our understanding of the garment sector in
Bangladesh and elsewhere. Historically, the sector has represented one of the first
opportunities for women to enter the formal labor force. Heath and Mobarak [2015]
and Atkin [2009] study the relationship between garments, female labour force par-
ticipation and schooling in Bangladesh and Mexico respectively. Mid-level managers
in the industry are also studied by Schoar [2011] and Achyuta et al. [2014] with dif-
ferent focus and research design.
9There are two additional methodological contributions of the paper. With respect to the pro-
ductivity literature, the paper uses a physical measure of productivity in a multi-product industry
with product differentiation. Line-level productivity is measured taking advantage of “standard
minute values” which allow to convert units of differentiated garment pieces into standardized mea-
sures of time value of output. With respect to the literature on the evaluation of training program,
we directly investigate the impact of the training on productivity, not just on the wages paid to
trainees. This is important as for a variety of reasons wages might fail to reflect the marginal value
of labour.
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2.2 Design and Data
The training program we implement was designed by GIZ, the German bilateral aid
agency, in conjunction with local training companies. GIZ’s goal in developing the
program was to increase the number of women working as supervisors in the sector.
The training was viewed as important to build skills of female operators, and to
convince factories that women were equipped to be supervisors. The training lasts
six weeks, with eight-hour sessions held at the classrooms at the training providers
offices on six days per week. The curriculum was divided more or less equally into
modules on production planning and technical knowledge, quality control, and lead-
ership and social compliance. We initially contracted with three training providers
and then later selected one of them with the capacity to conduct all of the sessions.
The project was carried out in two phases. Phase 1 began in November 2011
and continued through February 2013, with 56 factories sending five participants
each to training. After analysing the data from the first phase, we made several
changes to the project design and launched the second phase in February 2014.
Lessons from the first phase were incorporated into the design of the second phase.
As a result of incorporating the initial lessons, the quality of the data are gener-
ally higher in the second phase. Aside from a management simulation exercise that
we conducted only in Phase 1, we rely on the data from the second phase in the
analysis. We describe the design for the second phase here, and refer the reader to
Appendix A for a description of the design of the first phase.
In the second phase of the project we worked with direct and indirect suppli-
ers of a large UK-based buyer. We started with a pool of 26 suppliers of woven and
light-knit products located in the Dhaka area.10 The buyer invited these suppliers
to an information session in February 2014. At the end of the information session,
24 factories expressed interest in the project, all of whom ultimately participated.11
We asked each factory to consider the expected demand for new supervisors
in the factory in the months following training, and to select a number of trainees
matching that demand. Because the size of the factories varied and because, for
10We limited the sample to the Dhaka area for logistical reasons and to woven and light-knit
because production in these products is organized by sewing lines in Bangladeshi factories. Direct
suppliers are managed by employees working directly for the buyer; indirect suppliers are managed
on behalf of the buyer by intermediaries.
11Five of the factories sent operators to the first training session, but dropped out in the second
half of the program.
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example, some factories were planning to open new production lines, the number
of trainees varied from as few as four to as many as 24. Where an even number
of trainees was provided, we asked factories to select an equal number of male and
female trainees. Where an odd number of trainees was selected, we asked them
to select one more female than male. We informed the factories that much of the
training material was written, and therefore the trainees needed to have at least
basic literacy skills. We gave them no other criteria, but did encourage them to
involve managers down to at least the line chief level in the decisions. The fac-
tories sent 99 males and 100 female trainees to the training centre for the initial
diagnostic. Note that this represents a significant push toward female supervisors,
as in the typical factory only around 4 percent of supervisors were female at baseline.
We scheduled four training sessions, the first beginning March 9th, 2014 and
the last beginning June 1st, 2014. Each factory was randomly allocated to training
rounds 1 and 3 or to training rounds 2 and 4, and the trainees from the factory were
randomly assigned to receive early or late training. Randomization at the trainee
level was stratified on gender so that a nearly equal number of female and male
trainees were trained in each session.
Training sessions met six days per week for roughly eight hours per day, and
the training lasted six weeks. Factories agreed to give each trainee a six- to eight-
week trial as an assistant line supervisor immediately after the end of the training
program. We asked factories to identify the lines which were suitable for the trainee
trials and to identify an experienced supervisor working on each of those lines who
could act as a mentor for the trainee. On the penultimate day of training, we in-
vited the mentor supervisors to the training centre and matched them randomly
with one of the trainees from their factory – thus assigning the trainee randomly to
a production line for the trial period. On the day the mentors attended the train-
ing centre, we conducted a series of team building exercises between trainees and
mentors. After the six- to eight-week trial, factories were free to return the trainee
to a position as operator, leave them as an assistant supervisor, or promote them
to supervisor.
There was dropout of trainees at various points, detailed in Figure 1. The
factories initially selected 121 females and 96 males for training. All were invited to
the training centre for the initial assessment. On the allocated day, 100 females and
99 males actually showed up. Twenty-one females declined to come to the training
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Figure 2.2: Selection, Training, Trial and Promotion of Trainees
Note: Figure shows the number of female (red bars) and male (blue bars) trainees which participated
or dropped out in different stages of the project, and which got promoted to supervisor levels in
their factories.
centre, either because they decided they did not want to be supervisors or because
of resistance from their families. Meanwhile, three additional males came as some
factories replaced the females who declined to attend. Admission to the full training
program depended on passing the literacy and numeracy test administered at the
training centre. The literacy exam was developed in conjunction with researchers
at BRAC University.12 Nominees were disqualified if they scored zero on either the
literacy or numeracy exam, or if they scored below 25 percent on both parts of the
exam. Eleven females and 18 males did not pass the literacy / numeracy thresh-
old. An additional three females and five males were disqualified for other reasons,
mainly either because the factory sent a male rather than a female.13 Finally, after
the assessment day, 13 females and four males decided they did not want to com-
plete training and dropped out of the program. The remaining sample, all of whom
completed the training course, was 73 females and 72 males. Figure 1 also shows the
number of trainees working as a supervisor at various points after training, which
we discuss in more detail below.
12The literacy/numeracy test was developed by Sameeo Sheesh and Badrul Alam of BRAC Uni-
versity’s Institute of Education Development (IED). The content is based on the skills required to
benefit from the Operator to Supervisor Training material, and content taught in grades 5 through
8.
13In a couple of cases, the literacy exam was mismarked so that a failing score was given when
the exam was a marginal pass.
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2.2.1 Data
We conducted surveys on six separate occasions. Prior to the start of training, but
after factories nominated the trainees, we conducted a baseline survey at the fac-
tory and a combined survey and skills assessment for the trainees at the training
centre, which took a full day. In addition to gathering basic information on demo-
graphics, work history and attitudes, we assessed knowledge of skills and production
processes, conducted communication, teaching and leadership exercises, and tested
numeracy, literacy and non-verbal reasoning skills. The assessment is described in
more detail below.
Near the end of the six-week training program, we asked factories to nomi-
nate a number of production lines equal to the number of trainees where the trainees
would work as assistant supervisors for a period of at least six to eight weeks. We
also asked the factory to nominate one existing supervisor from each of these lines
who would serve as a mentor for the trainee. We then randomly assigned the trainees
to one of the nominated lines / mentors. With the list of lines and mentors in hand,
we conducted a baseline survey in the factory just prior to the start of the trail. For
the factory survey, we surveyed line operators, line supervisors, line chiefs, assistant
production managers, production managers and HR managers. Three operators and
all of the supervisors and line chiefs were surveyed at the lines where trainees would
have their trial. Line chiefs from the lines where trainees were working at the start
of the training were also surveyed. The three operators were randomly selected from
the line in a way which ensured that at least two of these operators work directly
under the mentor supervisor, and that we select both male and female operators
wherever possible.
On the last day of the training, the mentors were invited to the training cen-
tre and paired with their matched trainee. We conducted team building exercises
and also conducted a follow-up survey and skills assessment. The purpose of this
survey and assessment was to capture any effects of the training on trainees, and to
measure the skills of experienced mentor supervisors for comparative purposes. At
the end of the six- to eight-week trail period, we again invited the trainees back to
the training centre for refresher sessions and group discussions of their experience
during the trial. We also conducted a final skills assessment for trainees to measure
the effect of the factory trial.
The fifth survey was conducted in the factory after the trial period ended. We
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again surveyed three randomly selected operators, the supervisors and line chiefs of
the lines that were nominated for the trial, and the assistant production managers,
production managers, and HR managers. In addition, where there was either non-
compliance with the assignment of trainees to lines, or where trainees had moved
from the assigned line to another line after the trail began, we surveyed lines which
were not nominated for the trial, but where trainees were actually working as assis-
tant supervisors.
Finally, we conducted a second follow-up survey in the factory either two- or
five months after the trial ended. The survey sample was selected using the same
criteria as the previous factory survey. Operators and supervisors were surveyed
from lines where a trainee was working as either an assistant line supervisor or a
line supervisor. In addition, all of the trainees were surveyed in-person if they were
still working at the same factory, and over the phone, if they had left.
In addition to the face-to-face surveys, we conducted telephone follow-up
surveys with trainees at regular intervals. During the six- to eight-week trial, we
contacted the trainees every week to track the line they were working on, and the
level of responsibility given to them. We also asked the trainees to keep a daily
diary of their experience working as an assistant supervisor or supervisor. After
the trial ended, we contacted the trainees every month until March 2015 (four to
nine months after the trial) to track where they were working, and their designation.
In addition to the survey data, we also collected daily line-level production
data from each factory. We describe these data in more detail in Appendix B and
in Section 2.6 below.
2.2.2 Characteristics of Trainees
Table 2.1 shows basic demographic and skills data for the pool of trainees, compared
to existing supervisors and random operators where the comparison data are avail-
able. Compared with a sample of random operators, the trainees have two additional
years of schooling and just more than half a year more tenure in the factory. Age,
marital status and experience in the garment sector are similar to other operators.
We split the supervisor sample into mentors and non-mentors for the purposes of
comparing trainees with existing supervisors. We see that, while the trainees have
much more schooling than typical operators, they have almost a year less schooling
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than typical supervisors. They are also 4.7 years younger with 2.3 years less expe-
rience in the sector. However, the age of the trainees is statistically identical to the
age of the random supervisors at the time of their promotion to supervisor. With
regard to the relative skills of female- and male trainees (not shown on table), we
find that females are just over a year younger (p=0.05), but there are no differences
in schooling or experience.
Whether the trainees have less schooling than existing supervisors because
factories face a shortage of workers with higher schooling levels, or whether the fac-
tories have not selected the very best supervisory talent for the training program
is not clear. But while 62 percent of existing supervisors have at least a lower sec-
ondary certificate (that is, they have passed O-level exams), only 14 of 430 random
operators (3 percent) have achieved this level of education. This suggests that fac-
tories do face a very limited pool of workers with education levels comparable to the
pool of existing supervisors. This, combined with the age and experience profiles
of the trainees suggests that the factories selected trainees in a manner similar to
those selected in the usual promotion routine.
We can also compare the skills of trainees and the mentor supervisor using
tests administered at the training centre during the skills assessment, though we
lack similar data for other operators and supervisors. The bottom half of Table 2.1
shows that the literacy and numeracy scores of the trainees are significantly below
those of the mentor supervisors. These data provide further evidence that the skills
of the trainees are below those of the mentor supervisors.
2.3 Perceptions of female supervisors
We asked employees at all levels of the factories to tell us which tasks are the most
important for line supervisors. We first constructed a list of eight main tasks from
an initial set of open-ended conversations with managers. We then gave each re-
spondent 10 tokens and asked him or her to place the 10 tokens on the list of the
eight tasks to indicate the relative importance of each. Respondents were told they
could place all 10 tokens on a single task if they thought that it was the only one
that is important, or spread the tokens across the tasks as they wished. Surveys
were conducted with HR Managers, Production Managers, Assistant Production
Managers, Line Chiefs, Line Supervisors and Operators.
17
T
a
b
le
2
.1
:
D
em
og
ra
p
h
ic
C
h
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
P
a
n
e
l
A
:
T
ra
in
e
e
s
v
s.
O
p
e
ra
to
rs
a
n
d
S
u
p
e
rv
is
o
rs
M
ea
n
—
—
—
C
o
m
p
a
ri
so
n
s
—
—
—
T
ra
in
ee
P
o
o
l
O
p
er
a
to
rs
R
a
n
d
o
m
S
V
s
M
en
to
r
S
V
s
T
ra
in
ee
s
v
s.
T
ra
in
ee
s
v
s.
O
p
er
a
to
rs
R
a
n
d
o
m
S
V
s
N
=
1
9
9
N
=
4
3
0
N
=
9
2
N
=
1
4
2
G
en
d
er
(f
em
a
le
=
1
)
0
.5
0
0
.7
3
0
.0
4
0
.0
4
-0
.2
3
*
*
*
0
.4
6
*
*
*
A
g
e
(c
u
rr
en
t)
2
4
.4
2
4
.1
2
9
.1
2
9
.3
0
.3
0
-4
.6
6
*
*
*
A
g
e
a
t
p
ro
m
o
ti
o
n
to
S
V
2
4
.4
N
A
2
5
.3
2
4
.3
N
A
0
.8
4
M
a
rr
ie
d
0
.7
1
0
.7
7
0
.8
5
0
.8
9
0
.0
6
-0
.1
4
*
*
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
(y
rs
in
sc
h
o
o
l)
7
.8
3
5
.8
0
8
.7
7
9
.5
6
2
.0
3
*
*
*
-0
.9
5
*
*
*
W
o
rk
in
g
in
G
a
rm
en
ts
(y
rs
)
6
.5
3
6
.1
0
8
.8
3
9
.2
1
0
.4
3
-2
.3
0
*
*
*
T
en
u
re
in
F
a
ct
o
ry
(y
rs
)
3
.4
1
2
.7
8
3
.3
0
3
.8
0
0
.6
3
*
*
*
0
.1
1
*
*
*
P
a
n
e
l
B
:
T
ra
in
e
e
s
v
s.
M
e
n
to
r
S
u
p
e
rv
is
o
rs
M
ea
n
T
ra
in
ee
P
o
o
l
M
en
to
r
S
V
s
T
ra
in
ee
s
v
s.
M
en
to
r
S
V
s
N
=
1
9
7
N
=
1
1
3
L
it
er
a
cy
7
.1
4
9
.5
4
-2
.3
9
*
*
*
N
u
m
er
a
cy
3
.4
5
.2
-1
.7
2
*
*
*
N
o
n
-v
er
b
a
l
re
a
so
n
in
g
2
.7
5
2
.7
8
-0
.0
3
N
o
te
s
:
T
a
b
le
sh
ow
s
m
ea
n
ch
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
o
f
tr
a
in
ee
s,
ra
n
d
o
m
se
w
in
g
o
p
er
a
to
r
fr
o
m
li
n
es
a
t
w
h
ic
h
tr
a
in
ee
s
w
o
rk
ed
b
ef
o
re
tr
a
in
in
g
,
ra
n
d
o
m
li
n
e
su
p
er
v
is
o
rs
,
a
n
d
li
n
e
su
p
er
v
is
o
rs
se
le
ct
ed
b
y
fa
ct
o
ri
es
a
s
m
en
to
r
fo
r
tr
a
in
ee
s,
o
n
w
h
o
se
li
n
es
tr
a
in
ee
s
w
il
l
b
e
tr
ia
le
d
a
s
su
p
er
v
is
o
rs
a
ft
er
tr
a
in
in
g
.
S
ta
ti
st
ic
a
l
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
o
f
d
iff
er
en
ce
s
in
co
m
p
a
ri
so
n
s:
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
p
<
0
.1
.
18
Figure 2.3: Tasks of Supervisors: Attached Importance
Notes: Workers on various levels in 26 factories were asked to place 10 tokens on a list
of eight general tasks of line supervisors (generated after open ended conversations with
several factory managers), according to the relative importance they attach to the task.
Figure 2.3 shows the percentage of tokens placed on each of the eight tasks
by respondents holding different positions at the factory. The characteristics given
the highest weights are shown to the left of the graph. One pattern that emerges is
that there is very close agreement about which characteristics are important among
all levels of managers. Teaching and motivating operators are given the highest
weights by all managers. Operators, on the other hand, appear to prefer problem
solvers, giving slightly higher weights to understanding machines and correcting
mistakes. There is agreement across the hierarchy that organizing resources, corre-
sponding with management, and giving order are less important tasks of supervisors.
We then asked the same set of respondents whether, based on their own ex-
perience, they thought females or males were better at each of the eight tasks of
being a supervisor. The allowed responses included the option of “both are equal”.
We code these data in a way that indicates the perceived deficit that females face
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in each of the tasks. A response “males are better” is coded as -1, “females are
better” is coded as +1 and “both are equal” is coded as 0. The scores are shown
in Figure 2.4, again by type of respondent.14 The first takeaway from the table is
that males are overwhelmingly seen as having an advantage in every supervisory
task. Line operators and line supervisors rate males better in all eight tasks, line
chiefs and production managers rate males better in seven of the eight tasks, and
HR managers see males as being better in five of them.
We also find a very high level of agreement about the specific tasks where
females are most lacking. According to every category of respondent, females have
the largest deficits in understanding machines and organizing resources. All respon-
dents also agree that the three areas where females are closest to males are teaching
new techniques, motivating operators, and corresponding with management, though
there is some disagreement about the ranking of these three. Notice that the two
tasks rated as most important by managers are two of those where the gap between
females and males is perceived to be the smallest. On the other hand, machine
knowledge, rated highest by operators, is the area where females are perceived to
be the weakest.
The sample of operators is the largest and most diverse, so in Figure 2.5,
we show the same comparisons for different subgroups of operators. First we split
the randomly selected operators by gender. The relative rankings are very similar
for female and male operators – the correlation is 0.87 – though female operators
uniformly describe a smaller gap. Next we split the operators into those who have
and those who have not worked for a female supervisor at some point in their ca-
reer. Past experience working for a female supervisor has no significant effect on the
perceived gap in female skills. Finally, when we asked the trainees the same com-
parisons between generic male and female supervisors, the responses are very close
to those of other operators. As Figure 2.5 shows, female trainees do rate women
somewhat higher than do other operators.
We also asked trainees about their own ability relative to typical supervi-
sors in their factory. We first asked the trainees to rate the typical supervisor on a
scale of 1-10 with regard to each of the eight supervisory roles, and then asked the
trainee to rate her/him self on the same scale. Female trainees rate themselves as
14We did not ask the Assistant Production Managers to make this comparison because of time
constraints on the survey instrument.
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Figure 2.4: Tasks of Supervisors: Perceived Ability by Gender
Notes: Workers on various levels in 26 factories were asked for each of the eight main
supervisor tasks, whether they perceive female or male supervisor as more capable. An-
swers were aggregated on the task and designation of respondent level, with answers being
coded as -1 for “males are more capable”, 0 for “both are equally capable”, and 1 for
“females are more capable”.
worse than the typical supervisor on each of the eight characteristics, while males
rate themselves better at motivating workers and giving orders. The average gap
for males is only 0.09, while for females it is 0.45. Across skills, the females’ self-
assessments largely match the pattern of the gender perceptions more generally.
The correlation between the gaps the female trainees perceive in themselves and the
gaps that operators perceive in female supervisors is 0.68.
We aggregate the ratings of males and females on all eight skills to create a
single variable indicating each respondent’s beliefs about the relative skills of males
and females. For the aggregation, we assign a value of 1 to “females are better”,
0 to “males are better” and 0.5 to the indifferent response. The first column of
Table 2.2 shows how the average deficit for females across the eight tasks is affected
by the gender of the operator and past experience working with female supervisors.
Consistent with the data in Figure 2.5, we find that female operators have slightly
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Figure 2.5: Tasks of Supervisors: Perceived Ability by Gender,
Extended
Notes: Workers on various levels, of different gender, and with varying experience of
working under female supervisors in 26 factories were asked for each of the eight main
supervisor tasks, whether they perceive female or male supervisor as more capable.
Answers were aggregated on the task and group of respondent level, with answers being
coded as -1 for “males are more capable”, 0 for “both are equally capable”, and 1 for
“females are more capable”.
higher opinions of female supervisors, being about 12 percent more likely to choose
“female is better” over “male is better”. Previous reported experience working for
a female supervisor does not change the perceived skill level of females and males.
In the second column, we spilt the experience effect by the gender of the operator.
There is no effect for female operators, while there is a small effect for male opera-
tors (p-value 0.101).
We also asked operators whether they prefer to work for a female or male
supervisor. Similar to the coding for skills, we code the responses as 1 for “prefer
female”, 0 for “prefer male” and 0.5 for indifferent. As a group, the operators say
they prefer to work for male supervisors by a margin of about two to one. However,
female operators are 17 percent more likely to say they prefer females, and those
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Table 2.2: Attitudes toward female SVs: Baseline data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Females better than males, Prefer female SV
all 8 tasks to male SV
Operator is female 0.122*** 0.142*** 0.175*** 0.208***
(0.017) (0.022) (0.043) (0.046)
Experience working for female SV 0.011 0.122***
(0.017) (0.039)
Experience * female operator -0.002 0.099*
(0.019) (0.051)
Experience * male operator 0.047 0.182***
(0.028) (0.057)
Obs 428 428 426 426
R-squared 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18
Factory FE YES YES YES YES
Mean 0.25 0.25 0.32 0.32
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the production line level; regressions include age,
education and marital status of the respondent. Statistical significance of differences in
comparisons: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
with previous experience working for female supervisors are 12 percent more likely
to say they prefer working for a female supervisor (Table 2.2, column 3). Again
there appears to be, if anything, a somewhat stronger effect for male operators (col-
umn 4) – though as with the skills assessment, the gap between female and male
operators is not statistically significant. Among the 140 female operators reporting
experience working for a female supervisor, 40 percent say they prefer to work for
males, 30 percent for females and 30 percent are indifferent. Among males with no
experience working for females, the percentages are 81, 16, and 3.
In sum, the skills assessment provides little evidence that perceptions are
influenced by experience. However, when asked to express a preference to work for
male or female supervisors, previous experience working for women does appear to
matter, especially for male operators.
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2.4 Do measured skills match the perceptions?
The surveys indicate that female supervisors are viewed as less skilled than male
supervisors in each of eight supervisory tasks. The female trainees see similar weak-
nesses in themselves. Do these perceptions match reality? We conducted an exten-
sive skill assessment of the female and male trainees selected by the participating
factories during their first day at the training centre. We administered tests of nu-
meracy, literacy, and non-verbal reasoning. We also directly assessed technical skills
and knowledge of machines, and conducted teaching, communication, and leadership
exercises. The data from this assessment provide evidence on several dimensions of
the actual skills gaps between females and males selected by factories as having
supervisory potential. We use these data for two purposes. The first is to assess the
extent to which perceptions match reality at the baseline. The second is to measure
the effects of training and the trial period working as an assistant supervisor on the
trainees’ skills. For the latter purpose, we repeat some of the exercises at the end
of training and after the factory trial period.
2.4.1 Baseline measures: Do the skills gaps match the perceptions?
The most direct and extensive comparison we can make between perceptions and
reality is on the question of technical and machine knowledge. The assessment asked
the trainees to name different parts of sewing machines, and to tell us which type
of machine (e.g., flat lock, single needle, etc.) would be used for different sewing
processes. We showed the trainees garments of the type they typically produce with
faults in them, and asked them to identify what machine problem (e.g., loose thread
tension) is the most likely cause of the fault. We showed the trainees pictures of
production lines and asked them to identify issues where worker safety was being
compromised. In all, the diagnostic included 86 questions. Male trainees answered
65 percent of the questions correctly, while female trainees a statistically indistin-
guishable 64 percent correctly.
We conducted a very similar exercise after training and then again after the
trainees completed the trial in the factory. The first column of Table 2.3 shows
results of factory fixed effect regressions using all three rounds of the assessment.
For now, we focus on the top line of the table, which shows the difference between
females and males on the baseline assessment. We see that females on average score
one point lower on the 86-point scale, a difference which is highly insignificant. In
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other words, even though close to 90 percent of survey respondents say that male
supervisors have more technical knowledge than female supervisors, we find no sta-
tistical difference between the female and male trainees selected by the factories.
We also conducted exercises to measure teaching, communication and lead-
ership. In the teaching exercise, we divided the trainees into groups of four to six.
We assigned each trainee the role of teacher in one round of the exercise, with the
others being students. The teacher was given an abstract figure, which might be for
example several triangles and circles with some coloured in. The teacher’s task was
to instruct the students to reproduce the figure using only verbal instructions. She
could not show the figure to the students or use her hands. There are two types
of outcome measures. The simplest is the number of drawings that were correct.
The first row of column 2 on Table 2.3 shows that males obtain a slightly higher
percentage of correct drawings, with the gap being marginally insignificant with a
p-value of 0.10.
The second outcome from the teaching assessment comes from observations
recorded by two enumerators observing the exercise. For example, the enumerators
recorded whether the instruction was given at an appropriate pace, and the number
of times the teacher explained the task in more than one way. We take six such
observations and construct standardized measures for each assessment round. We
then sum the six standardized indicator variables to create an index of “soft teach-
ing skills”. Column 3 on Table 2.3 shows a factory fixed-effect regression with this
index as the dependent variable. We see no significant difference between males
and females in baseline teaching techniques, though the standard errors are larger
than we might like. We also note that the soft skills measure is not significantly
associated with the harder outcome – the percentage of correct drawings – though
the measured effect is positive (p=0.22).
We create similar ‘soft’ measures for the communication exercise and the
leadership exercise. In the communications exercise, the trainees were asked to give
a short speech on a topic related to rules in the factory, such as: “Describe to a new
operator all the things that you need to do when your machine breaks”. During the
speech, the trainee was interrupted with questions on two occasions. (For example,
“What should I do if I think I can fix the machine myself?”). Two enumerators
recorded judgements on whether the trainees spoke clearly, at a reasonable pace,
whether she had confidence, etc. The top row of column 4 in Table 2.3 shows that
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female trainees perform insignificantly worse by these measures. Finally, in the lead-
ership exercise we asked the group to create a production hierarchy, and then asked
them to produce some ‘products’ using Legos. The precise hierarchy depended on
the size of the group, but we measure whether there are differences across the gen-
ders in the probability of being appointed a management role, and in soft measures
reflecting the extent to which the individual participated actively in the discussion.
We find that males are significantly more likely to be appointed to management (75
percent vs. 32 percent, p<0.001), but (see the top row of column 5), we see that
women score insignificantly lower by these measures.
The teaching, communication and leadership exercises were intended to mea-
sure important aspects of confidence and preparedness to lead a production line. We
also asked the trainees questions which yield a self-assessed measure of confidence.
We first asked them to rate the average supervisor in their factory on a scale of 1-10.
We then asked them to rate themselves as a supervisor, two months after beginning
the job. Here we find that, at baseline, the male trainees express more confidence
in their ability. In the raw data, they rate themselves 0.33 points lower, while the
female trainees rate themselves 0.79 points lower. The top row of column 6 in Ta-
ble 2.3 shows a similar deficit for women of 0.47 points, controlling for factory fixed
effects. Thus, while both the technical assessment and the leadership exercises show
no significant differences between the female and male trainees, we do see differences
in their self-reported confidence levels.
2.4.2 Training and Trialing effects
We repeated the teaching, communication and leadership assessments at the end of
the six-week training period and again at the end of the factory trial period. For
the latter assessment, the trainees returned to the training centre for a review day
during which we conducted these assessments as well. Rows 2 and 4 of Table 2.3
show the various post-training measures, all measured relative to baseline. At the
bottom of the table, we show the p-value for tests of equivalence of female and male
trainees at each point in time. The table is an unbalanced panel, as there were sev-
eral nominated trainees who either failed the literacy / numeracy exam or dropped
out for other reasons, and there was further attrition before the post-trial review
day. However, results from regressions using the balanced panel are very similar,
suggesting that the patterns we observe are not driven by selection. Looking first
at the scores on the assessment of technical knowledge, we see slight improvements
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in both males and females after the training, but no change in the relative perfor-
mance across gender. After the factory trial (rows 3 and 5), however, we see the
performance of females appears to deteriorate somewhat. Indeed, comparing female
and male trainees, the post-trial technical assessment is the only measure showing a
significant difference by gender. The other outcome worth noting is that confidence
of both males and females increases after the training, with the measured magnitude
of the increase for females being slightly larger, but not significantly so.
2.4.3 Management simulation exercise
In the first phase of the project, we conducted a management simulation exercise
which we believe illuminates some of the issues facing female trainees. The exercise
was conducted during a follow-up survey around four months after the completion
of training. The simulation involved the trainees and eight randomly selected op-
erators. The operators were placed into four teams of two each and played two
“production” games, one involving Legos and one involving buttons. We random-
ized the order in which the games were played at the factory level. Each team was
assigned a leader whose job was to explain the particular exercise and manage the
operators as they performed their tasks. For the results we present here, the team
leader was either a female or male trainee.15 Each pair of operators played the
production game twice, once with Legos and once with buttons. Each team leader
played only one session – either Legos or button – so there were eight team leaders
in each factory, and each pair of workers played with two different team leaders.
For each of the Lego and button exercises, the teams played five separate
sessions. The first was a simple sorting exercise in each case, sorting either buttons
or Legos by colour. For Legos, the second, third and fourth sessions involved con-
structing chains of Legos with a particular color pattern – blue, yellow, green, blue,
yellow, green, etc. The three games were differentiated by their payoffs: the first
summed the length of the chains produced by the two operators, the second paid
based on the length of the longest chain produced by either worker, and the third
paid based on the shortest chain produced by either operator. The team leaders
were given incentive payments according to the payoff function.
15The full exercise also involved team leaders who were operators from the control group, the most
recently promoted supervisor who was not a trainee, another supervisor from the same production
line as one of the trainees selected at random (a “matched” supervisor), or another supervisor
selected at random (a “random” supervisor).
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Here we assess the performance of teams led by female trainees with that
of teams led by male trainees measured by the payoffs. We combine each of the
five individual games into a single regression by standardizing the payoffs on the
game-round level. We then run regressions with the standardized payoffs on the
left-hand side and a set of controls for characteristics of the team leader on the right
hand side. We focus the discussion here on the subset of games where trainees are
team leaders, comparing the performance of female and male team leaders.
Each pair of operators plays the set of five games twice, with one team leader
in the first session and a different team leader in the second session. The order of
the games (Lego - buttons, or buttons - Lego) is random, and within a round the
assignment of team leaders to operator pairs was random. But the assignment of
team leaders to session 1 or round 2 depended on the (non-random) order in which
leaders were provided by the factories. Logistical complexities working in the factory
prevented us from randomizing the session in which any team leader participated.
In particular, because factories anticipated that we wanted to talk with trainees,
the trainees were more likely to be assigned to the first session, and the existing
supervisors and control operators were more likely to be assigned to the second.
This matters, because even controlling for the team leader and game types (Lego
vs. buttons), operators were significantly more productive during the second ses-
sion. This is logical because we expect some learning by the operators from the first
to the second session – even though they play different games in each session. We
control for the session order effects in regressions.
Table 2.4 shows how the standardized payoffs vary with the gender of the
team leader in the sample of games involving female and male trainees. The speci-
fication in column 1 includes controls for factory, session (first or second) and game
fixed effects. We find that teams led by female trainees have payoffs which are 0.29
standard deviations higher than teams led by male trainees, a difference which is
highly significant. In other words, female trainees appear to be more effective as
team leaders than male trainees. Column 2 adds team leader demographics – age,
education, industry experience and factory tenure – and Column 3 adds operator
team fixed effects. Note that the third regression then isolates the cases where a
single team was led by both a male and a female trainee. Only 19 teams had this
pair of team leaders, so while the table shows a sample size of 600, the effective
size is much smaller. Nevertheless, the additional production by female-led teams
is statistically the same, increasing to 0.42 standard deviations.
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In columns 4 and 5 we examine whether trainees who before the survey visit
had been tried out as supervisors or promoted to supervisor perform better than
those not tried out or promoted. We find that those promoted to supervisor perform
significantly better than those not promoted. Since promotion is not random, we
are unable to say whether this is due entirely to selection – more able trainees are
promoted, while less able ones are not – or whether the experience as a supervisor
also makes the individual more effective as a leader. But the result does provide
some validation for the exercise itself, showing that those with more ability or ex-
perience perform significantly better in the game.
Finally, in column 6 we explore whether the gender composition of the opera-
tor team interacts with the gender of the team leader. We compare the performance
of mixed or all-male teams with those of all-female teams.16 The superior perfor-
mance of the female-led teams is significant only for the all-female team. When both
operators are women, their output is 0.41 standard deviations higher with a female
leader than with a male leader. But female leaders obtain no higher production
from mixed team than male leaders do.
In sum, then, the female trainees were significantly more effective in gen-
erating payoffs than were the male trainees. Trainees who were promoted before
the time of the first follow-up survey perform significantly better than those not
promoted. And female trainees perform best when they are matched with a pair of
female operators, and perform no better than male trainees when they lead mixed-
gender or all-male teams.
There are two further outcomes from the games. The first involves the strat-
egy choices of the team leaders. Recall that the payoffs changed from one game to
the next. In the second round, payoffs were for the sum of the output of the two
operators, but the third (fourth) game, we paid on the maximum (minimum) output
of either worker. After the second game, we asked each team leader which of the
two operators was better at the game. We then recorded whether the team leader
focused attention on the stronger operator in game 3 and on the weaker operator
in game 4, as the performances of these operators are expected to determine the
payoffs in these games. The fifth game involved a complex figure that was most
efficiently made in a “line”, with each operator specializing on one component. We
16Since only 20 percent of operators are male, all-male teams are very rare.
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record whether the team leader organized production in that manner. We then
sum the number of times the team leader adopted the “correct” strategy in each of
these three games. Column 7 regresses this sum on the gender of the team leader,
demographics of the team leader and the operators, and factory fixed effects. We
find that the male leaders adopted the correct strategy significantly more often, in
spite of the female leaders inducing higher output.
Finally, after the second session, the operators on the production team were
asked to compare the management style of the two team leaders they worked with.
They were asked whether the first or second team leader they worked with was better
at explaining the game, better at answering questions, better at motivating them,
always pressuring them, and so forth. Focusing on the responses of the 19 teams
led by both a female and a male trainee, we find that operators are more likely to
say that the male trainees were better at answering question, at motivating, and at
encouraging. Female trainees were selected more often only as “always pressuring”.
The last two outcomes, on strategy and operator opinions, are interesting in the
light of the superior performance of female trainees.
2.5 How are operator perceptions changed by experi-
ence?
The skills diagnostics indicate that the female trainees have only a very small and
statistically insignificant gap in technical skills. On the other hand, there are more
significant gaps in self confidence and in the outcomes of the teaching and leadership
exercises. The training closes these gaps. But the important outcomes are not the
training centre diagnostics, but the outcomes on the production floor. We examine
these using both surveys of operators working for the trainees and using adminis-
trative data on productivity of the lines where the trainees are assigned (ITT) or
work (OLS).
We conducted a first follow-up survey in the factory just after the end of the
initial trial period. During the six- to eight weeks between the end of the training
and this first follow-up survey, trainees were meant to be working as assistant line
supervisors, together with their mentor. Compliance with this agreement was very
high. Of the 135 operators completing training 129 were trialed as an assistant
supervisor. Four of the six not trialed (three females and one male) left the factory
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before the trial started. Recall that we told factories which specific trainees to place
on which lines. However, arguably we should only be concerned that they placed
a female (male) trainee on a line assigned to a female (male). In many cases, the
factory did not comply with the assignment at the individual level, but did comply
with the assignment at the gender level – that is, they switched two females or two
males. The trial was carried out on a different line in 34 percent of the cases. But
in the 77 cases where trainees were trialed on the lines designated for trials, there
was compliance in 71 cases.
At the follow-up conducted at the end of the trial period, we surveyed ran-
domly selected operators working on the lines where the trainees were assigned (ITT
lines) and on the lines where the trainees were actually working. Recall that for each
factory, the training was conducted in two rounds approximately two months apart.
The first follow-up survey was also conducted twice in each factory, at the end of
the factory trial for each training round. The second follow-up survey, however, was
conducted on both training lines at the same time. This has two implications. First,
this implies that the time gap between the end of the trial and the second follow-up
survey was about two months longer for the trainees in the first training round than
for those in the second round. Second, this meant that we were surveying twice as
many lines on the day of the second follow-up. As a consequence of this, we did not
survey all of the ITT lines at second follow-up. Therefore, we report both ITT and
OLS regressions for the first follow-up survey data, but only OLS regressions for the
second follow-up survey.
At each follow-up survey, we selected three operators at random from each
of the surveyed lines. We focus on two outcomes. First, we asked the operators to
rank on a scale of 1-10 both a typical supervisor in the factory and the trainee on
their line based on their knowledge of her/him. We regress the ranking of the trainee
on an indicator for his or her gender and for the gender of the surveyed operator,
controlling for the ranking of the typical supervisor by the operator. Second, we
asked the operators whether they prefer to work for a female or male supervisor,
and as before code the responses as 1 for “prefer female”, 0 for “prefer male”, and
0.5 for “indifferent”. For the first of these outcomes, we are interested in the ranking
of female trainees relative to male trainees, and for the second, we are interested in
whether exposure to a female trainee affects the preference for supervisors.
The first three columns of Table 2.5 below show the ITT regressions for the
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relative ranking (columns 1 and 2) and the preference for female supervisors (column
3). We find that the female trainees are rated almost a point – about 0.4 standard
deviations – lower than the male trainees. In column 2, we allow the relative rank-
ing to differ for female and male operators. We find, if anything, males rate the
females more harshly, though the difference is not statistically significant (p=0.26).
In column 3, we see that exposure to female trainees has the effect of making male
operators significantly less opposed to working with female supervisors. While fe-
male operators are more inclined than male operators to say they prefer to work for
female supervisors, their opinion is not influenced by exposure to the female trainees.
Columns 4-7 of Table 2.5 repeat the same regressions using the actual place-
ment of the trainees. We find almost identical effects in the ranking regressions
(columns 4 and 5), but slightly weaker effects in the preference regressions (column
7). Finally, columns 8-10 show the results of OLS regressions using the second
follow-up survey data. Because we use the sample of trainees working as assistant
supervisors or full supervisors at the time of the second follow-up, in column 6 we
show the first follow-up results using the sample of trainees working as supervisors
at the time of the second follow-up. We see that the results for male operators
are very similar to those in the full sample (compare column 6 with column 5),
though the smaller sample yields higher standard errors and an insignificant effect.
The results for female operators appear slightly different and less negative, for the
sample of trainees that continue to work as supervisors at the second follow-up.
This indicates that the weaker female trainees may be those who do not continue
as supervisors.
In the second follow-up survey, the deficit for female trainees is erased com-
pletely (See columns 8 and 9 of Table 2.5). Female trainees are rated as equal to male
trainees, by both female and male operators. Moreover, operators of either genders
who are exposed to the female trainees express higher preferences for working with
female supervisors. Note as well that the trainees as a whole are now rated as slightly
better than the typical supervisor in the factory. The improvement in the relative
ranking of the trainees is consistent with statements by production managers that
new supervisors require four to six months of experience to reach their full potential.
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2.6 Trainee Performance measured by Production Data
The literature measuring the effects of job training programs has typically relied on
outcome measures such as employment or earnings of trainees.17 This is reasonable
if wages equal the value of the marginal product of labour. In our context, we be-
lieve that approach has drawbacks. First, the factories typically have very specific
wages for each worker grade. Many or most of these are determined by minimum
wage levels, which are set nationally at the worker grade level. Thus, wages may
not reflect marginal products. Second, factories will attempt to make promotion
decisions based on their beliefs about actual productivity of the workers.
With this in mind, we have attempted to gather very detailed production
data for each of the factories. For the second phase of the project, we have daily,
line-level data for 12 or 13 months, typically starting two months prior to the begin-
ning of training and extending seven to nine months after the end of the training (see
Appendix B for a more detailed description of the data and its collection process).
There are three outcomes of interest: productivity, quality defects, and absenteeism.
By focusing on sewing, we are able to capture a measure of output which is very
close the pure quantity measure. A trained industrial engineer can take any garment
and estimate the number of minutes a fully-efficient worker will take to produce the
garment. These calculations come from summing the required time for each stitch to
make the garment. The times come from a combination of international databases
and in-factory time-and-motion studies. By multiplying these ‘standard minute val-
ues’ – SMVs (or standard allowable minutes – SAMs) by the number of units of a
given garment which are produced during the day, we obtain a measure of output –
output minutes – which is highly comparable across products. For example, a line
producing 1,000 shirts with an SMV of 15 minutes has production of 15,000 output
minutes. For productivity, we divide the output minutes by input minutes – the
sum of minutes worked by operators and helpers on the line over the same time
period18 – to obtain the industry standard measure of efficiency. This is essentially
a measure of Q/L:
17Much of this literature focuses on programs aimed at individuals who are out of work. See, for
example Card et al 2011; Attanasio et al 2011.
18Helpers are entry level workers who are allocated to lines but do not yet operate a sewing
machine on their own. They typically represent the lowest wage grade in the factory and do
auxiliary tasks on the lines, such as cutting thread or moving garments from one operator to the
next. We could improve the input minutes measure by a step if we had the wage bill for the whole
line. However, the industry typically uses three different wage grades for operators, and we most
often know only the total number of operators, not the number by grade.
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Output ∗ SMV/[(Operators+Helpers) ∗ hours ∗ 60] (2.1)
The average efficiency in the sample we are currently using is 53 per cent, which is
higher than the 38-40 per cent that those in the industry typically quote.19
A second measure of interest is the number of quality defects. Factories typ-
ically report both the number or percentage of garments that require some re-work
and the number or percentage that must be rejected. Reject rates are typically very
low, averaging less than 0.5 percent in our sample. Rework rates are much higher,
averaging around 7 per cent (with a median of almost 5 per cent). Because the
re-work time is included in the measure of “input minutes”, the efficiency measure
incorporates improvements in quality.
We construct a panel at the line level, with dummy variables indicating the
presence of a trainee working on the line either as an assistant supervisor or a full
supervisor. We begin with an ITT specification, using the gendered assignment of a
trainee on the line during the trail period, and then assuming this initial assignment
predicts the line on which the trainee will be promoted.
ygfld = αl + βfd +
∑
g∈{0,1}
γgTrialfld +
∑
g∈{0,1}
δgPost Trialfld + gfld (2.2)
where g ∈ {0, 1} represents male or female trainees, f is factory, l line, d the week
of production, and y the outcome of interest. TRIAL reflects the assignment of
the line to a female /male trainee during the trial weeks and POST TRIAL the
assignment of the line to a female/male trainee during the period after the trial.
We also present OLS results on the actual placement and roles of trainees.
These may suffer from both the endogenous placement of trainees and the endoge-
nous decisions to promote. As with the ITT regressions, we include both line and
factory/week fixed effects, which mitigates to some degree the issue of endogenous
placement. However, some of the trainees leave the factory and some return to being
operators after the trial. Since these outcomes are more frequent for females than
19The higher efficiency in our sample may come from having a more efficient sample of factories.
However, the data across factories are not always comparable because the international SMV values
are often adjusted upwards by factories to account for some expected level of inefficiency. We are
currently working to ensure the data are comparable across factories, but we include factory fixed
effects in all of the regressions using production data, which will absorb systematic measurement
differences across factories.
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for males, we should clearly be concerned with the endogenous promotion decisions
in interpreting the OLS regressions. We nevertheless think that the OLS results
are potentially interesting in spite of these selection issues, because promotion of
almost any females represents a change relative to what would have happened in
the absence of the experiment.
The first three columns of Table 2.6 report the ITT regressions for efficiency,
absenteeism and defect rates. The samples for each of the regressions vary some-
what because data on some measures are not available in some factories.20 The
cleanest results relate to efficiency. Compared to lines without trainees, we see that
lines where male trainees were assigned are about 2.3 percentage points – roughly
5 percent – more efficient during the trial period. During the trial, the trainees
represent extra supervisory labour on the line. Hence, even though they are least
experienced at this point, it is perhaps not surprising that they have a positive ef-
fect on efficiency. There is no increase in efficiency during the trial period on the
lines assigned a female trainee, suggesting that even though the female trainees are
additional supervisory labour, they are not effective in increasing efficiency. How-
ever, the situation changes during the post-trail period. Those trainees remaining
as supervisors may either be classed as Assistant Supervisors or as full Line Super-
visors during this period. In the latter case, and perhaps even in the former, they
are replacing an existing line supervisor, and hence no longer represent incremental
supervision. During this period, the female trainees catch up to the males. We
see that both female and male trainees have very similar effects on efficiency, with
positive coefficients which are economically important but statistically insignificant
at conventional levels.
Columns 4 through 7 present OLS results based on actual assignment. We
use actual assignment because the initial line assignment was agreed to only for the
trial period. We did not necessarily expect the factories to promote the trainees
to the same lines. The patterns are very similar to the ITT regressions, though
the coefficients are generally of slightly larger magnitude. The regression in column
4 shows that females perform significantly worse during the trial period, perform
equally well as males when both are assistant supervisors, and perform insignifi-
cantly better than male trainees when both have been promoted to full supervisor.
In column 5, we limit the sample to observations from days when the trainee was
20The sample size drops by about 75 percent when we use lines for which all three variables are
not missing.
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working on one of the original ITT lines. The patterns are similar, though now
the better performance of female trainees as full supervisors is marginally signifi-
cant (p=.096). Columns 6 and 7 report results for absenteeism and defect rates,
respectively. Again the patterns are similar to the ITT regressions except that
underperformance of female trainees relative to male trainees on quality issues is
almost significant when working as assistant supervisors (p=0.111; see bottom of
table).
The efficiency results mirror the opinions of operators working on the lines.
Female trainees start slower; they perform significantly worse than males during the
trial period. However, they catch up in the months after the trial period. We see
the same pattern in the ITT and OLS regressions. In the ITT regressions, the gain
made by female trainees relative to male trainees is significant at the 0.10 level,
while the gain in defect rates is marginally insignificant (p=0.125).21 In the OLS
data, we find significant relative performance gains between the trial and promotion
to line supervisors for efficiency, and between the period working as an assistant
supervisor and promotion to line supervisor for defect rates.
2.6.1 Do attitudes adjust?
Both the survey data and the production data suggest that the female trainees start
more slowly than their male counterparts, but catch up three to five months after
returning from training. The attitudes of operators with direct exposure to the
female trainees adjust over this time. We might ask whether there is any evidence
that the attitude adjustment is more general. That is, does the increase in female
supervision in the factory have indirect effects on operator attitudes towards female
supervisors? The data suggest there is no change to attitudes of other workers: The
sum of the generic female / male rankings – coded, as before, 1/0/-1 – is -5.06, -4.97
and -5.19 for the male operators surveyed at baseline, first follow-up and second
follow-up, respectively, and -3.33, -3.46 and -3.28 for female operators at the same
surveys. None of these differences are statistically significant. Direct exposure to
female trainees, on the other hand, has a significant effect on these rankings by the
time of the second follow-up survey: Female (male) operators working on lines with
female trainees have a cumulative ranking -2.86 (-4.71), compared with -3.71 (-5.28)
for those on lines with a male trainee. The female operator gap is significant with
21This is the p-value comparing the gap between female performance in the post-trial period and
female performance in the trial period with the same gap for males.
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a p-value of 0.07. Generic attitudes show some evidence of movement with direct
exposure, but there is no evidence of any broader effect in the factory.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter set out to understand some of the reasons for the very low share of
female production supervisors in the Bangladeshi garment industry, despite women
representing 80% of the industry’s workforce. We partnered with local training cen-
tres for mid-level managers, implementing a project which trains equal numbers of
male and female workers to become sewing line supervisors and subsequently placed
them as assistant supervisors on randomly selected lines at their factories for a trial
period of two months. We accompanied the project with extensive surveys of work-
ers, supervisors and managers at various levels in the factories, to gain additional
insights into the factors which keep the number of women in supervisory positions
in the industry that low.
Several key findings emerge from our analysis which provide novel insights
into this question. First women are generally perceived to be less competent when it
comes to solving technical and organizational problems. And while this perception
is more pronounced among male workers, it is also prevalent among females. On
the other hand, women are considered almost on par when it comes to leadership
and communication skills. We compare these findings against results from extensive
knowledge and skills tests of the workers nominated for the training, which reveals
a stark contrast: Women have equal technical knowledge, but lag behind to some
extend in leadership skills, and strongly when it comes to their confidence in their
own supervisor skills.
This mismatch between perceived and actual weaknesses of females as su-
pervisors could prevent factory managements to take effective measures to bring
more women into supervisory roles. We show that the training sessions and the two
months trials closed the gender gap in terms of confidence, and initial productivity
difference of the trial lines to which female trainees were assigned, compared to the
lines of male trainees, vanished after two months. Furthermore, workers directly
exposed to female supervisors improved their rating of them. This indicates that an
external intervention in which management puts trust into female supervisors over a
few months of initial trial time can overcome the initial lack of confidence, expressed
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by both female candidates for supervisor positions themselves, and other workers
in the factories, into their supervisor abilities. However, it could be precisely the
documented misperceptions about relative supervisory ability of men and women
which so far prevented more factory managements from taking such measures.
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Chapter 3
Organizational Learning:
Experimental Evidence from
Bangladeshi Garment Factories
3.1 Introduction
Learning on the job has long been known as a key driver for productivity growth
(Arrow [1962]; Lucas [1993]). Conceptually, learning on the job, especially within
organizations, can be separated into learning by doing something oneself, and learn-
ing from co-workers. While the evidence on the first is extensive and goes well back
into time (Wright [1936]; Benkard [2000]; Hendel and Spiegel [2014], see Thompson
[2010] for a review), there is only limited evidence available on the second. Levitt
et al. [2013] in a US car plant, and Thompson and Thornton [2001] in US ship yards
show that productivity of workers not only increases with the amount of a certain
car or ship model they produced themselves, but also with the amount of the prod-
uct produced by others in the firm. However, beyond the mere documentation of
the existence of learning from others in firms, little is known about, for example,
under which conditions it works particularly well.
One reason for the paucity of evidence on learning from co-workers is that
knowledge exchange between people is inherently difficult to observe. The above
mentioned studies measure organizational learning through increases in productiv-
ity across production units and time, if other workers in the organization have
already produced the product before. However, this leaves open the possibility that
the productivity increases are not driven by knowledge transfers, but alternative
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forms of peer effects.1 To clarify the mechanism behind the cross-unit productiv-
ity increases within firms, I collect data and run a randomized experiment in three
Bangladeshi garment factories. In the experiment, random pairs of workers are in-
duced by their superiors to brief each other when one of them starts producing a
garment that the other one has previously produced. This communication inter-
vention introduces exogenous variation in knowledge exchange across worker pairs,
and I show that this intervention increases the productivity of the workers receiving
the briefing. This indicates that increases in knowledge exchange among co-workers
can increase productivity, above the levels achieved if workers would just learn from
doing a certain task by oneself. Furthermore, there is some evidence that the effect
of the intervention was stronger where the worker being briefed shared social ties
with the worker who provided the briefing.
Bangladeshi garment factories are an ideal setting for studying organizational
learning. The sewing departments of these factories, on which this paper focuses,
are organized into parallel sewing lines of 20-80 workers, which are designed as in-
dependent production units on which the whole sewing process of a garment can
be completed. The three factories in my sample have more than 200 sewing lines
among them. Due to large order sizes and tight delivery deadlines, most garments
are produced on more than one line. In these cases, the different lines typically start
producing the garment on different days, as they finish previously allocated jobs.
Thus, when a given sewing line starts producing a new garment, there may or may
not be other lines in the factory with production experience on that garment. When
there are such lines, they have gained potentially valuable production information
which may or may not be shared with the sewing line starting production at a later
time.
Sewing lines switch to new garments with relatively high frequency, on av-
erage every 10 days. Due to the fast-moving fashion industry and its seasonality,
garments are technically differentiated, which is reflected by line productivity drop-
ping by a third on average when lines switch to a new garment. Only four to five
production days after the start of a new garment does line productivity reach its
long run level again (Figure 3.1). Given these learning processes and fast turnover
1This problem also holds for most studies on social learning outside organizations, for example
about new agricultural technologies (Foster and Rosenzweig [1995]; Munshi [2004]; Bandiera and
Rasul [2006]; Conley and Udry [2010]), or about microfinance services (Banerjee et al. [2013]; Cai
et al. [2015]), which use observed technology adoption as proxy for learning. These studies mostly
rely on estimating structural models or on placebo tests to separate learning from other possible
peer effects.
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Figure 3.1: Sewing Line Productivity before and after
Start of a New Garment.
Graph shows average sewing line productivity in the days before and
after switching to a new garment. The vertical dashed line denotes the
switch to the new garment, and Day 0 the first day of production of the
new garment. The capped bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
rates of garments, the potential gain from knowledge spill-overs is large. Workers -
or at least the supervisors of the lines who are held accountable for the productivity
of their lines - should have a strong incentive to utilize this knowledge.
The randomized communication intervention was conducted among the line
chiefs, the person responsible for the overall management of a line. For a period
of four months on randomly selected sewing floors in the factories, line chiefs were
instructed by the factory management to brief each other when one of them started
producing a garment that the other one had previously produced on his or her line.
The briefings were designed to last about 20 minutes, during which the line chief
with experience should have shared the most important production problems which
had to be overcome when producing the garment. I show that these briefings in-
creased productivity of the sewing lines of the line chiefs who received the briefing
during the first one to two days the garment was produced on the later line, before
productivity reached its long run level again.
The randomized intervention covers only a fourth of the dataset of sewing
line productivity that I collected. Using data from as long as two years before the
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experiment began, I first document that sewing lines are more productive on the first
days they produce a new garment when that garment has already been produced on
other sewing lines before. This effect is stronger if the garment has been produced
on lines which are located spatially closer to the line starting the garment. How-
ever, the effects I document in the observational data could also be driven by other
forms of peer effects, such as competition. For example, I show that sewing lines are
similarly more productive on the first days they produce a new garment when they
are the first line in the factory producing it, and other sewing lines start to produce
the same garment on the same day as well. This effect is also stronger if these
lines are located spatially closer. In these instances, no other workers have previous
experience with the garment that could be shared. In principle, these contempora-
neous effects could be driven by the selection of garments which are produced on
multiple lines on the first day, for example those with especially close delivery dates.
Nevertheless, this raises the question of whether the productivity increases observed
when other lines have prior experience producing the same garment might also be
generated by the same forces. By exogenously increasing the potential for knowledge
exchange between workers, the randomized intervention therefore provides valuable
evidence to what extent learning across co-workers contributes to these productivity
increases.
Using survey-based information on the social network among line chiefs, I find
some evidence that the effect of the briefings was stronger among line chiefs who
shared social ties. Furthermore, the overall effects of the intervention are stronger
when conditioning on line-garment type fixed effects. This could indicate that the
intervention had a stronger effect when line chiefs started new garments of types
that they would otherwise have struggled more with. This also fits with the overall
effect of the intervention being driven by a reduction of the left tail of productivity;
the intervention reduced the number of starts of garments on lines with extremely
low efficiency on the first days.
An advantage of this setting is that the dataset I collected allows me to
observe the production and knowledge diffusion process of more than 1,000 differ-
ent garments over the same set of sewing lines, while earlier studies on organiza-
tional and social learning typically observe the diffusion process of a single product,
or a small number of products. This allows me to control for time-invariant dif-
ferences between sewing lines when comparing productivity. Furthermore, I can
check whether the diffusion process of the garment is affected by observable product
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characteristics. Finally, the production data from these factories contains accurate
productivity data for the sewing lines which has been standardized across different
garments. Therefore, I do not need to base the comparison of output across hetero-
geneous products on assumptions which can be difficult to test (Foster et al. [2008]).
The positive effects of the intervention raise the question why similar man-
agement practices have not been implemented before at the factories. This question
relates to the literature on management practices in large firms (Bloom et al. [2013];
Bandiera et al. [2015]), which finds that firms, especially in developing countries, fail
to adopt practices which should be universally beneficial. A post-experiment survey
conducted with the head production engineers of the three factories, who supervised
the implementation of the experiment, revealed that the costs of the experiment in
terms of necessary labour input time was negligible compared to the productivity
gains. Instead, two of the three engineers reported they had never thought of con-
ducting such an experiment before, while the third had but did not expect it to yield
enough benefits. Finally, two out of the three factories continued with the communi-
cation practice after the end of the experiment, with the third citing resistance from
line chiefs as reason for the discontinuation. This could point to a conflict between
who incurs the gains of the intervention (the firm, through higher productivity)
and who bears most of the costs (the line chiefs, in terms of the opportunity costs
of the time it takes to provide the briefing), which resembles findings from Atkin
et al. [2015] on non-adoption of new technologies in Pakistani factories. Further-
more, the fact that the intervention seemed to have a stronger effect when provided
by socially connected workers points towards a broader aspect, that many manage-
ment practices rely on non-verifiable cooperation of workers for their effectiveness,
such as efficient communication of relevant production information. However, work-
ers might not have incentives for such cooperation for all kind of reasons, rendering
such seemingly universally beneficial management techniques less effective in reality.
Apart from the literature on organizational learning mentioned above, this
paper also relates to small but growing literature on experiments within firms. Atkin
et al. [2015] vary the pay-schemes for workers in Pakistani soccer ball factories, and
show that this variation affects whether employees report truthfully about the ben-
efits of new technologies in the production process. Bloom et al. [2013] randomly
selected textile factories in India who received in-depth management consulting, and
showed large effects on productivity of the firms. They cite low competitive pres-
sures as reason for the previous non-adoption of these practices by the factories, as
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well as a lack of trust to managers from outside the owner family, who could intro-
duce better management practices. Bandiera et al. [2013] introduce rank incentives
and a tournament for production teams at a soft fruit producer and demonstrate
that while the first measure decreases productivity, with the worst teams becoming
even less productive, the latter increases overall productivity, with the effect being
driven by the best teams becoming more productive. Bandiera et al. [2005] compare
worker productivity under piece rate pay and relative payment at the same firm.
They show that relative pay reduced worker productivity, but only in cases in which
workers can monitor each other’s effort. Bandiera et al. [2011] provide an overview
over this literature.
By using detailed data on worker and productivity at the sub-firm level, this
paper also connects to a broader literature on the interplay between management,
worker characteristics and productivity. Amodio and Carrasco [2015] exploit exoge-
nous variation in worker productivity in a setting with quasi-team incentives, and
show free-rider effects among co-workers, with the effect being ameliorated either
by social ties between workers or the introduction of piece rates per worker. Hjort
[2014] is a case study of a Kenyan flower packaging factory showing that ethnically
diverse work teams have lower productivity than ethnically homogeneous teams.
The negative effect of heterogeneous teams becomes stronger in times of ethnic ten-
sions in the country. Similarly, within the context of the garment industry, Kato
and Shu [2011] use data from a Chinese garment factory to show that the effect of
team incentives to increase productivity depends on the composition of work teams
out of urban and rural migrant workers. Furthermore, Hamilton et al. [2003] study
the introduction of team work in a U.S. garment factory, which has a similar set-up
as the factories I study in Bangladesh, and find a significant increase in productivity
from team work.2
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section introduces more background
information about the factories and describes in more detail the dataset collected,
while section three presents the non-experimental results on productivity spill-overs,
2Further studies in this field include Shi [2010] and Lazear [2000], who find strong and very
similar increases in labor productivity at two companies when they switch their wage scheme from
hourly to piece-rate pay. Mas and Moretti [2009] study peer effects among cashiers in a supermarket
in the US, and whether altruism or social pressure makes people work harder when their work effort
has positive externalities on the work pressure of co-workers. They mainly find the latter effect
to be at work. Das et al. [2013] investigate the effect of worker training on shift productivity in
an Indian steel mill. Nagin et al. [2002] could randomly vary the supervisory monitoring rate at a
telephone solicitation company, to investigate how this affected the shirking behaviour of employees.
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using the whole collected dataset. Section four provides more details on the exper-
iment and shows its main effects. Section five presents results on the interplay of
the intervention with social ties, while section six will conclude.
3.2 Background and Data
This study was conducted at three large garment factories in Bangladesh, which
has emerged as the third largest garment exporter in the world over the last years.3
For local industry standards, the three factories are very large and modern. Both
ownership and management are domestic, and all output is produced for the export
market. The factories produce mainly t-shirts, polo shirts, shirts and pants. The
factories vary in size, with between 1,200 - 5,000 workers employed in their sewing
departments.
Table 3.1 provides key characteristics of the three factories in the sample.
Factory 2 is smaller than the other two factories, with only 17 sewing lines located
on four sewing floors. However, it has a higher number of workers per line. Factory
3 is on the other side of the spectrum in many respects. It has many more lines
than Factory 2, which, however, have on average less than a third of the number of
workers per line. However, in most cases, two lines share one line chief, and in some
cases even four lines share one. Factory 1 lies in-between the other two factories on
most dimensions. It has 59 lines on six different sewing floors, each line with its own
line chief, and the size of the lines being closer to the ones from Factory 3. Workers
on lines are faced with new garments on average every 16 days in Factory 1, while
roughly every 8-10 days at Factory 2 and 3.
Sewing lines are organized as assembly lines in which each worker only does
one sewing operation, then passes on the garment to the next operator who does
another sewing operation. Additionally each line has one to three quality inspectors,
and garments found with quality defects that cannot easily be rectified are sorted
out and not counted in the line-wise output measure. The main tasks of the line
chief is to respond to problems from operators, to instruct operators with new tasks
when a new garment is started, and generally to keep work discipline and produc-
tivity high. Both workers (including line chiefs) and orders are allocated to sewing
lines from the factories’ central planning departments. Workers have fixed places
at lines, which they usually only change if promoted to new positions. Only when
3Source: WTO, International Trade Statistics 2014: www.wto.org/english/res e/statis e/its e.htm
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Table 3.1: Factory Characteristics
Factory 1 Factory 2 Factory 3
Nbr. Sewing Floors 6 4 14
Nbr. Sewing Lines 59 17 183
Nbr. Workers in Sewing Section ca. 2000 ca. 1200 ca. 5000
Nbr. Workers in whole Factory ca. 5000 ca. 2000 ca. 9000
Nbr. Buyers 28 74 10
Nbr. Garments in Data 866 839 1048
Avg. Nbr. Lines /Garment 3.12 1.49 3.94
Avg. Nbr. Days /Garment & Line 16.4 9.5 8.5
Avg. Nbr. Workers /Line 30.9 72.2 23.2
S.Dev. Nbr. Workers /Line 8.0 10.8 5.2
Notes: All information from production data collected from factories, except for
‘Nbr. Workers in ...’ which is from surveys of factory management.
absent workers on other lines need to be replaced do workers occasionally switch to
different lines on a day-by-day basis. However, workers with production experience
on some garments are generally not reallocated to other lines if these lines also start
producing the same garment. Thus, it is unlikely that such reallocations of workers
drive the observed productivity spill-overs across lines producing the same garment.
Appendix C furthermore presents the results of a placebo test which also indicates
that worker movements are not behind the productivity increases of later lines pro-
ducing the same garments.
The main dataset used for the analysis contains line-wise production data
for all lines in the factories for 30 consecutive months from Factory 1 and 2, and for
8 consecutive months from Factory 3, as this factory was recruited for this project
only at a later point in time. This dataset includes daily sewing line efficiency as
calculated by the factories, the garment being produced by a line on a given day, its
buyer, and the Standard Minute Value (‘SMV’) of the order. The SMV is a garment-
specific value, calculated prior to the start of production of a garment. It is the sum
of the times in seconds it takes to perform each sewing operation to assemble one
piece of the garment, providing a measure of the required labour input per piece
under ideal production conditions. To calculate the line efficiency measure, daily
piecewise output is multiplied by the garment-specific SMV, and then divided by
total labour input on that line and day measured in worker-minutes. As the SMV
is also essential in price negotiations with the buyers, the calculation of the SMV
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Table 3.2: Line Chief Characteristics
Factory 1 Factory 2 Factory 3
Avg. Age 30.0 30.0 32.2
S.Dev. Age 3.8 5.8 5.6
Avg. Years working in Factory 4.3 5.0 6.2
Avg. Y.s working as LC in Fact. 2.4 1.8 3.5
Avg. Y.s working as LC on current line 1.2 1.5 2.1
Promoted internally 58% 73% 52%
N 53 15 60
N Female LCs 1 1 0
Notes: All information from survey of all line chiefs in factory. Promoted internally is
percentage of current line chiefs who worked on lower position in same factory before
and were subsequently promoted to line chief.
is done professionally, and its breakdown into the individual sewing operations is
being scrutinized by the buyer. Therefore, the efficiency measure is of high quality
and comparability across different garments.
I also conducted a survey of all line chiefs working at the three factories,
which collected demographic and career information, plus information on the social
networks between all line chiefs on six dimensions: kinship, knowing each other since
before working at the factory, having worked together at another factory before, hav-
ing visited each other’s home, spending lunch breaks together, and generally ‘being
friends’. This network data is discussed in more detail in chapter four of this thesis.
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics from the surveys. Line chiefs are around the
age of 30 at all factories, and only 2 out of 128 line chiefs interviewed were female.4
They have worked as line chiefs on average for 1.8-3.5 years at the factories, and
report to be line chief of the line they were at the time of the survey for already
more than one year on average. This also fits with the accounts from the factory
management and the production data; line chiefs generally have a fixed line and are
only rarely reallocated. At all three factories, line chiefs report to have on average
ca. 10 years of schooling, which is equivalent with the Bangladeshi Secondary School
Certificate (SSC).
4The average share of female workers on the sewing lines is ca. 80%. Workers typically start
working in the garment industry at the age of 18 (child labour regulation these days being enforced
through foreign buyers), and stop by the age of 25-30, unless promoted to quality control, mechanic
or supervisory positions. However, only very few women get promoted to these positions.
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Sewing lines are kept homogeneous in terms of size and productivity within
the factories by the management, and workers are not sorted to lines according
to experience or productivity.5 The reason for this lies in the high flexibility re-
quired in operations. Buyers place orders with low predictability and close delivery
deadlines, and frequent disruptions to the production process (power failures, un-
rest outside factories, problems in supply and delivery chains, missing inputs) often
require re-allocations and re-prioritization of orders to lines. Therefore, it is not
optimal to have differentiated lines specializing on certain types of garments. This
non-specialization of lines on certain types of garments can also be seen in the
stacked bar charts for each of the three factories in Figure 3.2, in which each bar
represents a sewing line, and the wider spaces between the bars separate sewing lines
located on different floors. The differently coloured parts of the bars represent the
shares of different garment types (e.g. t-shirts, polos, pants,) among all garments
the lines produce. While some variation can be expected, in general the graphs show
little patterns of lines specializing on certain types of garments.
Lines also do not specialize in whether they are typically the first or a later
line in the roll-out of garment orders across lines. Figure 3.3 shows similar stacked
bar chart as Figure 3.2, but this time the differently coloured parts of the bars indi-
cate the share of the garments the line produced for which it was the first (orange),
the second (light blue), or the third or later line (dark blue) to produce it in the
factory. Again, few obvious patterns of lines being more often allocated garments
early on or later can be seen.6 According to the production engineers in the planning
departments, incoming orders are prioritized based on the importance of the buyer
to the firm and how close the delivery date is, and are then essentially allocated to
the ‘next free line’. This speaks against the higher productivity of lines producing
garments that have already been produced on other lines before being driven by
selection of certain types of lines with higher productivity into usually producing a
garment not as first line in the factory, but at a later time.
5An exception are the ‘sample lines’ on which first samples are produced for buyers during the
negotiations process for new orders, on which often the most experienced workers work. However,
sample lines are not included in my dataset.
6At Factory 3, the six floors to the left of the graph produce for one large buyer, while the other
floors for other buyers. As this buyer places larger orders, which are produced on average on more
lines, the lines on these floors are on average less often the first to produce a given order, and more
often the second, or later line.
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Figure 3.2: Garment Types produced on different Sewing Lines
Graphs represent the types of garments produced by different sewing lines at the three
sample factories. Each bar in the graphs represents a sewing line, and the wider spaces
between bars separate sewing lines from different sewing floors. The differently coloured
stacked parts of the bars represent different types of garments that the lines produced.
Legends show colours for most common garment types only, for illustration. In sub-graph
of Factory 3, each bar represents a line chief instead of a line (some line chiefs at this
factory look after 2 or 4 lines), to keep the number of bars in graph parsimonious. Graph
shows types for only 15 out of 17 lines for Factory 2, as type data is missing for two lines.
3.3 General Evidence on Productivity Spill-over
Before turning to the results from the randomized intervention, this section explores
in the overall production dataset to what extent line productivity profits from out-
put of the same garment already produced on other lines before. Given the evidence
from Figure 3.3, lines do not specialize in whether they typically are the first or a
later line in the factory to produce a garment. Therefore these effects should not
be driven by selection of higher productivity lines into producing garments later in
the roll-out process of garments across lines. The identifying assumption is then
that also for types of garments, which lines are for some reason better or worse at
producing, they do not specialize into producing those garments early on or at a
later stage in the roll-out process.
I observe 1,257 garments in the overall dataset which have been produced
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Figure 3.3: Start Rank of Garments produced on different Sewing
Lines
Graphs show for each sewing line in the three factories for which share of the garments
they produce the lines are the first (orange), the second (light blue), or the third or later
line (dark blue) to produce that garment in the factory. Each bar represents one line, and
the wider spaces between bars separate lines located on different sewing floors. In the
sub-graph of Factory 3, each bar represents a line chief instead of a line (some line chiefs
at this factory look after 2 - 4 lines), to keep the number of bars in graph parsimonious.
on more than one sewing line in the factories. In total, there are 4,964 instances
of a sewing line staring to produce one of these garments (from now on I will re-
fer to the event of a line starting a new garment as a ‘garment start’). Therefore,
these garments are produced on average on 3.95 different lines. Figure 3.1 showed
that on average sewing lines reach their long run productivity level again five days
after starting a new garment. Therefore, I keep the daily line productivity obser-
vations from the first five days a line produces a new garment for the sample of
the regressions. Denote the n’th day a sewing line produces a garment as the n’th
‘garment-day’. Thus the sample consists of all observations with garment-day less
or equal five.
The basic econometric model I estimate in this section is of the following
form:
yfignt =
∑
n
βAn ln(Aign) +
∑
n
βSn ln(Sign) +
∑
n
βXn Xgn + αfin + γfn + fignt (3.1)
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Productivity yfignt of sewing line i in factory f producing garment g in week
t on its n’th garment-day is regressed on the output Aign of the same garment
that has already been produced on all other sewing lines in the factory up to, but
excluding, the day on which line i started producing garment g. I interact this
previous output from other lines with fixed effects for garment-day n. Thus, the
effect of previous output of the same garment is estimated separately for each of
the five garment-days included in the sample, to see for how long previous output
affects productivity of a new line producing the same garment. I use the log of
previous output of the same garment as I expect each additional produced piece of
the garment to have a diminishing marginal effect on the stock of knowledge with
the garment held by other workers.
I additionally include in the regression the output Sign of the same garment
produced on all other lines on the same sewing floor, with its effect estimated again
separately for each garment-day. Sewing lines in the three factories are bundled on
sewing floors which contain on average 5-10 lines, and sewing lines located on the
same floor are running parallel and only 2-3 meters apart from each other. Sewing
floors, on the other hand, are either located on top of each other in the same build-
ing, or in different buildings. Therefore, to get from a sewing line on one floor to
one on another requires at least leaving one’s line out of sight and calling distance.
Furthermore, each sewing floor typically has its own floor production manager, who
could transfer knowledge with a garment he gained on one line to other lines on his
floor.7 For these reasons we could expect a priori the effect of production experience
with the same garment gained by lines on the same floor to differ from the effect of
experience gained by lines on other floors.
I control for fixed effects αfin on the line chief - garment-day level.
8 Thus,
I estimate the effect of previous output of the same garment (on the same floor)
as deviation of line productivity from learning curves estimated separately for each
line chief. Xgn is a vector of garment characteristics interacted with garment-day,
which in the baseline estimation includes the SMV of the garment, and individual
dummy variables for each type of garment. Finally, γft are time fixed effects on the
factory-week level. Standard errors are clustered on the line chief level.
7I use ‘he’ and ‘his floor’ as all floor managers in the three factories are male.
8The later results on the experimental intervention use line chief fixed effects, as the intervention
treats line chiefs. Thus, for consistency, I also use line chief fixed effects in this section. All results
are qualitatively similar when using line fixed effects instead of line chief fixed effects.
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Column 1 of Table 3.3 shows the results from estimating the empirical model
from equation 3.1. The ‘All Other Lines, Day n’ coefficients represent the effect of
log previous output of the same garment on all other lines in the factory for each
of the first five garment-days, while the ‘Lines Same Floor, Day n’ coefficients rep-
resent the effect of log prior output from other lines on the same floor. Output on
any other line increases productivity of later lines, and its effect does not seem to
reduce with the number of days the line already produces the garment. If including
more garment-days into the sample, the effect diminishes only slowly, but becoming
increasingly insignificant. On the other hand, output from lines on the same floor
has a large additional effect above and beyond the effect of previous output on any
line, which however disappears after the third production day.
The non-diminishing effect of output on any other line on productivity dis-
appears, however, when including additional fixed effects on the level of the 1,257
individual garments, as shown in column 2 of Table 3.3. This could point to selec-
tion of garments with potential for higher productivity, which is not captured by
garment type and SMV, into being produced on a larger number of lines. However,
this hypothesis is not supported by column 3, which repeats column 2, but excludes
those instances of lines starting garments in which no other line has produced the
garment before. The effect of previous output is now estimated only off its intensive
margin, off the amount of the garment that was already produced on other lines be-
fore, and not anymore off the extensive margin, whether another line has produced
the garment at all or not. Now both previous output on all other lines shows a sig-
nificant effect, as does the interaction with whether the garment has been produced
on the same floor before. The picture which now emerges is that the main effect of
previous output does not fundamentally depend on whether the garment has been
produced on the same or another floor before, with the effect being about a third
larger if the garment has been produced on the same floor before. The relatively low
level of this additional effect speaks against the hypothesis that the effect of previous
output is mainly a ‘within-person effect’, in the sense that the floor level production
manager gains knowledge about a certain garment on one line on his floor and then
applies the knowledge on another line. It seems more likely that knowledge on a
certain garment is gained by workers on one line, and then communicated to workers
on another, either on the level of ordinary workers, line chiefs, or floor supervisors.9
9In principle, the effect could still be a within-person effect in that the production head or head
engineer of the whole factory learns about all garments produced on any line in the factory and
then applies his or her knowledge when other lines anywhere in the factory start the same garment.
However, between two lines (at Factory 2) and 15 lines (Factory 3) on average change the garment
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So far, I showed the effect of previous output of the same garment on pro-
ductivity of new lines starting to produce the same garment. Most of the literature
on organizational learning used such effects as evidence for learning and knowledge
exchange in the factories. However, such effects could also be driven by other peer
effects. The mere fact that other workers in the factory produce the same product
could increase productivity even without learning effects. Workers could compete
about who is most productive with a product, or the productivity of some workers
could provide the factory management with a benchmark against which it could
compare productivity of other workers, and therefore more easily find out if workers
slack. To find more evidence on whether indeed knowledge transfers drive the pro-
ductivity increases of later lines producing the same garment, I run a simple placebo
test. If the increases in productivity that we observed would be driven by competi-
tion or less slack, these effects should arguably be even more prevalent if lines start
producing the same garment on the same day, as in these cases, the playing field for
competition or comparing efficiency should be more levelled. Furthermore, one can
study the effect of lines starting producing the same garment on the same day in
those cases when sewing lines are the first lines in the factory to produce a certain
garment. In these cases, no other workers have already gained experience with the
garment which could be shared. Therefore, learning effects should be absent. Thus,
in column 4 of Table 3.3, I study the productivity of the first lines in the factory to
produce a certain garment, and check whether it is increased if more than one line
start producing it on the same day, and if this effect is stronger if the other lines
starting the garment on the same day are located on the same floor.10 And, indeed,
strong and significant such effects can be seen in column 4.
This effect among first lines could be driven by selection of certain garments
into instances where more than one line is the first to produce it, such as rushed
starts, when an order needs to be completed quickly, and more than one line there-
fore start producing it on the same day. Furthermore, as each garment is only started
once for the first time in the factory, I cannot use garment fixed effects. Thus, the
on any given day. Thus it seems unlikely that these two persons could carry within them the whole
knowledge exchange process (while the additional effect of the floor supervisors, who are involved
in much less garment changes, is much smaller).
10I regress efficiency on log output produced on all other lines on the first day of production
which also started to produce the garment on the same day. There are 2,002 instances in the data
of a line starting a garment that has not been produced before on another line. At 1,170 of them,
some other line in the factory also starts producing the same garment on the same day, and at
1,054 instances, at least one of these other lines is located on the same floor.
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effects could be confounded by selection of garments with certain characteristics to
multiple first lines which is not controlled for by their type or SMV. Finally, the
presence of the effect among the first lines does not automatically imply that the
effect of previous output among later lines is not driven by learning effects; the two
effects could be explained by different mechanisms.
To gain additional insight on whether the effect among the first and later
lines are driven by the same or different mechanisms, I conduct a horse-race among
the two specifications in column 5, which replicates the specification from column
3, but adds log output produced by lines starting the garment on the same day
as additional independent variables. Note that this output is not mechanically co-
linear with previous output of the same garment, as previous output includes output
only up to, but excluding, the day the line also starts producing the same garment.
Thus, it cannot include output from lines starting the garment on the same day. In
fact, previous output and output from lines starting the garment on the same day
is negatively correlated, both overall and within units. As in this specification I can
observe again multiple starts per garment on different lines, I include garment fixed
effects again. The results from column 5 show that in this specification, both effects
are present. Lines are more productive the more of the same garment has already
been produced previously on other lines, and the more is being produced on the
same day on other lines.
To conclude this section, the existence of spill-over effects among first lines
should caution against interpreting the effects of output on other lines as learning,
even though in a regression which attempts to incorporate both peer and learning
effects, both effects seem to persevere. However, even when controlling for output
from other lines on the same day, previous output could still capture other possible
forms of peer effects. Therefore, the next section presents the results of a randomized
intervention which introduced exogenous variation in the likelihood that production
knowledge on garments is communicated, and shows that this intervention did have
an effect on line productivity when starting new garments.
3.4 Randomized Help Provision
To identify the effect that knowledge exchange between co-workers has on produc-
tivity growth, I carried out a randomized management intervention at the three
sample factories. Whenever a line on randomly selected ‘treatment’ sewing floors
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began producing a garment that had already been produced by any other line chief
in the factory, the most senior line chief with previous experience on the garment
was instructed by the factory’s production management to brief for 15-30 minutes
the line chief without the garment-specific experience on how initial production
problems with the garment were overcome on the earlier line.
The intention of this treatment was to exogenously increase the potential for
knowledge exchange on the production process of the garment between randomly
selected pairs of line chiefs, by lowering the costs of helping. In particular, the
intervention can be thought to decrease two parts of the cost of seeking and pro-
viding help. First, the possible perceived cost to approach someone else for help, as
one exposes a lack of knowledge on how to solve certain production problems (Lee
[2002]; DePaulo and Fisher [1980]). By having someone else being sent by higher
ups to share his or her experience with the garment, knowledge is shared without an
initial request for help which would reveal a lack of knowledge. Second, especially
if the person asked to share his or her knowledge needs to go to the workplace of
the other person to provide effective help, help provision can be thought to have a
fixed and a variable cost component. Allowing the distraction of listening to some-
one’s request for help, and possibly moving to the other person’s workplace would
constitute a fixed cost. Once this cost is borne, one would need to decide how much
effort to spend into analysing the problem at hand and figuring out an effective way
to communicate a possible solution, which introduces a variable cost component
into help provision. While the randomized help provision does not eliminate either
cost, it does make the fixed cost of engaging with the other worker and moving to
his or her workplace sunk, as the worker cannot decide anymore whether or not
to bear these costs. Thus we can think of this cost as being taken out of the cost-
benefit analysis of the worker asked to provide help, when deciding whether to do so.
The experiment ran on the treatment floors for four months, from June to
September 2014. The production data shows 377 non-first garment starts on the
treatment floors during this time at which some other line chief had already produced
the same garment, which should have been treated in the randomized experiment.
The treatment protocol was implemented by the industrial engineers from the fac-
tories. The engineers were provided experimental log books to record each instance
of a treatment of a garment start. According to these logbooks, 220 treatments
were actually administered during this time, of which 125 could be matched with
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garment starts in the production data.11 However, it is likely that compliance was
higher than indicated by these numbers. The implementing engineers admitted un-
derreporting of treatments in the logbooks. Among the actually treated garment
starts, there is likely to be selection into treatment of garment starts for which the
treatment was expected to have a stronger effect.12 For these reasons, the analysis
will focus on the intention to treat effect, assuming that any start of a garment
that should have been treated was actually treated. Any non-compliance with the
treatment would lead to an underestimation of the treatment effect.13
The sample from which floors were randomly selected consisted of 17 floors
across the three factories (Factory 3 requested to include only six out of its 14 floors
in the sample).14 Randomization across floors was chosen to make compliance with
the randomized implementation as simple as possible for the factory management.
The original intention was to randomize treatment across sewing lines. However,
the factory managements were worried that it would be too difficult for their staff
to remember which lines should be treated and which not. Furthermore, there was
the concern that if the intervention is implemented at some lines on a given floor,
and if it proves effective, its implementation would quickly be copied by other lines
in the same floor, which usually operate just a few meters away. Table 3.4 below
shows tests of balanced outcomes over observable average line and line chief char-
acteristics from April and May 2014, just before the start of the intervention, when
the random selection of units was done. No observable line chief or line character-
istics differ significantly across treatment and control floors, except for average line
11At 16 out of these matched reports, however, according to the production data, no other line
chief had produced the garment before. It seems that in these instances, line chiefs that had already
produced similar garments were sent to give instructions. The main reason for non-matching was
mismatch of the garment identifier provided in the logbooks, which could not be matched to any
garment the line was producing according to the production data in the days around which the
treatment was reportedly done.
12All three factories reported that already before the intervention, at times they sent line chiefs
to other lines to help their co-workers with new garments, if they are already experienced with the
garments. However, this behaviour was not institutionalized in any of the three factories. To the
extent that the factories already induced line chiefs to help each other, the factories were instructed
to not change their behaviour on the control floors, while always sending line chiefs to brief others
starting the same garments on the treatment floors.
13Note that there is no indication of garment starts on control floors being treated. The log-
books do not show any such treatment, and also the production managers who implemented the
intervention showed no sign of confusion about which garment starts should be treated, and which
not.
14In fact, the sample of floors over which the randomization occurred consisted of only 15 sewing
floors. However, at factory 1 and 2, one floor was randomly chosen at each factory, and one
(physical) half of the floor randomly selected into treatment. Therefore, the randomization occurred
effectively across 17 units, 13 full floors, and 4 half floors.
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Table 3.4: Balancing of Randomization across Sewing Lines
Control Lines Treated Lines N
Line Chief Characteristics
Age 30.06 0.16 73
Seniority Factory (months) 61.79 2.48 74
Seniority as Line Chief (months) 34.71 0.12 74
Seniority as LC current line (months) 9.45 6.54 71
Promoted Internally 64.7% -0.02% 74
Nbr. Social Connections 2.66 0.47 74
Education 15.27 -0.22 72
Line Characteristics
Avg. Number Worker 28.92 1.59 140
Avg. Daily Hours 9.57 0.16 140
Avg. Efficiency 53.53 -3.09* 140
Avg. SMV 10.76 -0.81 140
Notes: Line Chief characteristics from line chief surveys. Line characteristics from
production data. Values in ‘Treated Lines’ columns show deviation of average values
from treated lines from those from control lines, with * reflecting statistical difference
on 10% level.
efficiency, which was lower on the treated floors (p-value 0.082).15
As the intervention was conducted at the end of the time covered by the col-
lected production data, a substantial amount of pre-intervention data is available.
Figure 3.4 plots the average efficiency over the first four days a line produces a new
garment for four different cases: treated lines before and during the intervention,
and non-treated lines before and during the intervention in the factory. I use data
from the beginning of 2014 until end of September 2014, when the initially defined
treatment time ended. The left hand side shows the average learning curves over
all garment starts, while the right hand side shows the graph when only considering
non-first garment starts, which are in principle ‘treatable’. Prior to the start of
the intervention, and compared to control lines, treated lines had on average lower
efficiency values at the first days a new garment was produced, which fits with the
overall lower efficiency among lines in treatment floors shown in Table 3.4. This
difference is not accounted for by observable characteristics of lines or line chiefs,
15All differences, except for line efficiency, remain insignificant when controlling for factory fixed
effects.
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Figure 3.4: Pre-and Post- Treatment Learning Curves
Both graphs plot average efficiency over the first four days a line produces a new garment for
four different cases: From treatment floors, prior to start of treatment (solid square symbols),
from treatment floors, during experiment (solid triangle symbols), from control floors prior to
start of treatment (hollow square symbols), and from control floors during time of treatment
(hollow triangle symbols). Left hand graph uses sample of all garment starts, while right hand
side only from non-first garment starts. Efficiency standardized on factory-level.
and is driven by two out of the three factories. However, as shown in Figure 3.4,
while productivity remains constant across pre-treatment and treatment time on
control floors, treated lines experience an upward shift in their learning curves dur-
ing the time of the treatment. Interpreting the results in a difference-in-difference
framework, the intervention indeed had an effect in raising efficiency, especially at
the first day a new garment was produced.
Using a difference in difference framework to identify treatment effects, one
should check whether pre-trends differ between treated and non-treated units. Fig-
ure 3.5 provides such a check. For the first day a line produces a new garment that
has already been produced by another line before, it plots monthly average efficiency
over the year 2014, separately for lines selected for treatment (square symbols) and
as control lines (triangle symbols). The vertical line indicates the start of the treat-
ment with June 2014. It indeed looks as if first day efficiency was systematically
lower at floors selected for treatment in the months before the start of the treatment.
This difference is then greatly reduced with the onset of the intervention due to an
upward shift of first day efficiency on treatment floors, especially when compared to
the three months directly preceding the start of the intervention.
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Figure 3.5: Pre-Post Intervention Start Trends for First
Day Efficiency
Graph shows average monthly efficiency of lines on the first day they start
producing a new garment, separately for lines selected for treatment (solid
squares) and lines not selected (hollow triangles). The vertical line indi-
cates start of treatment from June 2014 on. Capped bars represent 95%
confidence intervals.
To estimate the intention-to-treat effect of the intervention in a difference-
in-difference approach, I keep, similar as above, the observations from the first three
garment-days from each garment start from those floors which were part of the
sample among which treatment floors were selected, from January until September
2014. As the intervention ran in the treatment factories from June to the end of
September 2014, it covers roughly the second half of the sample.16 Using this sam-
ple, I run the following baseline regression:
yfignt =
∑
n
βTn Treatign + αfin + γfn + δign + fignt (3.2)
Productvity yfignt of line i producing garment g on one of the first three
garment-days n is regressed on a dummy Treatign for the start of the garment
randomly being selected for treatment, interacted with fixed effects for the three
16More precisely, the intervention started on 21st May 2014 at Factory 2, on 23rd May in Factory
1, and on 1st June in Factory 3
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different garment-days included in the sample. I control, as in the previous section,
for fixed effects αfin on the line-chief - garment-day level, and γft on the factory-
week level. Furthermore, I include fixed effects δign for the ‘rank’ of the line in the
roll-out of the garment, which indicates how many other line chiefs in the factory
have already produced the garment, interacted with garment-day fixed effects.17
The reduction in the difference of starting productivity with the onset of the
intervention could imply that the results are caused by some other form of catch
up of productivity on treatment floors relative to control floors, which coincided
with the start of the intervention. To address this concern, I apply the reweight-
ing approach by DiNardo et al. [1996] to all regressions. It reweights observations
from the treatment floors such that in the pre-treatment time the average learning
curves do not differ anymore between treatment and control floors. I use the ap-
proach in a similar way as Duflo et al. [2013], who adapted it to control for possible
endogenous selection into treatment. Their basic idea is to reweight observations
from a controlled experiment such that independent variables that were not bal-
anced pre-treatment between treated and control units become balanced after the
reweighting. In this paper, I apply this approach to correct for the fact that the
dependent variable of efficiency on the first days a line starts a new garment is not
balanced between treatment and control groups prior to the start of the randomized
experiment. Identification using the reweighting approach relies on the assumption
that the treatment effect does not depend on the distribution of the independent and
dependent variables, as the approach creates artificial counterfactual distributions
in the sample used to estimate the treatment effect. More details on the implemen-
tation of the approach are shown in Appendix D.
Figure 3.6 demonstrates the reweighting approach, replicating Figure 3.5 af-
ter reweighting the data such that efficiency on the first day a line produces a new
garment which has already been produced on another line before is balanced in the
two months before the start of the intervention, the same time frame used to create
the results for the balancing tests from Table 3.4. Indeed, the graph now shows that
in the reweighted sample, efficiency on the first day a line starts producing a new
garment that has already been produced on another line before does not significantly
differ anymore between treatment and control floors in the two months before the
17Instead of rank fixed effects, I could have also controlled for cumulative output of the same
garment on previous lines, the central variable of interest in the regression from the previous section.
However, to more flexibly control for how many lines have already produced the garment before, I
instead use rank fixed effects (interacted with garment-day).
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Figure 3.6: Pre-Post Intervention Start Trends for First
Day Efficiency, Reweighted Data
Graph shows average monthly efficiency of lines on the first day they start
producing a new garment, separately for lines selected for treatment (solid
squares) and lines selected as controls (hollow triangels), with efficiency
data reweighted following the approach from DiNardo et al. [1996]. The
vertical line indicates start of treatment from June 2014 on. The lines
through the symbols represent 95% confidence intervals.
start of the intervention. In the reweighted data, no effect of the treatment is visible
during the first month of the intervention, in June 2014. A positive effect is now
mainly visible during July and September 2014.
Due to the small number of only 17 clusters over which the randomization
was conducted, special attention needs to be given for inference, as even standard
errors clustered on the 17 floors can be biased downwards, as shown by Cameron
et al. (2008). They suggest wild cluster bootstrap to estimate adequate standard
errors, which will be applied at all regressions estimating the effects of the random-
ized intervention.
Column 1 from Table 3.5 shows the results when estimating the model from
equation 3.2, using the reweighted data. A significant positive effect on productivity
on the first day of production of a new garment can be seen. First day efficiency is
increased by 4.09 efficiency units, which resembles 19.2% of the standard deviation
of first day productivity. Average first day productivity of lines if other lines have
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already produced the garment is 40.0 efficiency units, and overall long run efficiency
is 50.1. Thus, the intervention reduces the average gap of first day to long run
efficiency by about 40%. The effect becomes successively smaller and insignificant
on the second and third day of production. Column 2 adds garment fixed effects,
which had been shown in Table 3.3 to be important when estimating the general ef-
fect of previous cumulative output on productivity. In principle, the characteristics
of the garments produced on treatment and control lines should be balanced, due to
their random selection, and Table 3.4 shows no significant difference in the SMV of
garments across these two types of lines. However, the non-balanced pre-treatment
efficiency levels between treatment and control lines could be due to different gar-
ments being produced on these floors whose effect on efficiency is not captured by
their SMV, and the treatment effects we see could be induced spuriously by a change
in the garments produced on treatment lines. Thus, column 2 includes garment fixed
effects, which makes the estimate of the effect on first day efficiency somewhat larger
and more significant.
So far, I included all instances of a line starting a new garment in the sample.
However, only those starts of garments at which at least one other line has already
produced the same garment before can be treated, as the design of the intervention
requires the presence of one line chief who is already experienced with the gar-
ment, who can administer the briefing. Thus, a more direct way of estimating the
intention-to-treat effect is to restrict the sample only to the non-first garment starts,
both before and after the start of the intervention at the factory, and on treatment
and control floors, which is done in column 3. The results remain qualitatively the
same when estimated only on this restricted sample.
While garment fixed effects control for all unobservable characteristics of the
garment, they do not capture possible interaction effects of garments and lines. And
while lines are in principle not specialized on certain garment types, they could nev-
ertheless be differentially productive for different types of garments, for example as
they happened to have produced more of a certain garment type in the past than
another. And while I cannot control for garment - line chief fixed effects, as each line
chief only produces a garment once for the first time, I can control for garment type
- line chief fixed effects, to capture interaction effects between lines and classes of
garments, such as t-shirts, polos, or pants. Thus, column 4 uses line chief - garment
type fixed effects instead of garment fixed effects, which leads to a large increase in
the estimated effect of the intervention. This could be indicative of the effect of the
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communication intervention being larger among those garments which the line chief
was usually worse at producing. Furthermore, using this specification, the effect of
the intervention also becomes marginally significant on the second day of production
of the garment.
The hypothesis that the effect of the intervention could have had a stronger
effect among garment types which the specific line chief would struggle more with
also fits with evidence from Figure 3.7, which shows distributions of line productiv-
ities on the first day they produce garments that were already produced on other
lines before, for four different cases: treatment lines before (Jan-May 2014) and
during (Jun-Sep 2014) the implementation of the experiment, and control lines at
the same times. The increase in first day productivity of treatment lines during
the implementation of the intervention seems to be driven by a strong reduction of
the left tail of the productivity distribution. The number of starts with very low
productivity is greatly reduced, which is indicative of the individual treatments be-
ing enacted specifically when very low productivity could have been expected. This
also fits with the fact that less treatments were reported in the logbooks than gar-
ments starts selected for treatment were shown in the production data. And while
the production engineers said that the logbooks underreport the number of actually
conducted treatments, they also explained that in cases in which a line chief could
be expected to start the garment without any problems, as he or she had already
produced very similar garments before, no treatment was done as no effect of the
treatment was expected.
As an additional check on whether this treatment effect could be caused spu-
riously by a change in the characteristics of garments on treatment lines with the
onset of the intervention, Figure 3.8 replicates the distribution graphs of Figure 3.7,
however using the SMV of the garments produced on treatment and control lines
before and after the start of the garment instead of first day efficiency. Given that
the SMV of a garment captures the required labour input to produce one piece of
it, the SMV is a proxy for the complexity of the garment, and is highly negatively
correlated with efficiency in the overall data. However, there seems to be no shift in
the distribution of SMVs of the garments on treatment lines with the onset of the
intervention. Average SMV actually slightly increases. There is also no differential
pattern visible on control lines. This speaks against the treatment effects being
caused spuriously by treatment or control line shifting to a different composition of
the garments they produce with the onset of the treatment.
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Figure 3.7: First Day Productivity Distribution before and dur-
ing Intervention
Graph shows distribution of productivity on first day sewing lines produce new
garments already produced on some other line in the factory before, on treatment
floors, before and during implementation of intervention (top row), and on control
floors, before and during the implementation (bottom row).
3.5 Randomized Help Provision and Social Ties
The surveys that I conducted among all line chiefs in the three factories in the sample
contained questions on social ties they had to other line chiefs in the same factory.
This allows to study whether the effect of the treatment is affected by the pres-
ence of social ties to the line chief who provided the briefing. Social ties have been
shown to play important roles within firms, such as matching firms with workers
(Granovetter [1973, 1995], or Heath [2015] in the case of Bangladeshi garment facto-
ries), or to affect effort choice of workers (Bandiera et al. [2010]). Furthermore, they
have also been shown to play important roles outside organization in learning about
new technologies in small scale agricultural settings (Foster and Rosenzweig [1995];
Munshi [2004]; Bandiera and Rasul [2006]; Conley and Udry [2010]) or about new
microfinance services (Banerjee et al. [2013]; Cai et al. [2015]). However, due to the
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Figure 3.8: SMV Distribution of Garments before and during
Intervention
Distribution of SMV of the garments already produced on some other line in the
factory before, on treatment floors, before and during implementation of intervention
(top row), and on control floors, before and during the implementation (bottom row).
lack of documentation of many instances in which help should have been provided,
it is often not clear which line chief was sent for the briefing. Furthermore, to the
extent that the factory management is aware of social ties among line chiefs, it could
have sent socially connected line chiefs to provide the briefings in selected instances
in which it expected the line chief to profit either particularly much or little from
the briefing, which would bias the estimate of the interaction effect. To address this
problem, I exploit the instructions that were given to the factories which said that
the most ‘senior’ line chief in the factory who already produced the garment should
be the one that is sent to provide the briefings.18 Therefore, I interact treatment
18This specific instruction was given to minimize possible resistance among line chiefs against
the intervention, in cases in which less senior line chiefs were sent to more senior line chiefs. In
these cases, help provision might have not been accepted by the line chief who was supposed to be
briefed. Given that only randomly selected line chiefs receive briefings by these senior line chiefs,
the intervention essentially estimates the treatment effect of receiving help from the most senior
line chief who already produced the same garment. This estimate might be the most useful for
policy implications, as other factories implementing such a management intervention could likely
adapt the same policy, of always sending the most senior worker who has experience with certain
processes to instruct co-workers on them.
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with whether the line chief receiving the treatment reported social ties to the most
senior line chief who already produced the garment, which was the case in 59 out
of the 377 garment starts which should have been treated.19. I measure seniority
by the time a line chief already worked as line chief in the factory. To the extent
that it was not the most senior line chief according to this measure who was sent to
provide the treatment, or that no treatment occurred, the estimated effect can be
interpreted as an intention to treat (ITT) effect of the interaction.
Column 1 of Table 3.6 shows the results of this interaction, replicating col-
umn 1 from Table 3.5, but adding two further dummy variables, each interacted with
garment-day. The first (‘Connected, Day n’) indicates that the line chief starting
the garment shares social ties with the most senior line chief who has so far pro-
duced the garment, and the second is an interaction of this variable with whether
the garment start should have been treated. In this specification, a positive but
insignificant effect can be seen on the first day a line produces a garment, while the
effect turns negative, and still insignificant on the second day.
In column 2 the usual line-chief - garment-day fixed effects are interacted
with garment type fixed effects, as was already done in column 4 of Table 3.5. Now,
the effect of the interaction becomes very large, 17 efficiency units, or 84% of the
standard deviations of productivity on the first day a line produces a new garment
that has been produced on another line before. However, this large effect comes
against the backdrop of a large and negative (but insignificant) effect of being con-
nected to the most senior line chief in general. This could point towards the effect
being driven by a few influential observations, and it indeed seems that two observa-
tions with unusual high efficiency values of over 150 points have an over proportional
effect on the results. I thus drop all 3 observations with efficiency values of more
than 150 points.20 The size of the interaction term now drops to 11 efficiency points
(and its p-value to 0.051), while the general effect of being connected to the most
senior person who produced the garment so far drops to 6 efficiency points, remain-
ing insignificant.
Thus, there is some cautious evidence that the effect of the treatment was
19The network data I use is directed, in the sense that line chief A is considered socially connected
to line chief B if and only if line chief A reported a link on one of the six dimensions asked to line
chief B, regardless of whether line chief B reported a connection to line chief A or not.
20This is done after the data had already be cleaned of clear outliers with efficiency values of
more than 200 points.
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stronger when the briefing was done by a line chief with whom the line chief receiving
the briefing shared social ties, if we condition the regression on line-chief - garment
type fixed effects. This is in line with findings from the previous section, that also
the overall treatment effect was stronger when conditioned on these fixed effects. In
fact, once an interaction term with social ties is included in the regression, the size
of the general effect of the treatment remains close to the ones estimated without
line-chief - garment type fixed effects. The increase in the overall effect we saw in
Table 3.5 when including these fixed effects seems to be driven by those instances
in which the briefing was done by a socially connected supervisor.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper presented evidence from a randomized communication intervention in
three Bangladeshi garment factories, with the aim of reducing the costs of sharing
knowledge about the production processes of garments which are produced on dif-
ferent sewing lines in the same factory. In the intervention, supervisors of randomly
selected sewing lines receive a briefing whenever they start producing a new gar-
ment which has already been produced by any other line in the factory before, by
the most senior supervisor who already produced the garment on his or her line.
I show that productivity of those lines was increased whenever they were selected
to receive a treatment. The increase in productivity was mainly visible on the first
day a line produced a new garment, while in some specifications also on the second.
Thus it is visible during the steepest part of the learning curve through which lines
go when starting to produce a new garment. The effect was driven by a reduction
of the number of starts of garments with extremely low productivity. This points
towards the treatment having been more effective at those garment starts at which
productivity would have otherwise been very low.
To obtain an idea of the overall effect of this intervention on factory produc-
tivity and profits, I use the baseline estimate from column 1, Table 3.5, which shows
a significant increase of productivity of about 4.1 efficiency points on the first day
a line produces a new garment. Sewing lines on average switch to a new garment
every 10 days, and at roughly every second of these starts, another line has already
produced the garment before. As average daily productivity in the three factories is
47.4 efficiency units, a very basic back-of-the envelope calculation shows that output
was increased by 4.1/(2 ∗ 10 ∗ 47.4) ≈ 0.43%. Anecdotal evidence shows that labour
costs make up around 12% of revenue on average in these factories, while the profit
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margin is about 6%. If we assume that the intervention would save 0.43% of labour
costs, this would translate into an increase in profits of 0.86%. On the other hand,
the pure monetary costs of the intervention are very low. The hourly wage of a line
chief in the factories is about US $0.50, therefore the wage cost of a half-hour brief-
ing is about $0.25. In the largest of the three factories with more than 180 sewing
lines, if every garment start at which the garment was already produced on another
line before were treated, roughly 3000 such briefings would have to be conducted
per year, yielding a yearly monetary cost of the intervention of $750. I do not have
information on the revenues of the firms, but local business newspaper report that
factories of this size generate revenue in excess of $10 Mio per year, which, using
the commonly referenced margin of 6%, would yield profits of $600,000. A 0.85%
increase would thus imply an increase in profits of ca. $5,000, or a return on the
intervention of more than 700%.
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Chapter 4
Social Network Formation in
the Workplace:
Evidence from Four Bangladeshi
Garment Factories
4.1 Introduction
Social networks have been shown of importance in areas as diverse as matching sup-
ply and demand in markets, diffusion of new technologies, in driving peer effects, or
facilitating contract enforcement.1
This growing interest in social networks has fostered the collection of original net-
work data, especially in development economics. Recent studies that do so include
Banerjee et al. [2013], who collected network data from 75 villages in Southern India,
Beaman et al. [2015], who did so from 200 villages in Malawi, Alatas et al. [2012],
who collected network data from 640 hamlets in Indonesia, or Cai et al. [2015], who
did so in 185 Chinese villages. These novel network data from rural communities in
developing countries add to an existing stock of network data from developed coun-
tries, such as the AddHealth dataset, which contains network data among students
at 84 US high schools, and which has been extensively used in empirical network
research (e.g. Clark and Loheac [2007]; Calvo-Armengol et al. [2009]; Currarini et al.
[2009], or Mele [2013]), or the social network data among Harvard students, first used
by Leider et al. [2009]. This paper introduces and discusses a novel network data set
1Section two of this chapter contains a broad discussion of the vast literature on social networks
in economics and social sciences.
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collected among sewing line supervisors (‘line chiefs’) in four Bangladeshi garment
factories in 2013/14, and compares characteristics of these networks against those
from other networks used in the literature. To the best of my knowledge, this is the
first network dataset from workers within large firms in a development context. It is
similar in size and focus to the one collected by Bandiera et al. [2010] from workers
at a UK soft fruit producer, and it is used in Chapter 2 of this thesis, to estimate
whether communication of production knowledge between co-workers within firms
has a larger effect on productivity if workers share social ties.2 This chapter applies
several common network formation models to this data to understand which, if any,
of these models is best able to explain the processes that led to the formation of
these networks at the garment factories.
While the main contribution of this chapter is the introduction and descrip-
tion of the new line chief network dataset, the availability of network data from a
novel background offers contributions to a few not yet settled discussions in network
research, by adding empirical evidence in favour or against certain hypotheses in the
field. First, it shows that in a network in which nodes are grouped into clearly de-
marked groups (sewing floors), a block-random graph model with just two estimated
probabilities, one for within group tie formation and one for cross-group tie forma-
tion, does a good job at capturing both the empirical density and clustering levels of
the network, something that many other network formation models have struggled
to do in other contexts. It thus contributes to a discussion on whether the commonly
observed high clustering levels of empirical networks are mainly due to homophily
or network externalities (Graham [2015a]). Second, the negative correlation of a line
chief’s in-degree, but not out-degree, with subsequent turnover adds to a literature
in organizational studies which has found conflicting evidence on which measure of
network positions matters for predicting turnover in different datasets (Mossholder
et al. [2005]; Feeley et al. [2008]). And third, the data shows that newly arriving line
chiefs tend to form ties to existing line chiefs with higher lagged in-degree values
from the time before the arrival of the new line chiefs, confirming a main assumption
of preferential attachment random graph models (even though this model’s predic-
tions fit poorly with the characteristics of the line chief network). The availability of
lagged degree allows to better identify the effect of degree on subsequent line forma-
tion, which is more problematic if only one cross-section of network data is available.
2More precisely, a subset of the network data is used in Chapter 2, as only three out of the four
factories in the sample also participated in the communication intervention analysed in Chapter 2.
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The network data was collected from sewing line supervisors in four garment
factories in and around the Bangladeshi capital Dhaka. These factories, locally
owned and managed, but producing all of their output for export to international
garment retailers, are organized into several departments – knitting, dyeing, cut-
ting, sewing, and finishing. The sewing departments are the most labour intensive
ones, employing 50-70% of all workers in the sample factories, and are organized
into parallel, independent sewing lines of 20-80 workers, each designed such that
the whole sewing process of one garment can be done on one line.3 Please refer to
Chapter three of this thesis for more background information on the factories in the
sample.
Each sewing line is headed by a supervisor, typically called ‘line chief’. It is
these line chiefs among which the network data was collected. All line chiefs at the
four factories in the sample were asked to report social ties to all other line chiefs
in the same factory on six dimensions:4 kinship, which other line chiefs one already
knew before working at the factory, with whom one had already worked together
at another factory before, whom one had already visited at home, with whom one
spends lunch breaks together, and with whom one generally is befriended.
The surveys were administered twice, in 2013 and 2014, at Factory 1 and 2,
and once in 2014 at factory 3 and 4, as these two factories only joined the project
in early 2014. Thus, the dataset contains six networks on the factory-year level. At
Factory 1, 67% of all line chiefs surveyed in 2014 were already surveyed in 2013,
while this share was 47% in Factory 2, implying rather high turnover rates among
line chiefs in these factories. In total 227 surveys of 185 distinct line chiefs across the
four factories were conducted, implying that 42 line chiefs were interviewed twice,
once in 2013 and once in 2014. Table 4.1 below summarizes key demographic charac-
teristics of the surveyed line chiefs for each factory-year. Only two out of the 185 line
chiefs interviewed are female (with one female line chief interviewed twice), reflect-
ing a very strong gender imbalance at supervisory levels at the factories, which can
3The number of workers per line is much more homogeneous within the sample factories. In
fact, within factories, lines are kept more or less interchangeable by the factory management, to
maximize flexibility in a production environment characterized by many shocks, such as power
failures, supply and delivery chain failures (often caused by the frequent political general strikes,
called ‘hartals’), and low predictability of the orders which will be placed by buyers. Variation
across factories in average number of workers per line stems from specialization of factories into
garment types (shirts, pants, jackets,) or fabric types (knit, woven).
4The four sample factories are located 1-3 hours travel by car from each other. Thus, it is
unlikely that the surveyed line chiefs might have social ties to line chiefs at another of the four
factories in the sample, and no attempt was made to elicit such ties across factories in the surveys.
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Table 4.1: Line Chief Characteristics
Fact. 1 Fact. 1 Fact. 2 Fact. 2 Fact. 3 Fact. 4
2013 2014 2013 2014 2014 2014
Age 28.8 30.0 30.4 30.0 32.2 30.8
Years in factory 3.9 4.3 5.9 5.0 6.2 5.2
Years as Line Chief 2.0 2.4 1.9 1.8 3.5 2.3
Promoted Internally 56% 58% 81% 73% 52% 77%
Education Code 14.9 15.0 14.9 14.7 15.7 15.1
N 57 53 16 15 60 26
N Female Line Chiefs 1 1 0 1 0 0
Notes: All information from survey of all line chiefs in factory. Promoted internally is
percentage of current line chiefs who worked on lower position in same factory before and
were subsequently promoted to line chief.
be found throughout the Bangladeshi garment industry.5 Otherwise, average line
chief characteristics are homogeneous across the factories, particularly age. Only
at Factory 3 are line chiefs slightly older, and have worked already slightly longer
at the current factory, as well as on their current position as line chiefs. They also
report on average slightly higher educational attainment.6
This paper proceeds as follows. Section two will survey the literature on so-
cial networks. Section three will describe in more detail the network data collected
from the line chiefs at the four factories. Section four will apply basic random graph
network formation models to the data, while section five will do so with models
which allow for richer heterogeneity in network nodes. Section six will study actual
network formation directly from the data, exploiting the fact that from Factory 1
and 2, two network surveys at different points in time are available, allowing us to
directly observe how line chiefs who arrive new between these two surveys form ties
5Notwithstanding this, ca. 80% of the total sewing labour force in the four sample factories
is female. Workers typically start working in the garment factories at the age of 18 (child labour
prohibition these days enforced through foreign buyers), and drop out again at the age of 25-
30, unless promoted to supervisory, mechanical, or quality inspector positions. However, almost
only male workers are promoted to these positions. Chapter 2 of this dissertation compares the
effectiveness of female and male supervisors from a multi-angle perspective, and discusses possible
reasons for the very low promotion rate of women to supervisory positions.
6Differences in age, seniority and education from Factory 3 to other factories are statistically
significant on 5% level. Education code is an IPA Bangladesh (the survey firm) specific code for
educational attainment, with 14 implying 10 years of schooling, 15 implying secondary schooling
certificate (SSC), and 16 implying 11 years of schooling.
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with the existing line chiefs and with other new ones. Section seven will study the
effect of network position on turnover between the two survey rounds, while section
eight will conclude.
4.2 Literature
The literature on social networks is vast, and this chapter can only provide a ten-
tative overview. The research on social networks originated from sociology and
political science . However, at least since the 1990s, interest into social networks
has rapidly grown among economists as well. The literature on networks can broadly
be separated into two classes. The first takes social networks as given, and studies its
effects on people’s behaviour, knowledge, and attitudes, while the second studies the
formation of networks. However, the formation of networks is often endogenous to
its effects. Therefore, this separation is not always desirable. Only recently, though,
did studies emerge which analyse the formation and effects of networks simulta-
neously (e.g. Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens [2013] on peer effects in academic
achievement among high-school students).
4.2.1 Literature on Effects of Social Networks
The first class of the literature on the effects of given networks is the older and larger
one, spanning social sciences such as sociology, political science, anthropology, eco-
nomics or criminology. Lazarsfeld et al. [1944] is often cited as a starting point of
research on the effects of social networks, when they show how US voters rely on
the opinion of other people in their social network, and especially on opinion leaders
among them, to make decisions on whom to vote. Lazarsfeld and Merton [1954]
coined the term ‘homophily’, to describe the often observed preference of persons to
form social ties to other persons who are similar to them. Myers and Schultz [1951]
and Granovetter [1973, 1995] showed that large shares of jobs are found through so-
cial networks of workers, starting a large literature on the interplay between social
networks and labour markets. Ioannides and Loury [2004] provide a survey of this
literature up to this point. More recently, one focus of the literature on social ties
and finding a job has been on immigrant communities. Munshi [2003] uses rainfall
as instrument for migration waves of Mexicans to the US, and shows that when
larger numbers of Mexicans have recently arrived in the US, the chances of finding a
job for newly arriving immigrants increase. Beaman [2012] finds similar effects using
exogenous resettlements of refugees from different nationalities among US cities.
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The role of social ties in bringing together supply and demand has also been
documented in markets other than the labour market. In an early paper about
Moroccan bazaar traders, Geertz [1978] argues that focusing attention on a narrow
subset of possible trade partners in the market to whom one is socially connected is
profit maximizing. Sampling offers of supply and demand for a given good from all
traders in the market on any given day does not allow to collect the necessary back-
ground information on all the traders to prevent being shortchanged. Uzzi [1996]
documents the role of social ties among producers and traders in the New York
garment industry. Social ties allow for the transfer of valuable information between
traders and producers and facilitate joint problem solving in case of unforeseen dif-
ficulties. He goes on to show that traders that conduct more trade within steady
business relationships are less likely to exit business. Weisbuch et al. [1996, 2000]
are case studies about the fish market of Marseille, France, showing how many buy-
ers only buy from a small subset of sellers in the market. This tendency is more
pronounced among buyers which buy more frequently and larger amounts. Finally,
McMillan and Woodruff [1999] find that Vietnamese entrepreneurs whose relation-
ship was initiated through business associations or common third business partners
grant more trade credit to each other, as these social ties can be leveraged against
defaulting on the credit.
Another widely studied effect of social ties is the one on technology diffusion.
The literature can be traced back to Coleman et al. [1966], who showed that physi-
cians who had more social ties were faster at starting to prescribe novel drugs. They
argued that this is caused by the spread of information on these drugs through social
networks. Using a more careful research design, by looking at the effect of ‘opinion
leaders’ among physicians during times of heightened uncertainty due to changes in
prescription guidelines, Bhatia et al. [2006] confirm the effect of social ties among
physicians on drug adoption. Over the last decades, the effect of social ties on tech-
nology adoption has been studied especially intensely in the context of small scale
agriculture in developing countries. Foster and Rosenzweig [1995] and Munshi [2004]
in the context of India, Bandiera and Rasul [2006] in Mozambique, and Conley and
Udry [2010] in Ghana all documented how the adoption of improved seeds or more
profitable cash crops spread along social ties among farmers. Similarly, in a recent
paper, Banerjee et al. [2013] inform exogenously selected leader in Indian villages
about newly available microfinance services, and show how knowledge and take-up
of these services spread along social ties within the villages. The take-up decision
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in this case was mainly driven by knowledge that spread about the product, not by
the number of other people in ones social circle who also took up the product. Thus
the effect of social ties on adoption seems to be primarily a knowledge diffusion
effect, and not so much a peer effect. Similarly, Cai et al. [2015] show that adoption
of rain-indexed agricultural insurance spreads along social networks among Chinese
villagers. They argue that as in the case of microfinance take-up in the Indian vil-
lages, the effect was driven by diffusion of knowledge about the product, and not by
peer effects. Similar research in developed countries has shown how the decision on
whether and which health insurance plan (Sorensen [2006]) or retirement plan (Duflo
and Saez [2003]) to pick is strongly correlated among colleagues working in the same
departments within organizations. Duflo and Saez [2003] provided a small monetary
incentive to random workers from a large organization to attend retirement plan in-
formation events, and find that non-incentivized worker from the departments of
the incentivized workers have a significantly higher propensity to attend the events
as well, and to obtain retirement plans, compared to non-incentivized workers from
departments at which no worker was incentivized. Bertrand et al. [2000] showed
how social networks affect dependency on welfare, while Hong et al. [2004] show
their effect on participation in the stock market.
A further strand of literature has emphasized the role that kinship and neigh-
bourhood networks play in insuring against negative shocks in developing countries
(De Weerdt and Fafchamps [2011]; Fafchamps and Gubert [2007a,b]; De Weerdt and
Dercon [2006]). Two main findings of this literature are that these networks are not
necessarily formed optimally, in that they do not link heterogeneous members which
likely face uncorrelated shocks. Furthermore, transfers to insure against negative
shocks are not necessarily based on reciprocity but exhibit significant net-transfers
over time between network members, pointing towards social norms and altruism
as driver behind these transfers. In a recent interesting contribution, the ability
of community based networks to sometimes shift whole communities into new oc-
cupations with better income prospects has also been described (Munshi [2011]).
However, community network effects need not be unambiguously positive, as rural
community based insurance networks can also discourage people to migrate to cities
in search of better paid work (Munshi and Rosenzweig [2013]).
Finally, the work of Kandel [1978] on how peers in social networks of ado-
lescents affect political attitudes and the propensity for drug use spawned a long
interest in social sciences on networks and peer effects among adolescents. Re-
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cent contributions are for example Clark and Loheac [2007], who confirm peer ef-
fects among adolescents on (legal) drug use, showing that these effects are stronger
among boys, or Calvo-Armengol et al. [2009], who show that the centrality of the
position of a student in his or her peer network affects his or her school performance.
4.2.2 Literature on Network Formation
The second class of research on networks studies the formation of networks. For the
most part, this research attempts to infer from the structure of established networks
clues on its formation process, by utilizing models of network formation which yield
distinct predictions for the resulting networks. Thus, the final network structure
allows to some extent to discriminate between different models in terms of the like-
lihood with which they describe the true process through which the network was
formed.
The literature on network formation can be split up into two subcategories,
random and strategic network formation. Random network models can be traced
back to the seminal paper of Erdos and Renyi [1959], who study the properties of
networks in which each link between two nodes of a network is created randomly
and independently with a given probability. Even though the model is too stylized
to explain many features of real world networks, it has ever since served as the
foundation for most of the empirical network formation literature.
Strategic network formation models, which assume that link formation in a
network is not a random process but the outcome of utility maximization of two or
more nodes, have emerged more recently. Jackson and Wolinsky [1996] are often
cited as the starting point of this literature, who introduced widely used equilib-
rium concepts, such as pairwise stability, to study which networks can emerge in
equilibrium given the utility functions of the network members. The focus of this
literature is on the theoretical modelling on network formation, and the testing of
the predictions mostly utilizes again empirical models founded on random graph
theory. Given the focus of this paper on a novel empirical network dataset and
the estimation of several empirical network models on this data, the discussion of
theoretical models of network formation is largely skipped, and only touched upon
insofar as it helps guiding the application of empirical models on the new dataset.
See Jackson [2008] for a discussion of basic theoretical strategic network models.
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Basic random graph models are fitted to the data using simple network den-
sity values, and predictions of the model regarding clustering values and degree
distributions can then be compared against their empirical counterparts. The es-
timation of more complex models which are often used to test the predictions of
theoretical network models, and which can incorporate characteristics of individual
network nodes, are faced with more difficulties, and the literature is still rapidly
evolving. One strand of this literature regresses the existence of links on the node-
pair level on observable characteristics of the involved nodes (e.g. Fafchamps and
Gubert [2007a,b], or, more recently, Graham [2015b]). However, these studies as-
sume that link formation, conditional on observables, is still independent for each
pair of two nodes, thereby ruling out externalities in link formation, which are at the
heart of many strategic network models. To estimate network formation allowing
for externalities in link formation, researchers have used exponential random graph
models (ERGMs). The estimation of these models is technically sophisticated and
requires sampling from distributions over networks. Furthermore, the commonly
used sampling methods have recently been criticised for being unreliable (see Chan-
drasekhar [2015] for a recent discussion of ERGMs and other empirical network
models). Given both their technical complexity and the recent uncertainty about
their estimation, I will not estimate ERGMs in this paper.
A recent contribution to the estimation of network generation models under
the presence of link externalities by Chandrasekhar and Jackson [2014] are sub-
graph models (SUGMs). These models combine the ability of ERGMs to capture
arbitrary levels of link externalities with the easy estimateability of node-pair level
regressions. They assume that not only pairs of nodes can decide whether or not to
form links between them, but groups of nodes of arbitrary size can agree to form
specific sub-graphs among them, such as cliques (complete connection among all
nodes in the group) or stars (all nodes in the group are connected to one node
among them). By assuming a model in which groups of certain sizes can form
certain subgraphs, these models allow estimating parameters of network formation
models which can reproduce models that exhibit high levels of dependency of link
formation. Section five will estimate a simple expositional SUGMs model based on
Chandrasekhar [2015], using the line chief network data.
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4.3 Description of Line Chief Network Data
This section introduces the line chief network data in more detail. The directed
graphs of the six networks on the factory-year level are shown in Appendix E. In
the graphs, the different colours of the rectangular nodes indicate line chiefs work-
ing on different sewing floors, and the thickness of the links that connect the nodes
represents the number of different dimensions on which a connection was reported
by one line chief to another. The networks are all directed, which means that the
existence of a link from line chief i to line chief j does not imply the existence of
a link from j to i. Especially if network data is only available from a sample of
the target population, directed links are transformed into undirected links in many
empirical studies, by assuming a link in both directions between nodes i and j as
long as reported by at least one of the nodes (Banerjee et al. [2013], Chandrasekhar
et al. [2014]). The subsequent analysis, however, always works directly with the
directed network data, unless explicitly stated otherwise, as some analysis is only
possible with, or yields results that are better interpretable, when using undirected
network data. In these cases, the network is transformed into an undirected network
as described above, by assuming a link in both directions between two line chiefs as
long as reported by at least one of them.
In total, 620 directed links have been reported across the 227 line chief sur-
veys, of which 278, or 44.8% were reciprocated by the other line chief. This ratio
seems to be broadly in line with other empirical network studies. For example, in the
network among Harvard students from Leider et al. [2009], 36.6% of all links were
reciprocated, while Feeley et al. [2008] report a reciprocity rate of 30% in a social
network among fast-food employees. If we assume a directed link from one line chief
to another as long as at least one of the two line chiefs has reported a link in either
direction, we would therefore have 962 such directed links, or 481 non-directed links
between two line chiefs.
4.3.1 Degrees
As a first description of the networks, Table 4.2 shows the average out-degree, the
number of links a line chief reports to other line chiefs, for the six different net-
works on the factory-year level. It distinguishes between links to line chiefs from
all sewing floors in the factory (column 1), and only from the same floor (column
2). On average, five (Factory 2 and 3) to ten (Factory 1 and 4) line chiefs work on
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Table 4.2: Average Out-Degree of Line Chiefs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Weighted Weighted
Fact. Year Out-Degr. Out-Degr. Out-Degr. Out-Degr. N #Flrs
Same Fl. Same Fl.,
1 2013 2.28 2.07 4.58 3.88 57 6
1 2014 2.81 2.77 4.38 4.28 53 6
2 2013 3.75 2.31 6.81 4.19 16 4
2 2014 4 2.73 6.87 4.67 15 3
3 2014 2.15 1.87 3.72 3.18 60 14
4 2014 3.54 3.23 5.54 4.81 26 3
All 2.73 2.37 4.72 3.97 228 36
Notes: Table shows for each network on the factory-year level average out-degree of
a line chief, when considering links to all other line chiefs in the factory (column 1
& 3), and to all line chiefs on the same floor (column 2 & 4). Column 3 & 4 use
weighted outdegrees, where weighted links mean that a link reported from one line
chief to another is multiplied by the number of dimensions it is reported on (visited
home, lunch breaks, friendship,...).
the same sewing floor, which are roughly equally sized within factories (see nodes of
same colour in network graphs in Appendix E). Furthermore, while column 1 and
2 show the average number of links reported on at least one dimension, column 3
and 4 show the average number after weighing links by the number of dimensions
they are reported on. A link reported on only one dimension has weight 1, a link
reported on two dimensions has weight 2, and so on. Essentially, in the weighted
links degree measure, a link reported to another line chief on one dimension, e.g.
spending lunch-breaks together, is counted as a separate link from one reported to
the same line chief on another dimension, e.g. ‘being friends’.
On average, line chiefs report links to 2.73 other line chiefs in the factory, of
which on average 2.37 are reported to line chiefs from the same floor. This shows
that social ties are heavily concentrated within floors. When looking at weighted
links, line chiefs report on average 4.72 links, which implies that the average link is
reported on 4.72 / 2.73 = 1.73 dimensions, while ties to the same unit are reported
on average on 1.67 dimensions. At no factory and year are ties to the same unit
reported on average on more dimensions than ties to other units. Thus, while being
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reported more rarely, conditional on being reported, ties to other units are reported
on slightly more dimensions. This could be indicative of ties to line chiefs on other
floors being underreported relative to those from the same unit. It could be that
line chiefs from the same floors were more salient in the mind of line chiefs, when
being asked about ties to fellow line chiefs. Therefore, also relatively weaker ties to
line chiefs from the same floor were reported, while ties to line chiefs on other floors
had to be of a higher minimum strength to be reported.7
Table 4.3 below shows how many ties were reported on average by the line
chiefs on the six different dimension, again separately between ties to all line chiefs,
and those from the same floor. The number of kinship ties seems negligible, which
indicates that the hiring process in these factories is not characterized by current
workers referring family member for jobs if the factories look for additional workers
(though Heath [2015] argues that many jobs in the Bangladeshi garment industry
are filled through factories asking experienced workers to refer acquaintances from
their home villages to them, in case positions need to be filled). Also only a minority
of workers report ties to co-workers in the factories which they knew already before
working at the factory. Most ties are reported on the dimensions of spending lunch
breaks together, and simply regarding each other as ‘friends’.
The top row of Figure 4.1 below shows the out-degree distribution among all
line chiefs in the six networks. The degree distribution is of prime importance in
network research, as its shape constrains many higher order network characteristics
(Faust [2007]), and as it is an important statistic for fitting random network models
to empirical data. The left-hand side graph shows the non-weighted distribution
(each link has the same weight, regardless of the number of dimensions the link
was reported on), while the right-hand side graph shows the distribution with links
weighted by number of dimensions on which they are reported. Both empirical dis-
tributions seems to loosely follow a power distribution, which is a common feature of
empirical network data (Jackson [2008]). I will return to fitting statistical distribu-
tions to the network data in the next section, when I discuss random graph network
formation processes in the context of my data. The bottom row of Figure 4.1, on
the other hand, shows the distribution of node’s in-degree, the number of directed
links to the line chief reported by other line chiefs. These distributions seem to be
7In the surveys, line chiefs were asked, dimension by dimension, first ”to which other line chiefs
from the same floor are you connected on dimension X”, and then”to which line chiefs from other
floors are you connected on this dimension”. The interviews were usually conducted in separate
rooms just off the sewing floors where the line chiefs worked.
87
Table 4.3: Reported Social Ties on Individual Dimen-
sions
(1) (2)
Dimension Out-Degree Out-Degree, Same Floor
Kinship 0.02 0.004
Knew Before 0.37 0.26
Worked Together 0.16 0.13
Visited 0.96 0.83
Lunch 1.33 1.15
Friends 1.88 1.58
All 4.72 3.97
Notes: Table shows average number of links reported to other line
chiefs on the six individual dimensions asked. Column 2 shows
average number of ties reported on these dimensions to other line
chiefs located on same sewing floor.
closer to Poisson-distributions, especially the one of unweighted in-degrees, another
often observed distribution of degrees in empirical networks. There are also notably
less line chiefs with in-degree zero than with out-degree zero. This is also reflected
in the lower standard deviation of in-degree, 1.86, compared to 2.53 for out-degree
(using unweighted degrees). 44 of the 227 line chiefs do not report any ties to other
line chiefs but nevertheless do receive ties from others, while there are only 16 line
chiefs who report ties but do not have any incoming ties. Thus, while line chiefs
vary more in the propensity to form, or report, links, the links they report seem to
be directed more evenly across line chiefs.
Table 4.4 below tests whether observable line chief characteristics correlate
with (unweighted) out- and in-degree, by regressing the degrees on line chief observ-
ables and factory-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the line chief
level (recall that 42 line chiefs at Factory 1 and 2 were interviewed twice in 2013
and ’14). When using out-degree, gender shows a significant effect. The two female
line chiefs report more ties. Furthermore, older line chiefs report slightly less ties.
Given that degree is a count variable, column 2 repeats column 1 using a Poisson
regression model. In this regression, only the effect of gender remains, while the
effect of age vanishes. With in-degree, gender flips its sign, now exhibiting a highly
negative effect. Much less ties are reported to the two female line chiefs, even though
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Figure 4.1: Degree Distribution of Line Chiefs
Graph shows empirical distribution of out-degree of all line chiefs across all factories
in top row, unweighted (left graph), and weighted (right graph). Bottow row shows
in-degree distribution accross all factories, unweighted and weighted. Weighted links
mean that a link reported from one line chief to another is multiplied by the number
of dimensions it is reported on (visitied home, lunch breaks, friendship,...).
they themselves report more ties than their male peers. There might be a culturally
rooted tendency in this male dominated group of line chiefs to either not form, or
not report social ties to female co-workers. Furthermore, seniority as line chief, as
represented by years already working as line chief in the factory, has a positive effect
on in-degree. When using a Poisson regression model, seniority in the factory, the
time one has already worked on any position in the factory, shows a slight addi-
tional positive effect. There might be a status effect from being socially connected
to senior line chiefs, and thus social ties to them are more eagerly seeked or reported.
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Table 4.4: Predictors of Out- and In-degree of Line Chiefs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Poisson Poisson
VARIABLES Out-Degree Out-Degree In-Degree In-Degree
Age -0.062* -0.024 0.002 -0.001
(0.037) (0.014) (0.023) (0.008)
Gender 1.142** 0.349** -2.948*** -14.573***
(0.518) (0.173) (0.342) (0.735)
Seniority in Fact. 0.057 0.020 0.117 0.042*
(0.100) (0.033) (0.085) (0.024)
Seniority as LC 0.035 0.016 0.192** 0.063**
(0.122) (0.041) (0.095) (0.028)
Started this Position -0.120 -0.035 0.015 0.033
(0.549) (0.195) (0.350) (0.118)
Education 0.009 0.005 0.029 0.017
(0.074) (0.027) (0.048) (0.017)
Constant 2.711 1.037 3.894*** 14.792***
(1.816) (0.660) (1.066) (0.836)
Observations 216 216 216 216
R2 0.084 0.323
Factory FE YES YES YES YES
Notes: Table shows results from regressing out- and in-degree of line chiefs on
observable line chief characteristics, and factory-year fixed effects. Column 2 and
4 use a Poisson regression model. Robust standard errors clustered on line chief
level in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
4.3.2 Core-Periphery Structure
The finding that seniority has a positive effect on in-degree points towards the ex-
istence of a core-periphery structure of the network, as can be found in many other
empirical networks. The concept of core-periphery structures in social networks ar-
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guably takes a more prominent role in organizational and business studies, which
often found this pattern in social networks within organizations, than in economics.
In within-organization networks, membership in the core group often comes with a
high social status, derived from seniority or high productivity (Burt [2000]; Fuchs
[1995]), which fits with positive correlation of in-degree and seniority in the line
chief data. Cummings and Cross [2003] found some evidence that a more pro-
nounced core-periphery network structure was associated with lower performance of
work teams.
In its simplest form, a core-periphery structure is a partition of all nodes
in a network into two groups (core and periphery), with nodes from both groups
preferring to have links with nodes from one group (the core) (e.g. Persitz [2009]).
This definition is met by the line chief network data, when splitting the line chiefs in
two groups of above and below median seniority, in terms of time a line chief already
worked on this position, within each factory-year network. The following Table 4.5
shows which shares of possible links within these two groups, and across these two
groups are reported. The highest share of links is found within the group of senior
line chiefs. Below median seniority line chiefs are more likely to report ties to above
median seniority line chiefs than to other below median seniority line chiefs, with
the difference being statistically significant on the 1% level. Senior line chiefs are
as likely to report ties to junior line chiefs as junior line chiefs are among them-
selves, but also more likely to report ties to other senior line chiefs. Thus we have
a typical core-periphery structure with a more connected core of more senior line
chiefs, and a periphery which is more connected to the core than among itself. This
pattern also holds when defining the core as the group of line chiefs with seniority
above the 66th percentile or above the 75th percentile, as shown in Table 4.5 as well.
4.3.3 Persistence of Links over time
I can check how persistently ties are reported over time within the subset of line
chiefs which were interviewed twice at Factory 1 and 2, in 2013 and 2014. In 2013,
72 directed ties were reported within this subset of 42 line chiefs. In 2014, 37 of
these ties were reported again, or 51%. This ratio masks some heterogeneity across
the two factories, with the ratio being 39% at Factory 1, and 94% at Factory 2. Note
that the lower percentage from Factory 1 does not necessarily imply a low persis-
tence across the survey years. 35 out of the 42 line chiefs interviewed at both years
are from Factory 1. This implies that there are 35*(35-1) = 1190 possible directed
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Table 4.5: Core-Periphery Pattern
MEDIAN To below To above
median Sen. LC median Sen. LC
From below median Sen. LC 0.047 0.065
From above median Sen. LC 0.048 0.078
66 PERCENTILE To below To above
66 pctl. Sen. LC 66 pctl. Sen. LC
From below 66 pctl. Sen. LC 0.053 0.069
From above 66 pctl. Sen. LC 0.047 0.085
75 PERCENTILE To below To above
75 pctl. Sen. LC 75 pctl. Sen. LC
From below 75 pctl. Sen. LC 0.053 0.070
From above 75 pctl. Sen. LC 0.052 0.104
Notes: Table shows likelihood of a line chief below or above median seniority
to report a link to another below or above median seniority line chief. Second
and third panel of table show numbers when considering line chiefs above and
below 66’th and 75’th percentile of seniority. Seniority is measured in years
line chief already works in factory as line chief.
links within these 35 line chiefs from Factory 1 per survey round. In the second
survey round from 2014, these line chiefs from Factory 1 reported 70 directed links
among themselves. Had there been no persistence across the two survey rounds in
terms of reported links, the probability that a link that had already been reported
in 2013 would be reported again in 2014 would have been the same as if the 70
links would have been allocated randomly (without replacement) among the 1190
possible links. Thus any given link would have been reported with probability 0.061.
However, the fact that links that were reported in 2013 were reported again in 2014
with probability 0.393 shows that there is indeed significant persistence in reported
links over time. I am not aware of other studies which attempted to measure the
persistence of reported social networks, against which the results from this network
can be compared against.8
8Burt [2000] reports high decay in business relationships, defined by bankers doing business deals
among each other, with 90% of relationships gone after four years.
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4.3.4 Density, Diameter and Component Structure
The density of a network is simply the share of all possible links in the network that
are reported. Define gij ∈ {1, 0} as the element on the ith row and jth column of
the adjency matrix of a network g, taking value 1 if a link exists from node i to
node j, and zero otherwise. For directed networks, the density of a network g is
thus defined as:
density(g) =
∑
j 6=i gij
n(n− 1) (4.1)
Most empirical networks exhibit low density, or ’sparsity’ (Chandrasekhar [2015]).
More precisely, a ‘sparse’ network is defined as a network whose density goes to zero
if its size n, the number of nodes it contains, goes to infinity. Networks are sparse as
long as the average degree of a node increases less than proportionally as n grows.
Most empirical networks show a pattern in which average degree stays constant as
n goes to infinity, which could be due to nodes having a capacity to maintain only
a limited number of ties. Therefore, these networks are sparse.
The density of the line chief network is on average 0.059 across the six sub-
networks, varying between 0.036 at Factory 3 and 0.286 at Factory 2 in 2014, as
shown in column 1 of Table 4.6. Interestingly, the rank of the six sub-networks
when it comes to their density fits exactly with their inverse rank when it comes
to their size; the smallest network (Factory 2, 2014) has the highest density, while
the largest network (Factory 3) has the lowest. Thus, also the network generation
process underlying these networks is likely to be one in which degrees increase less
than proportionally with network size, therefore generating sparse networks.
While many real world networks exhibit low density, they often have at the
same time a low diameter and low average path lengths. Define as path a connec-
tion between two nodes along other nodes in the network which only follows existing
links, and which does not uses the same link twice. Define the distance between two
nodes as the number of links one has to follow on the shortest path between the
two nodes. Diameter refers to the longest distance between any two nodes in the
network. Diameter thus refers to the maximum number of links one has to follow in
order to reach any node in the network from any other node. Average path length,
on the other hand, refers to the average shortest path lengths between all pairs of
nodes in the network. The observed prevalence of low average path lengths or diam-
eters in networks with low density has been dubbed the ‘small-world’ phenomenon
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(Milgram [1967]).
Diameter and average path length can easily be calculated also for directed
networks, whereby the directed distance between two nodes now is the smallest
number of links one has to follow in their defined direction to reach one node from
the other. However, diameter and average path lengths can only be calculated for
connected networks, in which each node can be reached from any other node by
following a series of links. The directed diameter for directed networks, accordingly,
can only be calculated for ‘strongly’ connected networks, in which each node can be
reached from any other node following links in the direction they are defined on. As
can be seen from the graphs in Appendix E, only the two networks from Factory
2 are connected, and no network is strongly connected. In case of non-connected
networks, the diameter is sometimes set to infinity. Alternatively, one could report
the diameter for the largest component of the network, which is the largest sub-set
of nodes in the network which are (strongly) connected. This is especially common
if the largest component is a ‘giant component’. Giant components are defined as
components which include more than n2/3 nodes of the network, and are the only
component in the network to do so (Jackson [2008]). Given this definition, those
four networks that are not connected do have giant components, at least for the
undirected network, as the size of the largest undirected component (column 5, Ta-
ble 4.6) is larger than n2/3 (column 7). However only three of the six networks have
a directed giant component (column 4 vs column 7). Columns 2 and 3 of Table 4.6
show the directed and undirected diameter of the largest component of the six sub-
networks on the factory-year level, which is relatively small compared to component
size, at least for the undirected networks.9
4.3.5 Clustering
Many empirical networks exhibit clustering, the existence of sub-groups of nodes
which have more links among them than would have been expected if all links in the
network were created randomly and independently. A common way of measuring
clustering in a network is by the overall clustering coefficient. It measures the share
among all instances in which a node i is connected to two other nodes j and k,
in which j is also connected to k. More formally, for undirected network data, let
gij ∈ {1, 0} denote again whether there exists a link between node i and j. Then
9Note that the directed diameter can be shorter than the undirected diameter, when the largest
strongly connected component is smaller than the largest connected one for the undirected network.
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Table 4.6: Density, Diameter and Largest Components
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dir. Undir. Largest Largest
Fact. Year Density Diam. Diam. Dir. Comp. Und. Comp. N N2/3
1 ’13 0.040 7 8 11 47 57 14.8
1 ’14 0.054 7 7 13 29 53 14.1
2 ’13 0.250 4 4 11 16 16 6.4
2 ’14 0.286 4 3 13 15 15 6.08
3 ’14 0.036 7 10 9 45 60 15.3
4 ’14 0.142 7 5 18 21 26 8.8
All 0.058 220
Notes: Table shows for each network on the factory-year level its density, directed and
undirected diameter (col. 2 & 3), and size of the largest connected and strictly connected
component (col. 5 & 4).
the overall clustering coefficient can be expressed as:10
CU =
∑
i;j 6=i;k 6=i;j 6=k gijgikgjk∑
i;j 6=i;k 6=i gijgik
(4.2)
Column 1 of Table 4.7 below shows the clustering coefficient for the undirected ver-
sions of the six networks. If all links in a network would have been created randomly
and independently between any two nodes i and j with probability p, the clustering
coefficient itself would also be p. In the networks from the garment factories, 481
out of 5,294 possible undirected links were reported. Had the network been cre-
ated by such a random process, the ratio 481/5, 294 = 0.091 would be an estimate
for probability p, and therefore also for the clustering coefficient. However, as can
be seen from column 1 of Table 4.7, the empirical clustering coefficients from the
six networks are much higher, ranging between 0.40 and 0.73, thus indicating high
levels of clustering. They are also higher, but not out of range, compared to other
networks commonly used in the literature (compare the clustering coefficients for
various networks shown in Table 1 of Chandrasekhar (2015), which range from 0.17
10The overall clustering coefficient can be distinguished from what is sometimes referred to as the
average clustering coefficient, which is basically a node level clustering coefficient, with the average
taken over all nodes to obtain the final coefficient. For each node i, among all pairs of nodes j and
k that are both connected to node i, the share at which j and k are connected is taken to provide
a node-level clustering coefficient, which can then be averaged across. This value by construction
correlates strongly with the overall correlation coefficient, though the average clustering coefficient
gives a higher weight to nodes with low degree.
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Table 4.7: Clustering Coefficients
(1) (2)
Clustering Coef. Clustering Coef.
Factory Year Undirected Directed
1 2013 0.40 0.34
1 2014 0.64 0.56
2 2013 0.52 0.44
2 2014 0.56 0.45
3 2014 0.44 0.38
4 2014 0.73 0.56
All 0.52 0.46
Notes: Table shows for each network on the factory-year
level the undirected clustering coefficient as defined in equa-
tion 4.2, and the directed clustering coefficient as defined in
equation 4.2.
to 0.41). Note that the much higher propensity in the line chief network data to
report ties to line chiefs from the same floor, as opposed to line chiefs from other
floors, naturally induces a higher level of clustering.
A variation of the clustering coefficient for directed networks such as the line
chief network is the share among all cases in which a node i has a link to node j,
and node j a link to node k, in which i also has a directed link to node k. More
formally, this coefficient can be expressed as a slight variation of equation 4.2:
CU =
∑
i;j 6=i;k 6=i;j 6=k gijgjkgik∑
i;j 6=i;k 6=i gijgjk
(4.3)
Column 2 of Table 4.7 shows this directed clustering coefficient for the six networks,
and the average coefficient across the networks. These coefficients are somewhat
lower than the undirected ones, but are still much higher as what would have been
expected in the case of a completely random and independent network generation
process.11
11There are 10,588 directed links possible in the network data, of which 620 directed links have
been formed. The ratio of these two number, 0.059, would be the expected directed clustering
coefficient in case the network had been created by a process in which each node randomly and
independently forms a link to any other node j with probability p=0.059.
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This section has provided a detailed discussion of the Network Data, in-
cluding degree distribution, density, diameters of networks, clustering of links, and
persistence of reported links over time. The next two sections will discuss how these
network characteristics can be used to infer more about the possible network gener-
ation mechanism which lead to the emergence of the observed line chief networks.
4.4 Network Formation: Basic Random Graph Model
In this section, I will start applying basic random network formation models to the
line chief network data, to understand to what extent these models can generate the
observed levels of density and clustering, and the empirical degree distribution. I
will then, in the next section, turn to more complex models, which can incorporate
line chief characteristics, to understand if this methodology can add to the under-
standing of this process. Finally, given that from Factory 1 and 2, I have two rounds
of networks surveys, collected roughly one year apart, with a number of additional
line chiefs having joined the network in the meantime, I can go one step further
by observing the network formation process over time directly, thereby validating
or rejecting some results that came out of applying standard network formation
methodology.
4.4.1 The Erdos and Renyi [1959] Model
The canonical random network model was introduced by Erdos and Renyi [1959].
In its simplest static version, consider a network with n nodes, and links from node
i to j are formed with probability p, independently of links between nodes i and k.
The properties of random graphs are mostly studied in the limiting case if n goes to
infinity. In the canonical random graph model, it is assumed that the average degree
of a node stays constant as n goes to infinity, or np = C for n→∞. This network
formation process leads to a Poisson distribution for degrees di across nodes i:
f(di = k) =
(np)ke−np
k!
(4.4)
This model is most useful as a benchmark, which demonstrates that such a simple
random network fails to capture two key stylized facts observed with most empirical
networks, sparsity and relatively high clustering of links (Chandrasekhar [2015]).
Recall that sparse networks are defined as networks in which the average degree
increases less than proportionally with n as n goes to infinity. Thus, the canonical
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Table 4.8: Density and Clustering
(1) (2)
Factory Year Density: pˆ Clustering Coeff. n
1 2013 0.040 0.34 57
1 2014 0.054 0.56 53
2 2013 0.250 0.44 16
2 2014 0.286 0.45 15
3 2014 0.036 0.38 60
4 2014 0.142 0.56 26
All 0.058 0.46 220
Notes: Table compares for each network on the factory-year
level the empirircal network density against the empirical clus-
tering coefficient, as defined in equation 4.3.
random graph model, in which the average degree np stays constant as n goes to
infinity, creates sparse networks. However, while this model can generate the ob-
served low density of empirical networks by choosing an appropriate low value for
p, it cannot explain at the same time the high clustering of these networks. Static
random graphs have a clustering coefficient of p as well. Thus, assuming constant
degree, their clustering coefficient goes to zero as well as n goes to infinity.
We can use the empirical density pˆ of networks as an estimate for p when
fitting the canonical random graph model. Table 4.8 therefore compares the (di-
rected) clustering coefficient as predicted by this model, pˆ (column 1), against the
empirical clustering coefficient, as defined by equation 4.3 (column 2). The cluster-
ing coefficient as predicted by the fitted Erdos-Renyi model is consistently below
the empirical one, and by magnitudes so for all factories except Factory 2. Thus,
as with many empirical networks, the static random graph model cannot generate
both the observed levels of sparsity and clustering at the same time.
To test how well the predicted Poisson degree distribution matches the em-
pirical degree distribution, Figure 4.2 plots again the degree distribution, with the
fitted Poisson distribution plotted over the histograms. The left-hand graph in Fig-
ure 4.2 does so for the out-degree, the centre graph for the undirected degree, and
the right-hand graph for the in-degree, using the empirical density of the network
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Figure 4.2: Empirical Degree Distrubtions and Poisson Distribution
Figures show histograms of out-degree (left), undirected degree (center), and in-degree (right),
and fitted Poisson distributions as predicted by the random graph model from Erdos and Renyi
[1959]. Poisson distributions are fitted using the empirical density across all networks.
as estimate for p in equation 4.4. While the Poisson distribution seems to fit the
undirected and in-degree distribution reasonably well, it seems to be at odd with
the distribution of out-degree, which has many more nodes in the left, but also in
the right tail as predicted by the Poisson distribution.12 This is another commonly
observed conflict between the predictions of the canonical random graph model and
many empirical networks.
4.4.2 Growing Random Graph Models
To address the shortcoming of missing tails in the predicted degree distribution,
growing random graph models have been developed. In uniformly growing random
graph models, one additional node is ‘born’ at each time period t, and will, at the
time of its birth, form m links with the already existing nodes. It can be shown that
as t, and thus n, goes to infinity, the cumulative degree distribution will approach
a (variation of an) exponential distribution:
F (di < k) = 1− e
−k
m
+1 (4.5)
Note that this distribution does not depend on the time that has passed in the
network formation process. The expected share of nodes with degree smaller than
12Formal Pearson or likelihood chi-square tests reject the equivalence of all three degree distri-
butions with the fitted Poisson distributions on at least the 2% significance level. However, the
test might be too strict in rejecting equivalence of the distributions for the intention of Figure 4.2,
which is to show whether the empirical distribution fits qualitatively better with a Poisson degree
distribution, as predicted by the Erdos and Renyi (1959) model, or rather with exponential or
power distributions, as predicted by other network models.
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k will be constant as the formation process evolves. Note, furthermore, that, as
each node starts with m nodes at birth, the distribution function is only defined for
k ≥ m. The mean degree in this model is 2m (as each node brings m links into the
graph, and each link involves two nodes).
Uniformly growing random graph models have been extended to preferential
attachment models (Barabasi and Albert [1999]). Now each new born node does
not form m links with randomly chosen existing nodes, but to existing nodes with
a probability proportional to the degree of the existing nodes. With this network
formation process the expected degree distribution approaches a power distribution
as n goes to infinity:
F (di < k) = 1−m2k−2 (4.6)
As the number of links formed is still the same as in the uniform growing random
graph model, the mean degree of networks is still 2m. Figure 4.3 plots the same
degree distributions as shown already in Figure 4.2 against fitted exponential and
power distributions. The parameter m was approximated by the mean degree di-
vided by two, as predicted by these models. As both growing random graph models
do not predict any node with degree less than m, the exponential and power dis-
tributions are not defined for this range in Figure 4.3. For reference, the Poisson
distribution as predicted by the static random graph model is included again, the
same which was already included in Figure 4.2. For the undirected and in-degree
distribution, the exponential and power distribution do not seem to fit the empirical
distributions better than the Poisson distribution, which as the only one of the three
captures the left tail rather well. For the out-degree distribution, both the power,
and especially the exponential distribution seem to capture the right tail better than
the Poisson distribution. However, as they are not defined for degrees smaller than
m, they cannot be tested on how well they capture the left tail. However, if we
assume that the networks were indeed generated by a growing random graph pro-
cess, we could assume that the observed degrees of nodes lower than m are due to
underreporting of ties, and we could assume that in reality these nodes have degree
m. In this case, the histograms would be bunched at degree m, as shown by the
hollow bar in the graphs of Figure 4.3, and the bars to the left of the hollow bar
in each graph would disappear. This hypothetical distribution would be captured
better by the power or exponential distribution.13
13However, formal Pearson-chi square tests reject again equivalence of the empirical distributions
with the exponential or power distribution. However, the same qualification to this rejection as
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Figure 4.3: Empirical Degree Distributions and Exponential, Power, and
Poisson Distribution
Figures show histograms of out-degree (left), undirected degree (center), and in-degree (right),
and fitted Poisson, Exponential, and Power distributions, which are fitted using the empirical
density across all networks.
To conclude, the Poisson distribution does a decent job in capturing the
undirected degree distribution, and especially the in-degree distribution, and grow-
ing random graph models do not seem to add value in explaining these networks.
The out-degree distribution seems to be best captured by an exponential distribu-
tion, or at least its right tail. However, in uniformly growing random graph models,
the high-degree nodes are the longest existing nodes in the graph. But as shown
in Table 4.4, senior line chiefs do not report more out-going links, contradicting
a basic prediction of this models. Thus, growing random network models do not
seem to have explanatory power for the formation of the line chief network, at least
above and beyond static random graph models, which themselves do not capture
the out-degree distribution well.
4.4.3 ‘Meeting Friends’ Models
While standard growing random graph models can capture degree distributions with
fat tails, they do not generate higher clustering than static random graph models
stated in footnote 12 should apply. Apart from that, the hypothetical degree distribution would
obviously also have a higher mean degree, implying a higher value m (which is equal to mean degree
divided by two), which would affect the fitted exponential and power distributions again. As I do
not want to overemphasize the aspect of these bunched degree distribution, I left the non-adjusted
power- and exponential distribution in graph. The pictures do not qualitatively change with the
adjusted distributions, as the two distributions are simply shifted slightly upwards. The formal
rejection of equivalence of distributions from the Pearson chi square test would still hold. Graphs
with these distributions adjusted for higher m are available from the author.
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do. For n going to infinity, and with m constant over time, the clustering coefficient
goes to zero, just as for static random graph models. As n grows, the likelihood
that when matching randomly with m out of the n nodes, some of the m nodes are
connected among themselves goes to zero. It can be shown that this even holds in
case of preferential clustering, even though it is difficult (Jackson [2008]). To cap-
ture non-negligible clustering in a random graph framework, it has to be enriched
with more structure, as done in the ‘meeting friends’ model of Jackson and Rogers
[2007]. In this growing random network model, each new-born node forms again
m links to existing nodes. However, while mr of these links are formed through
random matching with existing links, the m − mr remaining links are formed to
randomly chosen neighbours of the mr nodes connected to in the first step. It turns
out that in this model it is easier to derive predictions for the degree distribution
when considering only directed links. In this case, the probability of a node i being
matched to a new born node only depends on the age of node i, not on the one
of its neighbours, as each node has the same number of outgoing links that could
go to node i. For directed networks, the predicted in-degree distribution is then
(out-degree being m for each node):
F (din < k) = 1−
(
mmr
m−mr
) mr
m−mr
(
din +
mmr
m−mr
) −mr
m−mr
(4.7)
This is an augmented power distribution. Given that, as already shown, the in-
degree distribution in the line chief network is well approximated by a Poisson
distribution, it will not be approximated well by the distribution derived from the
meeting-friends network. Figure 4.4 plots this distribution over the empirical in-
degree distribution to show the mismatch. Therefore, it does not appear that the
‘meeting friends’ class of random graph models can be used to explain first the ob-
served degree-distribution, and subsequently the high correlation coefficient of the
network.
4.4.4 Block Random Graph Models
The attempts so far to capture both the network density and clustering levels of the
line chief network with random graph models ignored the fact that ties are reported
disproportionally to line chiefs from the same floor, a tendency which automatically
increases clustering. We can incorporate floors in random graph models using block
models, which date back to Holland et al. (1983). In these models, all nodes in a
network are allocated to blocks B, a mutually exclusive and exhaustive partition of
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Figure 4.4: Degree Distributions in ‘Meeting Friends’
Model
Figures show histograms of in-degree, and the Power distributions
from the meeting friends model of Jackson and Rogers [2007] as shown
in equation 4.7, with m fitted with the empirical density of the net-
works, and mr = 0.95m.
the nodes. The probability that a link is formed between nodes i and j then depends
on the pair-block Brs which contains i and j, with pair-block Brs being the pair of
blocks Br and Bs, such that Br contains node i and Bs node j. Essentially, nodes
that are located in the same block have a distinct probability that ties are formed
between them (which itself can vary from block to block), compared to nodes that
are not in the same block (where the probability can also vary across the pairing of
two blocks that contains the nodes).
The concept of the blocks naturally lends itself to sewing floors in the line
chief network. I estimate a restricted version of the block model with the data from
the network, in which I only consider two different probabilities; probability pS for
a link being formed between two line chiefs from the same floor (regardless of which
floor), and probability pR for a link being formed between two line chiefs from dif-
ferent floors (regardless of the pair of floors). I estimate this restricted version to see
whether simply the within/across floor variation in network densities can account
for the observed levels of clustering. The probabilities of link formation in the block
model between two nodes in block r and s can be estimated by the pair-block den-
sity pˆrs, the density of the network in which each (potential) link connects a node
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from block r with a node from block s, whereby r = s or r 6= s. Table 4.9 shows the
estimated probabilities pˆS and pˆR for each factory-year network. Between 23% and
68% of all possible directed links within floors are reported in the networks, with
the average of 36% across the factories (column 1 – average weighted by number of
possible within-floor links per factory-year). For Factories 2 and 3, this estimate for
pS are now very close to the within-floor clustering coefficient, as shown in column 3,
while for Factory 1 it is half of the coefficient and roughly two-thirds for Factory 4.14
This is a marked improvement compared to Table 4.8, where the overall clustering
coefficient was ca. eight times as large as the overall density. Cross floor density
varies between essentially zero at Factory 2 in 2014 (only two links reported across
the six floors with 53 line chiefs) to 13% at Factory 2. This density is well in line
with cross-floor clustering at Factory 1, 2 (at least in 2013) and 4, while out of line
in Factory 3. However, the discrepancies between cross-floor density and clustering
at Factory 3 could be due to small sample bias.15 Therefore, it seems that static
block random graph models can capture both density and clustering of the line chief
networks well.
To conclude this section on basic random graph models, as in many empirical
settings, the basic random graph model due to Erds and Renyi (1959), and subse-
quent growing random graph models struggle to model both the observed density
and clustering at the same time. Also variations of the model explicitly designed
to reconcile sparsity and high clustering, such as the ‘meeting-friends’ model from
Jackson and Rogers (2007), do not provide a good fit, as their implied degree dis-
tribution is at odds with the empirical one. However, a simple block random graph
model gets close to reconciling observed network density and clustering.
This result contributes to a debate on the reasons for the ubiquitous high
levels of clustering observed in empirical networks. Is it due to homophily, meaning
that nodes of similar characteristics have a higher likelihood of forming links, thus
generating clusters among themselves? Or is it due to network externalities, such
that links which are part of a cluster yield higher utility? For example, friendship
with another node could be more enjoyable if one shares third friends with this
14Within floor clustering coefficient refers to the directed clustering coefficient, as defined in
equation 4.3, on the network that ignores any pairs of nodes which are not on the same floor.
15At Factory 3, only 17 out of 3,314 possible cross floor links were reported, and there are only
three instance in which one directed cross-floor link can be followed by another cross-floor link from
that node to a third node on yet another floor. In one of these three cases, however, (see graph
of Factory 3 in the Appendix E), the first node does also have a direct node to the third node,
resulting in a directed clustering coefficient of 0.33.
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Table 4.9: Block-Random Graph Models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
pˆS pˆR Clustering Clustering
Factory Year (within flrs.) (across flrs.) within flrs. across flrs.
1 2013 0.231 0.004 0.414 0.000
1 2014 0.334 0.001 0.577 0.000
2 2013 0.617 0.128 0.590 0.093
2 2014 0.683 0.127 0.622 0.226
3 2014 0.496 0.005 0.461 0.330
4 2014 0.412 0.018 0.649 0.000
All 0.359 0.009 0.516 0.126
Notes: Table compares for each network on the factory-year level the empirical
(directed) network density within floors (pˆS) and across floors (pˆR) against the
empirical (directed) clustering coefficient as defined in equation 4.3, calculated
within and across floors
node. These two scenarios are empirically often difficult to discriminate (Graham
[2015a]). However, in the line chief network, in which we observe very high levels
of clustering, we do have a simple measure of homophily, line chiefs working on
the same floor. Once we allow for the possibility of differential likelihood of social
ties being formed within floors, static random graph models, which ignore network
externalities, explain the observed level of clustering. It could be that also in other
empirical networks with high clustering, if we had better information on underlying
group structures of nodes, a lot of variation in clustering could be captured by block
random graph models.
4.5 Network Formation: Heterogeneous nodes models
In the basic network model, all nodes are homogeneous in the sense that links form
with equal probability between two nodes. Growing random graph models already
introduced heterogeneity in terms of ‘age’ and degree of nodes which affect the like-
lihood of them forming links with other nodes, while block random graph models
assign nodes to certain groups with the probability of links forming between two
nodes depending on each’s group. However, more recent models allow for much
richer heterogeneity on the level of individual nodes i, by incorporating observable
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node characteristic vectors xi.
One early generation of these models came in form of dyad-level regressions,
in which a dummy for whether a link exists between two nodes was regressed on
absolute and relative values of the elements in the vectors xi of the pair of nodes
(Fafchamps and Gubert [2007a,b]; Comola [2012]; Graham [2015b]). For the sake
of estimateability, this literature ignores externalities of link formation, which is at
the heart of many strategic network models. It assumes that the utility a nodes i
derives from a link with node j is separable from the existence of any other links
node i or j have. This still leaves open the question of correlation of errors within
and across nodes. As unobserved characteristics of nodes that form links are likely
correlated, so too would be their errors. One way this literature addresses this
problem is by clustering standard errors on social distance of nodes (Fafchamps and
Gubert [2007a,b]).
A recent extension of the early dyad level-models are Sub-Graph Models
(SUGMs, Chandrasekhar and Jackson [2014]). These models assume that nodes
cannot only agree to form bilateral links, but any kind of sub-graphs, such as trian-
gles or cliques of any other number of nodes which are fully connected among each
other. In an expositional version of the model, Chandrasekhar (2015) assumes that
in a first step, all possible triplets of nodes i, j, and k meet and decide whether to
form a triangle among them (that is, three links ij, jk, and ik), depending on the
node characteristics, both in absolute terms as in relative terms to each other. In
a second step, all not-yet connected pairs of two links meet, and decide whether to
form bilateral links (also referred to as ‘unsupported’ links). The explicit introduc-
tion of triangles or higher-order sub-graphs allows the model to capture arbitrary
levels of clustering in otherwise sparse networks. The estimation of the model is
straightforward in a regression framework if the network is sufficiently sparse, as
in this case the number of ‘incidental’ triangles, which were not formed explicitly
as triangles but by a combination of otherwise formed triangles and bilateral links
tends to zero as the number of nodes goes to infinity. Thus, they do not bias the
estimates of the parameters which govern triangle and unsupported link formation.
Chandrasekhar and Jackson [2014] show that the sparsity condition holds if every
node in the network participates in at most o(
√
n) unsupported links and o(
√
n)
triangles, which is fulfilled by most empirical networks.
Table 4.10 below shows the results when estimating simple dyad-level and
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Sub-Graph Models from the line chief networks. Columns 1 and 2 show the results
from the dyad-level model, where the sample consists of all directed pairs of nodes
i and j in the networks, and the dependent variable is a dummy whether a directed
link runs from node i to node j. The econometric model estimated in column 1 and
2 of Table 4.10, estimated using logit regression, is:
linkijf = α+ β
S(xif + xjf ) + β
D(xif − xjf ) + βlγijf + δf + ijf (4.8)
In this model linkijf stands for a link from node i to node j in factory f , xi is a vec-
tor of observable characteristics of node i, γijf represents relationship characteristics
of the two variables, such as whether they are on the same floor, and δf are factory
fixed effects, while ijf is an independent random term. Covariates of node i and j
need to enter dyadic regressions in a symmetric way, which, with directed network
data, is achieved best by assuming one coefficient for the sum of xi and xj , and one
for the difference between them (Fafchamps and Gubert [2007a]). In principle, node
level fixed effects δif can be added as well, as each node is part of 2(n− 1) directed
dyadic relationships. However, Graham [2015b] shows that in this case, the variance
of the estimator is inflated relative to standard asymptotic confidence intervals, and
needs to be adjusted. Therefore, in this demonstration of the model, node fixed
effects are not included. I cluster standard errors on social distance, with a distance
cut-off of one link. This means that I allow arbitrary correlation of the residual from
the observation of link i to j with the residuals of all dyad-level observations which
include either node i or j.16
Column 1 from Table 4.10 shows the results when estimating equation 4.8
using the data from all six networks on the factory-year level, and using all node
pairs within a factory-year as observations. The results do not show any effect of
the four included line chief characteristics age, seniority as line chief, seniority in
factory, and education. Only a dummy for working in the same floor has a strongly
positive effect, in line with prior results.
The formation of links within floors might have different determinants than
those across floors. Given that the large majority of links are formed within floors,
it might be instructive to only look at the determinants of links within floors, which
is done in column 2, Table 4.10. As all node pairs in the sample are now located on
the same floor, the same-floor dummy is dropped. In this specification, the sums
16I implement this clustering approach in STATA using the ‘ngreg’ command from Marcel
Fafchamps homepage: http://web.stanford.edu/ fafchamp/resources.html
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of seniority as line chiefs has a positive effect on link formation, while the differ-
ence has a negative one. This implies that, within floors, links are disproportionally
formed from more junior to more senior line chiefs in terms of years the line chief
already works on this position in the factory, and is in line with the results from
Table 4.4 which show that these senior line chiefs has a higher in-degree but not
higher out-degree.
Columns 3-6 show the results of estimating the sub-graph model with trian-
gles first and then remaining node pairs. While dyad-level regression models can
be readily estimated using either directed or undirected network data, it is easier
to estimate this sub-graph models using undirected network data, as it is more
straight-forward to determine whether an undirected link is part of an undirected
triangle. Thus, columns 3-6 work with the undirected network again. Following
Chandrasekhar [2015], column 3 shows the results from the first step of estimating
the sub-graph model, a logit regression using the sample of all 90,521 possible undi-
rected triangles between node i, j, and k within the six networks, of a dummy trijkf
for a triangle being formed on the characteristics of line chief i, j, and k:
trijkf = α+ β
S(xif + xjf + xkf ) + β
D(|xif − xjf |+ |xif − xkf |+ |xjf − xkf |)
+ βTγijkf + δf + ijf (4.9)
While βS is again a vector of coefficients for the sum of the covariates, now
across all three nodes involved in a link, βD is a measure for the role of homophily
in link formation, the often observed tendency of nodes to form links with nodes
of similar characteristics. A negative sign for βD would indicate homophily. Using
the absolute value of the differences of node characteristics ensures that the node
characteristics are included in the necessary symmetric way when using undirected
network data. The term γijkf now captures triangle level characteristics, such as
whether all three nodes are on the same floor, while, again, factory fixed effects are
included. However, looking at the results from column 3, there is no evidence for
homophily in this network. Again, there is a tendency for more senior line chiefs
to form triangles, but, if anything, diversity in seniority increases the likelihood a
triangle is filled. Furthermore, as usual, nodes from the same floor have a strongly
increased likelihood to form triangles. Column 4 repeats the regression from column
3, while restricting again the sample to all possible triangles within the same floor.
While the pattern for seniority as line chiefs holds in this sample as well, a similar
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Table 4.10: Dyadic Regression Model and Sub-Graph Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MODEL Dyad-Regression S u b-G r a p h - M o d e l
VARIABLES Link Link Triangle Triangle Rem. Link Rem. Link
Diff. Age -0.018 -0.013
(0.011) (0.012)
Diff. Sen.ity as LC -0.049 -0.076**
(0.040) (0.038)
Diff. Sen.ity in Fact. -0.039 -0.028
(0.028) (0.023)
Diff. Education -0.008 0.008
(0.026) (0.029)
Sum Age -0.020 -0.016 -0.015 -0.015 0.000 0.049
(0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.019) (0.030) (0.044)
Sum Sen.ity as LC 0.069 0.106** 0.070* 0.077* -0.028 -0.048
(0.046) (0.049) (0.041) (0.045) (0.069) (0.100)
Sum Sen.ity in Fact. 0.040 0.004 0.008 -0.024 0.033 -0.048
(0.034) (0.033) (0.027) (0.028) (0.043) (0.052)
Sum Education 0.018 0.022 0.035 0.066* 0.005 0.000
(0.029) (0.030) (0.038) (0.038) (0.085) (0.132)
Hom. Age -0.005 0.007 0.037 0.062
(0.013) (0.014) (0.043) (0.065)
Hom. Sen.ity as LC 0.056* 0.068** 0.146* 0.294*
(0.031) (0.084) (0.153)
Hom. Sen.ity in Fact. -0.009 0.021 -0.084* -0.032
(0.021) (0.020) (0.047) (0.093)
Hom. Education 0.025 0.053* -0.079 0.034
(0.031) (0.072) (0.090)
Same Floor 4.496*** 7.122*** 3.00***
(0.239) (0.426) (0.380)
Constant -5.704*** -1.466 -10.83*** -5.488** -5.610* -5.633
(1.219) (1.267) (2.345) (2.296) (3.117) (4.347)
Observations 9,540 1,366 76,930 1,547 4,265 332
Factory FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Column 1 and 2 show results of regressing a dummy for the existence of a link on the node-
pair level on the sums and the differences of observable characteristics of the pair of line chiefs.
Column 2 does so only for pairs of line chiefs on the same floor. Columns 3 and 4 regress the
existence of a triangle of links between three nodes on the sum, and the sum of the three absolute
differences of the characteristics in each of the three pairs involved in the triplet (see equation 4.9).
‘Sen.ity as LC’ measures months line chief works already as line chief in factory, and ‘Sen.ity in Fact’
month line chief works on any position in factory. Education is IPA Bangladesh specific ordinal
measure of educational attainment. Robust Standard Errors in Column 1 and 2 clustered on social
distance, distance cut-off one link: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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pattern now also emerges for education. More educated line chiefs have a higher
likelihood to be part of triangles, which however involves also taste for diversity in
education when forming triangles.17
Column 5-6 represent the second step in the estimation of this simple triangle-
dyad subgraph model. Using the sample of all remaining node-pairs which are not
part of an actual triangle in the network, a logit regression of the following empirical
model is run:
linkijf = α+ β
S(xif + xjf ) + β
D(|xif − xjf |)|+ γijf + δf + ijf (4.10)
This model resembles the dyad-regression model shown in equation 4.8, but
adapted for undirected network data, and estimated now using only the sample of
pair-nodes which are not part of a triangle. The coefficient vector βD now again
measures the effect of homophily on bilateral link formation. The regressions reveal
again a slight ‘heterophily’ in terms of seniority both when estimated on the overall
sample of remaining node pairs (column 5) or only using within floor pairs (column
6). However, in the overall sample, also homophily with respect to seniority in the
factory becomes visible.
4.6 Actual Network Formation
To conclude the discussion on network formation, I can make use of the fact that I
have two rounds of survey data available from Factory 1 and 2, conducted roughly
one year apart from each other. This allows me to study how those line chiefs that
newly joined the ranks of line chiefs between the two survey rounds formed ties with
both the existing as well as the other newly joined line chiefs. The outcome of this
analysis can then be compared against the assumptions of network formation mod-
els, or their results when estimating these models, which attempt to infer the past
network formation process from ‘snap-shots’ of network data at a given point in time.
In principle, as the network data includes for each line chief the months he
or she already worked in the factory and as line chief, one could simply study which
ties those line chiefs report that joined the ranks of the line chiefs recently. To
some extent, this is already done by the analysis shown in Table 4.10, which showed
17Education is strongly negatively correlated with seniority in factory, somewhat positively cor-
related with seniority as line chief, and uncorrelated with age.
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that less senior line chiefs who have joined recently have a tendency to report links
to line chiefs that already worked longer on this position. The availability of two
rounds of network data, however, allows to specifically extend the analysis to study
whether newly joined line chiefs preferentially form ties with existing line chiefs
that already have many ties. This is, for example, the central assumption from
preferential attachment random graph models, as discussed above. However, when
regressing a dummy for a link between two line chiefs on the degrees of the involved
line chiefs, the degrees would be mechanically correlated with the dependent vari-
able. We could not disentangle whether the link was formed to the line chief because
he had a high degree, or because of some innate characteristics that made the line
chief more popular to form links with at that point in time. Therefore, I instead use
lagged in-degree of the line chief from the previous survey from 2013 as independent
variable, to test whether newly joined line chiefs by 2014 preferentially form links
to line chiefs who had a high degree in 2013. Section 3 has shown persistence of ties
reported across the two survey rounds, and the correlation coefficient of in-degree
in 2013 and 2014 is 0.52.
Table 4.11 shows the results when studying the determinants of links formed
by the ‘new’ line chiefs. It thus only uses data from the second survey from 2014
from Factory 1 and 2, in which 26 line chiefs were interviewed that were not inter-
viewed the year before. Table 4.11 focuses on the links that these 26 new line chiefs
reported, both with line chiefs that were already interviewed the previous year, and
with the other new line chiefs. In column 1, Table 4.11, I estimate a dyad-level
regression model as shown in equation 4.8, using the sample of directed pairs of line
chiefs i to j, in which i is a new line chief, and j can be any other line chief. Column
1 is the baseline model, regressing a dummy for reported links by new line chiefs to
other line chiefs on a dummy for whether the other line chief was already a line chief
last year, whether he or she works on the same sewing floor, and on the sum and
differences in the four main line chief observable characteristics. While, as usual,
working on the same unit has a strongly positive effect on link formation, there is
no significant effect of forming links with line chiefs that were already present in the
previous survey round. Instead there seems to be a strong tendency to form links to
older line chiefs. This is somewhat at odd with the results from the previous table
which showed a preference to form links to more senior line chiefs, but not older
line chiefs. While this difference could be driven by the restriction of this sample to
Factory 1 and 2, it could also be that, while new line chiefs have a desire to form
ties to more senior line chiefs, they cannot readily find out the seniority, or social
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‘status’, of all line chiefs in the factory. Instead, they use age as a more readily
observable proxy for status to form initial ties.
Column 2 regresses link formation on the central variables of interest, in- and
out-degree of line chiefs from the previous survey in 2013 at the factories. It thus
restricts the sample to pairs of line chiefs in which one line chiefs has not been a line
chief in the factory in the previous survey while the other has been. There seems to
be indeed a tendency to form ties to line chiefs that had a higher in-degree in 2013.
This effect is not explained by the inclusion of the line chief observables again in
column 3, which, if anything, slightly strengthens the result (p-value of in-degree:
0.050). The central assumption of preferential attachment network models seems
to be confirmed in this data, even though the model’s predicted degree distribution
did not fit with the empirical one from the line chief network. Out-degree in 2013,
on the other hand, has no effect on link formation. The effect of differential age on
link formation remains unchanged compared to column 1.
Finally columns 4 and 5 repeat column 2 and 3, but now regressing not a
dummy for a new line chief reporting a link to an existing one, but instead an ex-
isting one reporting a link to a new line chief, on the observable characteristics of
both line chiefs. Neither in- nor out-degree of the existing line chief in 2013 has an
effect on whether a tie is reported to a new line chief. What does show an effect is
seniority as line chief; less senior existing line chiefs are more likely to report link to
new line chiefs than more senior ones.
4.7 Degree as Predictor for Turnover
To conclude this chapter, the fact that two rounds of surveys are available from Fac-
tory 1 and 2 will also be used to study whether the number of ties a line chief has
in the first round predicts whether the line chief will still be present at the factory
in the survey one year later. Relating turnover behaviour of employees to network
centrality measures has been done by a number of studies in organizational research
(Feeley and Barnett [1997]; Feeley et al. [2008]; Mossholder et al. [2005]). Inter-
estingly, these studies have produced to some extent conflicting results on which
measure of centrality matters for predicting turnover of workers. While in Mossh-
older et al. [2005]’s dataset in-degree of a worker is significantly negatively correlated
with subsequently leaving the organization, in Feeley et al. [2008] out-degree is, while
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Table 4.11: Actual Network Formation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Out-Link Out-Link Out-Link In-Link In-Link
Existing LC 0.161
(0.493)
Same Floor 4.761*** 4.194*** 5.153***
(0.656) (0.648) (0.749)
In-Degree ’13 0.179* 0.197* -0.132 -0.128
(0.097) (0.101) (0.113) (0.202)
Out-Degree ’13 0.036 0.026 -0.013 -0.043
(0.068) (0.081) (0.100) (0.129)
SUM Age -0.084*** -0.125*** -0.031
(0.030) (0.046) (0.040)
SUM Seniority as LC 0.236 0.258 -0.247*
(0.256) (0.249) (0.132)
SUM Seniority in Fact. -0.050 -0.087 0.058
(0.126) (0.141) (0.068)
SUM Education -0.137 0.010 -0.025
(0.134) (0.137) (0.098)
DIFF. Age -0.088*** -0.125*** 0.011
(0.030) (0.040) (0.041)
DIFF. Senior. as LC 0.085 0.141 0.291**
(0.217) (0.238) (0.146)
DIFF. Senior. in Fact. -0.173 -0.137 0.042
(0.130) (0.145) (0.076)
DIFF. Education -0.186 -0.180 -0.091
(0.121) (0.130) (0.128)
Constant 2.986 -5.310*** 0.446 -0.964** 2.856
(4.839) (0.631) (5.667) (0.418) (4.494)
Observations 904 686 608 117 105
Factory-YEar FE YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Column 1 regresses a dummy on whether a line chief, who was not present in the
2013 survey, reports a social tie to another line chief on the sum and difference of his or her
characteristic and those of the other. Column 2 and 3 include lagged degree from the 2013
survey from the other line chiefs, thereby restricting the sample on possible links reported
by new line chiefs to those which were already present in the survey from the previous year.
Column 4 and 5 regress a dummy for a tie reported by a line chief who was already present
in the 2013 survey to a line chief who was not on sum and differences of the line chief
characteristics. Regressions control for factory-year fixed effect. Robust standard errors
clustered at level of line chief reporting tie in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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in-degree is not (Feeley and Barnett [1997] use degree in an undirected network).
Therefore, the line chief data from Bangladesh could add valuable additional evi-
dence from workers with a different cultural and socio-economic background. While
in-degree could capture the status of a member of a network, and thus the resources
he or she could muster to deal with difficulties on the job, out-degree could capture
the engagement of a person with his organization.
Table 4.12 below shows the results when regressing, among the sample of
line chiefs interviewed in Factories 1 and 2 in 2013, a dummy of whether the line
chief is still present in the 2014 survey on his or her out- and in-degree in 2013, and
on several other observable line chief characteristics. In line with Mossholder et al.
[2005], but not with Feeley et al. [2008], I find that in-degree is negatively corre-
lated with turnover, but not out-degree, after controlling for all available line chief
observables and factory fixed effects. This effect becomes especially strong when
using weighted in-degree, in which an incoming link is weighted by the number of
different dimensions it is reported on (spending lunch break together, visited home,
friendship,...). Also undirected degree is not significantly related with turnover.
This speaks in favour of the hypothesis that it is specifically the ‘social resources’
one has in the factory that matter more for the decision to stay or leave than one’s
social engagement with the organization.
4.8 Conclusion
This chapter has introduced a novel social network dataset among line supervisors
from four Bangladeshi garment factories. It has tested and estimated several net-
work formation models, to understand which class of these models could provide
most insight into the formation process of these networks. Two main results remain
from this analysis. First, static block-random network models do a good job in
capturing both the observed levels of density and clustering of the network data,
something that both the canonical random graph models from Erdos and Renyi
[1959], as well as growing random graph models, often struggle to achieve. Second,
as common in work-place social networks, the network exhibits a core-periphery pat-
tern, with more senior line chiefs forming the core, and more junior line chief having
a preference to form ties to the line chiefs in the core as compared to other line chiefs.
Especially the availability of two rounds of network surveys from two of the
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four factories in the study allows the derivation of some additional results. First,
there is significant persistence of ties being reported across one year. 51% of ties
being reported in 2013 are reported again in 2014. Had ties in 2014 been formed
randomly and independently from ties in 2013, only 7.5% of ties from 2013 should
have been reported again by chance in 2014. There is very little evidence so far in
the literature on persistence of reported social connections. Second, we could see
that in-degree of line chiefs in 2013 had predictive power on whether newly joined
line chiefs in the 2014 survey report social ties to those line chiefs already present
in the survey from 2013. This confirms a central assumption from preferential at-
tachment random network models. Finally, in-degree, but not out-degree of a node
is positively correlated with still working at the factory one year later, which is
additional evidence for the empirical literature on turnover in organizational stud-
ies, which so far has found conflicting evidence on which kind of network position
measure matters for predicting worker turnover.
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Table 4.12: Degree and Turnover Likelihood
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Weighted Deg. Weighted Deg.
VARIABLES Stay Stay Stay Stay
Out-Degree 0.020 -0.024
(0.072) (0.030)
In-Degree 0.268* 0.124**
(0.159) (0.061)
Undir. Degree 0.130 0.014
(0.087) (0.023)
Seniority as LC -0.213 -0.198 -0.148 -0.106
(0.178) (0.165) (0.146) (0.138)
Seniority in Fact. 0.116 0.123 0.114 0.108
(0.118) (0.115) (0.104) (0.100)
Age 0.051 0.046 0.061 0.055
(0.047) (0.048) (0.046) (0.046)
Education 0.111* 0.109* 0.103 0.107*
(0.065) (0.064) (0.065) (0.063)
Started as LC 0.024 0.015 0.159 0.221
(0.551) (0.545) (0.515) (0.505)
Constant -3.511* -3.156* -3.872** -3.556*
(1.855) (1.871) (1.871) (1.829)
Observations 67 67 67 67
Factory FE YES YES YES YES
Notes: Table shows results when regressing among all line chiefs surveyed in
2013 in Factory 1 and 2 a dummy on whether he or she is still present at the
factory one year later on his or her out-degree and in-degree (columns 1 & 2), or
undirected degree (column 3 & 4) in 2013, and all other observables. ‘Seniority
as LC’ measures month line chief worked as line chief in factory, and ‘Seniority in
Fact’ months working on any position in factory. Education is IPA Bangladesh
specific ordinal variable of educational attainment. Regressions control for factory
FE. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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Appendix A
Description: Operator Training
Project, Phase 1
A.1 Project Design
The first phase of the project began in November 2011. The training program was
designed with the goal of increasing the number of female supervisors in factories,
and GIZ expressed a preference that we train only female operators as part of the
project. Recognizing the value of having some comparison sample of male operators,
we agreed with GIZ to train four females and one male from each of the participat-
ing factories. We began contacting potential factories, with a letter of introduction
from a large UK-based buyer, in August 2011. The first training session began in
November 2011. After six rounds of training, we stepped back in January 2013 to
assess the design.
Our aim was to select a sample of factories capable of selling directly to large
international buyers. We obtained an initial sample using data from transaction-
level trade data obtained from the Bangladeshi National Bureau of Revenue. These
data provide volume (net weight) and value of exports at the shipment level. The
data have identifiers which allow data from individual exporters to be aggregated.
We aggregated data by exporter and calculated the unit value (U.S.$ per kilogram)
for each exporter / product / year. We also summed total exports by exporter. Us-
ing these two measures, we selected a sample of firms with annual shipment volumes
large enough to sell directly to large foreign buyers, with unit values in the range of
mid-level buyers. This selection process yielded an initial sample of 665 exporters.
We then selected the group of around 20 suppliers to one particular mid-range buyer
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based in the UK. For each of the 665 exporters on the initial list, we created a score
based on export volume and unit values indicating how close the exporter was to
the 20 suppliers of the initial UK-based buyer. We selected around 400 exporters,
and searched local directories and the internet for contact information. This yielded
a sample of 230 factories, which we began contacting in August 2011.
By November 2011, after contacting about 200 of the factories on the list,
we had received an initial commitment to participate in the project from 96 units
of 85 distinct factories. Table A1.1 shows how the characteristics of the 85 facto-
ries differ from the initial list. The table shows both a comparison characteristic
by characteristic, and the p-values from a probit regression including several of the
characteristics. We find that that those factories agreeing to participate sell to more
buyers, and sell to higher-end buyers. The quality of buyers is measured by the av-
erage unit price paid by each buyer. For each seller, we then ordered the buyers by
unit price, and measured the unit value paid by the buyer at the 90th percentile in
the ranking. We also find some evidence that the participating factories had higher
rates of recent growth and export products to a larger number of countries.
Participating factories were randomly placed into one of eight treatment
rounds of 12 factories each. In practice we allowed factories to defer participation
to a later round once, and in the end, several factories decided not to participate.
By December 2012, when training round 6 began, we had exhausted the initial list
of 96 factories. Note that all of the comparisons we will make with trainees control
for factory fixed effects, so we view the factory-level attrition issue as mainly one of
external, but not internal, validity. During the second round of the program, discus-
sions with the local office of the International Finance Corporation led to inclusion
of seven factories located in the Dhaka EPZ in the project. These factories were
added in training rounds 4 and 5.
Table A.1 shows characteristics of the factories participating in rounds 1-6.
The factories are large, averaging 19 production lines and 2,100 workers. Somewhat
more than half of the employees in a typical factory work in the sewing section.
The distributions are slightly right-skewed, with the median factory having 15 pro-
duction lines, with 2,000 workers in total, of which 59% are in the sewing section.
A typical factory had been operating for 12 years. Given the rapid growth of the
sector, this is very likely older than the industry average.
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Table A.1: Take-Up of the Program
Signed-Up Not Signed-Up p-value p-value
N = 85 N = 145 Probit
Size (Export, 1000 Kgs) 830.4 683.8 0.11 0.44
Average Unit Value (per Kg) 925.9 883.8 0.15 0.01
Growth (Sales 2010 to 2009)* 1.89 1.46 0.08 –
Number of Destinations 10.1 8.3 0.09 0.18
Number of Buyers 9.75 8.3 0.06 0.02
Number of Products 3.01 2.91 0.32 0.31
Main Product in Woven 0.59 0.54 0.26 –
Year of first export 2006 2006.2 0.2 –
Median Buyer 560 631 0.18 0.44
90th Pcntile Buyer 183.6 283 0.03 0.01
Notes: * On a sample of 80 and 135 exporters respectively.
A.2 Selection of Trainees
Our aim was to select from each factory four female and one male operator for
training, and a valid comparison group against which to measure the trainees. The
details of selecting workers evolved a bit across training rounds, as we describe be-
low, but in all rounds the process started with factories selecting a pool of potential
trainees to which we administered a diagnostic test. The test was based on one
designed by GIZ to measure literacy, a requirement for the training, and technical
knowledge. We also gave the potential trainees a short non-verbal reasoning test
and asked them questions about aspirations to work as a line supervisor. Because
women were sometimes forbidden to participate in the training by their families, we
also asked the potential trainees if their families would allow and support them to
attend the training. Potential trainees were excluded if they did not pass the liter-
acy test or said their families would not allow them to participate in the training.
For training rounds 1 to 3, we asked the factories to identify 16 female and 4
male operators who were good candidates for the training. We ranked the nominees
according to their diagnostic score and then selected the two females with top marks
on the diagnostic test as trainees. We then assigned a random number to the female
trainees ranked 3rd to 6th on the diagnostic test, and assigned the two with the
highest random numbers to training, and the two with the lowest random numbers
to control. Among the males, we followed a similar procedure by taking the males
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with the top two marks and randomly assigning one to treatment and one to control.
In round 4, we modified the selection process to allow the factory to choose
two females they wanted to send to training, conditional only on them demonstrat-
ing a basic level of literacy. We then took the top four females after excluding the
two selected by the factory and randomly selected two for treatment and two for
control. We also altered the method of replacing trainees when the selected individ-
uals declined to participate.
In round 5, we modified the process further by reducing the number of op-
erators the factory identified as candidates to eight females and four males. The
factory then selected two of the eight females for training; the remaining two females
and the male were selected randomly in the same manner as the previous rounds.
We further modified the method for selecting “replacement” trainees, as described
below.
There was a non-trivial amount of noncompliance. Over the six rounds, 50
workers assigned to training did not attend at all, and an additional eight attended
for less than one full week. Factories most often reported that these workers ei-
ther had decided they did not want to attend, or their families had said they could
not attend. However, the family was most likely to intervene in the case of fe-
male trainees, while we note that the percentage of non-complying males assigned
to training (21.2 percent) was higher than the percentage of non-complying females
assigned to training (15.2 percent).1 These non-compliers were replaced by 40 work-
ers receiving training even though they were not assigned to training including 19
workers assigned as controls. Thus, non-compliance is a concern in the Phase I data
when we compare the outcomes of those assigned to treatment against the controls.
As with the selection of trainees, the protocol for selecting replacements also
evolved over the training rounds. In training round 1, the factories chose the replace-
ments themselves, as we had not anticipated the severity of this non-compliance.
Beginning in round 2, we insisted that the factory send the next female or male
on the diagnostic ranking if a selected trainee declined to attend. Then, beginning
in round 5, we altered the initial selection process to add a third female control –
selecting 2 of the females ranked 3 to 7 by diagnostic score – and a second male
1We interpret this as suggesting that factories cared more about which males received training
than they did about which females received training, perhaps because they did not plan to promote
all of the females.
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control – selecting one of the males in the top three diagnostic scores as the trainee.
Replacements were then selected at random from among the controls.
Over the first six training rounds, 271 operators (213 females and 58 males)
received training. We exclude from this total eight workers who attended for five
days or fewer. Conditional on attending at least one week, attendance was very
high. Out of the 36 training days, males attended 34.4 days on average and females
34.5 days. All but two of the men attended at least four of the six training weeks,
as did 96 percent of the women.
After the sixth training round, we decided to suspend the training temporar-
ily. Having already gathered a substantial amount of data and information, we felt
we would gain by analysing those data and perhaps adjusting the design for the re-
maining factories. We resumed the training with the start of Phase 2 of the project
in February 2014, which’s details are described in the main body of the paper.
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Appendix B
Production Data: Description
and Collection
As part of both Phase 1 and 2 of the project, we collected daily production data
from all factories on the sewing line level. The data is similar in its format and
organization across the two project rounds. However, in Phase 1 of the project
we collected data in a two week interval every other month, while in Phase 2 we
collected data for each day between January 2014 and March 2015. Given the con-
tinuity and greater amount of data, we base the analysis in the main part of the
paper on the data from Phase 2, which we describe in more detail in this appendix.
We collected the data with three main outcome variables in mind: line-level
productivity, the quality defect rate, and worker absenteeism. We asked factories
to share all internal data needed to construct these variables. The standard mea-
sure of productivity in the Bangladeshi garment industry is (piecewise output *
SMV)/(workers * daily hours * 60mins), where SMV is the Standard Minute Value
of the garment being produced. The SMV is the time industrial engineers estimate a
fully efficient production line would take to produce one unit of the garment. When
estimated to a common standard, the SMV thus allows us to compare the efficiency
of production of different products – e.g., the efficiency of a line producing a tank
top with an SMV of six minutes can be compared with the efficiency of a line pro-
ducing a dress shirt with an SMV of 18 minutes.
We asked the factories to provide productivity records for each sewing line
and day detailing on daily output, the number of defective units, the SMV of the
garment being produced, the number of hours each line operated, and daily number
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of workers present and absent on the line. Not all factories record information on
all of the variables. In some instances, the factories record data, but declined to
provide it for certain outputs. For example, one factory declined to provide SMV
data, and a few others do not have industrial engineering departments, and hence do
not estimate SMVs by product. For other variables, there are sometimes differences
in the specific data the factories record, though often these differences are not con-
sequential. For example, for defects, we sometimes received defect rates (defective
units / output) and sometimes the number of defective garments. Records on ab-
senteeism would sometimes contain information on the numbers of workers assigned
to the line, allowing to standardize the absenteeism numbers. At factories where
this information was not included, we instead standardized the number of absent
workers by the number of present workers provided in the productivity data.
In almost all factories, the three types of data (on productivity, defects, and
absenteeism) was provided by different departments within the factories (usually
the production, quality, and HR departments), and thus came in different formats,
which required to enter the data separately and subsequently merge them to one
document. Likewise, in most factories, the data we requested was provided in a digi-
tal format, usually a spreadsheet maintained by the factories, which allowed for easy
collection and entering. At some factories, however, data was provided as copies of
paper files, requiring the data be digitised. Ultimately, though, we harmonise the
data so that variables are comparable across factories.
As we noted, the data from some factories did not contain the information
necessary to calculate all of the outcomes of interest. This is especially the case for
efficiency, where our standard calculation relies on the availability of the SMV data.
Some of the factories that do not measure SMV have other data which can be used
to estimate a roughly equivalent measure of efficiency. For example, four factories
in the Phase 2 sample have information on daily targets for their sewing lines. By
assuming that the targets are set such that line efficiency would be 100%, we can
back out a ‘synthetic SMV’ by setting Daily Target * SMV = workers * daily hours
* 60mins.1
1Factories from which both SMV and targets are available show that targets are usually not set
such that efficiency, in case the target is met, is 100%. Rather, efficiency in these cases would be
around 50%, which is in line with the typical average efficiency in almost all Bangladeshi garment
factories. Thus, the ‘synthetic SMVs’ which we back out using targets are likely to overstate actual
SMVs by a factor of two. And indeed, efficiency values at those factories where we use ‘synthetic
SMVs’ are on average twice as high as in the other factories (93% vs 47%). However, note that all
analysis we conduct with the production data uses factory fixed effects, therefore relying only on
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Table B.1: Production Data Availability
Outcome variable Nbr. Factories
Productivity 14
Productivity, excluding synthetic SMV 10
Defects rate 16
Absenteeism 10
Productivity + Defects + Absenteeism 7
Productivity (excl. synth. SMV) + Defects + Absenteeism 4
Total Nbr. Factories with some Prod. Data 17
Notes: Table shows for how many factories participating in Phase 2, usable daily data on
line-wise productivity, defects rates, and absenteeism could be collected.
From 17 of the 19 factories remaining in the project throughout, we were able
to collect data for at least one of our three outcome variables of interest; productiv-
ity, defects, and absenteeism. Table B.1 shows from how many of these 17 factories
we could collect enough data to construct each of the three variables, and for how
many we could construct all three. While the availability of defects data is most
widespread, productivity data is reduced by a number of factories recording neither
SMVs nor targets. Finally, the availability of absenteeism data for our analysis is
limited by a number of factories recording only daily absenteeism numbers for the
whole factory (or sometimes the sewing floor), but not recording data on the sewing
lines on which workers are assigned.
within factory variation in productivity. Given that for each factory we use either only productivity
based on original or synthetic SMVs, the productivity data is consistent within each factory.
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Appendix C
Worker Movement
While sewing worker are allocated to fixed lines, they do at times switch lines on
a day-to-day basis to replace absent workers. With average daily absenteeism rates
in the sample factories non-negligible at 3-5%, there is scope that within these real-
locations, enough workers with relevant production knowledge on specific garments
are moved across lines to drive the observed increases in productivity when other
lines have already produced the same garment before. This would indicate that
productivity spill-overs to later lines producing the same garment are driven by
within-worker transfers of production knowledge across sewing lines, and not by
knowledge exchange across workers.
To test for the likelihood that indeed short term movements of workers ac-
count for the higher productivity if other lines have already produced the garment
before, a tentative test is conducted. If workers with experience on the garments are
reallocated across lines, the lines from which the workers are taken should experience
a negative effect on their productivity if they still produce the garment when further
lines start producing the garment as well, and workers are reallocated away to these
lines. Table C.1 below shows the results when regressing the daily efficiency of first
lines that produced a garment in the factory on line chief - garment-day fixed effects,
factory-week fixed effects, and on a dummy indicating that by that day, additional
lines (‘Additional Line’) have also started producing the same garment. The results
show that instead of a drop in productivity, if anything, the first line experiences
an increase in productivity when other lines also start producing the garment. The
source of these positive effects are not immediately clear. These effects could be
due to reverse knowledge spill-over from the additional lines back to the first line,
or due to other forms of peer effects, such as competition. However, these results
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are not in line with what could be expected if systematic movement of workers with
production experience on certain garments would cause the observed productivity
spill-over.
Table C.1: Worker Movement
VARIABLES Efficiency
Additional Line 3.249***
(0.838)
Constant 43.353***
(3.640)
Observations 18,749
R2 0.513
Factory-week FE YES
L.Chief-Grmt.Day FE YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix D
Application of DiNardo et al.
[1996]
The implementation of the reweighting approach of DiNardo et al. [1996] requires
the estimation of two probit models; first, of a dummy indicating whether a unit i
in the sample is selected for treatment (Ti = 1) on the unbalanced variable zi, and,
second, of a dummy indicating whether the unit is selected as control (Ti = 0) on zi.
The predicted probabilities P (T = 1|zi) for each unit i for being in the treatment
group, and P (T = 0|zi) for being in the control group conditional on the unbalanced
variable z, and the unconditional probabilities P (T = 1) and P (T = 0) of being
selected into treatment or control sample, respectively, are then used to calculate
weights wi for each unit i according to:
wi =
P (T = 0|zi)P (T = 1)
P (T = 1|zi)P (T = 0) (D.1)
To implement the approach, I first regress, on a sample of all sewing lines, a dummy
indicating that a sewing line is located on a floor selected for treatment, on the line’s
average efficiency on the first days it produced new garments that have already been
produced on other lines before, during the pre-intervention time April and May
2014, controlling for factory fixed effects. The predicted values of this regression
for each sewing line yield P (T = 1|zi) for calculating the weights wi, according to
equation D.1. Similarly, I also regress a dummy indicating that a line is located
on a control floor on its average first-day efficiency during April and May 2014, to
obtain P (T = 0|zi). I then reweight all observations from the treatment lines with
weight wi for the respective line (control units are not reweighted in this approach,
therefore weights wi for lines from control floors are set to 1).
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Appendix E
Network Graphs
The six subsequent graphs depict the six network datasets collected at the factory-
year level, two in 2013 and 2014 at Factory 1 and 2, respectively, and one collected at
Factory 3 and 4 in 2014, respectively. Nodes with same filling colour represent line
chiefs on the same floor. Thickness of links represents number of dimensions (visiting
at home, spending lunch breaks together, being friends,...) that connections were
reported on. Red frames of nodes represent line chiefs not surveyed due to being
absent on the survey day. All graphs show directed links; the link is mentioned by
the node which ‘touches’ the link, and to the node which does not touch the link.
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Factory 1, Year 2013
Factory 1, Year 2014
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Factory 2, Year 2013
Factory 2, Year 2014
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Factory 3 (Year 2014)
Factory 4 (Year 2014)
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